Moving charon to libcharon.
This commit is contained in:
Tobias Brunner
@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2008 Martin Willi
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* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
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* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
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* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
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* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
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* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
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* for more details.
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*/
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#include "keymat.h"
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#include <daemon.h>
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#include <crypto/prf_plus.h>
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typedef struct private_keymat_t private_keymat_t;
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/**
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* Private data of an keymat_t object.
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*/
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struct private_keymat_t {
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/**
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* Public keymat_t interface.
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*/
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keymat_t public;
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/**
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* IKE_SA Role, initiator or responder
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*/
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bool initiator;
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/**
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* inbound signer (verify)
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*/
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signer_t *signer_in;
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/**
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* outbound signer (sign)
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*/
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signer_t *signer_out;
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/**
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* inbound crypter (decrypt)
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*/
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crypter_t *crypter_in;
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/**
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* outbound crypter (encrypt)
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*/
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crypter_t *crypter_out;
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/**
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* General purpose PRF
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*/
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prf_t *prf;
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/**
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* Negotiated PRF algorithm
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*/
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pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
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/**
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* Key to derive key material from for CHILD_SAs, rekeying
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*/
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chunk_t skd;
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/**
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* Key to build outging authentication data (SKp)
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*/
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chunk_t skp_build;
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/**
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* Key to verify incoming authentication data (SKp)
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*/
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chunk_t skp_verify;
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};
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typedef struct keylen_entry_t keylen_entry_t;
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/**
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* Implicit key length for an algorithm
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*/
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struct keylen_entry_t {
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/** IKEv2 algorithm identifier */
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int algo;
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/** key length in bits */
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int len;
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};
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#define END_OF_LIST -1
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/**
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* Keylen for encryption algos
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*/
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keylen_entry_t keylen_enc[] = {
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{ENCR_DES, 64},
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{ENCR_3DES, 192},
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{END_OF_LIST, 0}
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};
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/**
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* Keylen for integrity algos
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*/
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keylen_entry_t keylen_int[] = {
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{AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, 128},
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{AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, 160},
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{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96, 256},
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{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, 256},
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{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192, 384},
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{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256, 512},
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{AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, 128},
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{END_OF_LIST, 0}
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};
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/**
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* Lookup key length of an algorithm
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*/
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static int lookup_keylen(keylen_entry_t *list, int algo)
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{
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while (list->algo != END_OF_LIST)
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{
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if (algo == list->algo)
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{
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return list->len;
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}
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list++;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Implementation of keymat_t.create_dh
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*/
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static diffie_hellman_t* create_dh(private_keymat_t *this,
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diffie_hellman_group_t group)
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{
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return lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group);;
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}
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/**
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* Implementation of keymat_t.derive_keys
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*/
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static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
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diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
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chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
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pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function,
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chunk_t rekey_skd)
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{
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chunk_t skeyseed, key, secret, full_nonce, fixed_nonce, prf_plus_seed;
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chunk_t spi_i, spi_r;
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crypter_t *crypter_i, *crypter_r;
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signer_t *signer_i, *signer_r;
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prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
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u_int16_t alg, key_size;
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prf_t *rekey_prf = NULL;
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spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
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spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
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if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
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{
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* Create SAs general purpose PRF first, we may use it here */
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if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, &alg, NULL))
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
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transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION);
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return FALSE;
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}
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this->prf_alg = alg;
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this->prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, alg);
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if (this->prf == NULL)
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!",
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transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION,
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pseudo_random_function_names, alg);
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return FALSE;
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}
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "shared Diffie Hellman secret %B", &secret);
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/* full nonce is used as seed for PRF+ ... */
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full_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r);
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/* but the PRF may need a fixed key which only uses the first bytes of
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* the nonces. */
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switch (alg)
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{
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case PRF_AES128_XCBC:
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/* while rfc4434 defines variable keys for AES-XCBC, rfc3664 does
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* not and therefore fixed key semantics apply to XCBC for key
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* derivation. */
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key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf)/2;
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nonce_i.len = min(nonce_i.len, key_size);
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nonce_r.len = min(nonce_r.len, key_size);
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break;
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default:
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/* all other algorithms use variable key length, full nonce */
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break;
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}
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fixed_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r);
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*((u_int64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
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*((u_int64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id);
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prf_plus_seed = chunk_cat("ccc", full_nonce, spi_i, spi_r);
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/* KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
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*
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* if we are rekeying, SKEYSEED is built on another way
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*/
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if (rekey_function == PRF_UNDEFINED) /* not rekeying */
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{
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/* SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir) */
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this->prf->set_key(this->prf, fixed_nonce);
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this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, secret, &skeyseed);
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this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skeyseed);
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prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, prf_plus_seed);
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}
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else
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{
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/* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr)
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* use OLD SAs PRF functions for both prf_plus and prf */
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rekey_prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, rekey_function);
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if (!rekey_prf)
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "PRF of old SA %N not supported!",
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pseudo_random_function_names, rekey_function);
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chunk_free(&full_nonce);
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chunk_free(&fixed_nonce);
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chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed);
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return FALSE;
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}
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secret = chunk_cat("mc", secret, full_nonce);
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rekey_prf->set_key(rekey_prf, rekey_skd);
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rekey_prf->allocate_bytes(rekey_prf, secret, &skeyseed);
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rekey_prf->set_key(rekey_prf, skeyseed);
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prf_plus = prf_plus_create(rekey_prf, prf_plus_seed);
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}
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYSEED %B", &skeyseed);
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chunk_clear(&skeyseed);
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chunk_clear(&secret);
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chunk_free(&full_nonce);
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chunk_free(&fixed_nonce);
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chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed);
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/* KEYMAT = SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr */
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/* SK_d is used for generating CHILD_SA key mat => store for later use */
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key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &this->skd);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_d secret %B", &this->skd);
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/* SK_ai/SK_ar used for integrity protection => signer_in/signer_out */
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if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &alg, NULL))
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
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transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
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return FALSE;
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}
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signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg);
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signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg);
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if (signer_i == NULL || signer_r == NULL)
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!",
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transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM,
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integrity_algorithm_names ,alg);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
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return FALSE;
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}
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key_size = signer_i->get_key_size(signer_i);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", &key);
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signer_i->set_key(signer_i, key);
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chunk_clear(&key);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", &key);
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signer_r->set_key(signer_r, key);
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chunk_clear(&key);
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if (this->initiator)
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{
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this->signer_in = signer_r;
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this->signer_out = signer_i;
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}
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else
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{
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this->signer_in = signer_i;
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this->signer_out = signer_r;
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}
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/* SK_ei/SK_er used for encryption => crypter_in/crypter_out */
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if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &alg, &key_size))
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
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transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
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return FALSE;
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}
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crypter_i = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8);
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crypter_r = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8);
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if (crypter_i == NULL || crypter_r == NULL)
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N (key size %d) not supported!",
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transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
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encryption_algorithm_names, alg, key_size);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
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return FALSE;
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}
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key_size = crypter_i->get_key_size(crypter_i);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &key);
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crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, key);
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chunk_clear(&key);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &key);
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crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, key);
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chunk_clear(&key);
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if (this->initiator)
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{
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this->crypter_in = crypter_r;
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this->crypter_out = crypter_i;
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}
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else
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{
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this->crypter_in = crypter_i;
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this->crypter_out = crypter_r;
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}
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/* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */
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key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &key);
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if (this->initiator)
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{
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this->skp_build = key;
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}
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else
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{
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this->skp_verify = key;
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}
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
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DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pr secret %B", &key);
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if (this->initiator)
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{
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this->skp_verify = key;
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}
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else
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{
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this->skp_build = key;
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}
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/* all done, prf_plus not needed anymore */
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
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return TRUE;
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}
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/**
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* Implementation of keymat_t.derive_child_keys
|
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*/
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static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
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proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
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chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
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chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
|
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chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
|
||||
{
|
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u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
|
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chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
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prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
|
||||
|
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if (dh)
|
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{
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if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
|
||||
{
|
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return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
|
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}
|
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seed = chunk_cata("mcc", secret, nonce_i, nonce_r);
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed);
|
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|
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if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
|
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&enc_alg, &enc_size))
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for encryption",
|
||||
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!enc_size)
|
||||
{
|
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enc_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_enc, enc_alg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (enc_alg != ENCR_NULL && !enc_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylength defined for %N",
|
||||
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* to bytes */
|
||||
enc_size /= 8;
|
||||
|
||||
/* CCM/GCM/CTR/GMAC needs additional bytes */
|
||||
switch (enc_alg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV8:
|
||||
case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV12:
|
||||
case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV16:
|
||||
case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV8:
|
||||
case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV12:
|
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case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV16:
|
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enc_size += 3;
|
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break;
|
||||
case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV8:
|
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case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV12:
|
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case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV16:
|
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case ENCR_AES_CTR:
|
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case ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC:
|
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enc_size += 4;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM,
|
||||
&int_alg, &int_size))
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for integrity",
|
||||
integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!int_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_int, int_alg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!int_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylength defined for %N",
|
||||
integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* to bytes */
|
||||
int_size /= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skd);
|
||||
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, seed);
|
||||
|
||||
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i);
|
||||
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i);
|
||||
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r);
|
||||
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r);
|
||||
|
||||
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
|
||||
|
||||
if (enc_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption initiator key %B", encr_i);
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption responder key %B", encr_r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (int_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity initiator key %B", integ_i);
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity responder key %B", integ_r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.get_skd
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static pseudo_random_function_t get_skd(private_keymat_t *this, chunk_t *skd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
*skd = this->skd;
|
||||
return this->prf_alg;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.get_signer
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static signer_t* get_signer(private_keymat_t *this, bool in)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return in ? this->signer_in : this->signer_out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.get_crypter
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static crypter_t* get_crypter(private_keymat_t *this, bool in)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return in ? this->crypter_in : this->crypter_out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.get_auth_octets
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static chunk_t get_auth_octets(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
|
||||
chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
|
||||
identification_t *id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
chunk_t chunk, idx, octets;
|
||||
chunk_t skp;
|
||||
|
||||
skp = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
|
||||
|
||||
chunk = chunk_alloca(4);
|
||||
memset(chunk.ptr, 0, chunk.len);
|
||||
chunk.ptr[0] = id->get_type(id);
|
||||
idx = chunk_cata("cc", chunk, id->get_encoding(id));
|
||||
|
||||
DBG3(DBG_IKE, "IDx' %B", &idx);
|
||||
DBG3(DBG_IKE, "SK_p %B", &skp);
|
||||
this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skp);
|
||||
this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, idx, &chunk);
|
||||
|
||||
octets = chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, chunk);
|
||||
DBG3(DBG_IKE, "octets = message + nonce + prf(Sk_px, IDx') %B", &octets);
|
||||
return octets;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Key pad for the AUTH method SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD "Key Pad for IKEv2"
|
||||
#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH 17
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.get_psk_sig
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
|
||||
chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret,
|
||||
identification_t *id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
chunk_t key_pad, key, sig, octets;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!secret.len)
|
||||
{ /* EAP uses SK_p if no MSK has been established */
|
||||
secret = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
|
||||
}
|
||||
octets = get_auth_octets(this, verify, ike_sa_init, nonce, id);
|
||||
/* AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>) */
|
||||
key_pad = chunk_create(IKEV2_KEY_PAD, IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH);
|
||||
this->prf->set_key(this->prf, secret);
|
||||
this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, key_pad, &key);
|
||||
this->prf->set_key(this->prf, key);
|
||||
this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, octets, &sig);
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "secret %B", &secret);
|
||||
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "prf(secret, keypad) %B", &key);
|
||||
DBG3(DBG_IKE, "AUTH = prf(prf(secret, keypad), octets) %B", &sig);
|
||||
chunk_free(&octets);
|
||||
chunk_free(&key);
|
||||
|
||||
return sig;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Implementation of keymat_t.destroy.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void destroy(private_keymat_t *this)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DESTROY_IF(this->signer_in);
|
||||
DESTROY_IF(this->signer_out);
|
||||
DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_in);
|
||||
DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_out);
|
||||
DESTROY_IF(this->prf);
|
||||
chunk_clear(&this->skd);
|
||||
chunk_clear(&this->skp_verify);
|
||||
chunk_clear(&this->skp_build);
|
||||
free(this);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* See header
|
||||
*/
|
||||
keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator)
|
||||
{
|
||||
private_keymat_t *this = malloc_thing(private_keymat_t);
|
||||
|
||||
this->public.create_dh = (diffie_hellman_t*(*)(keymat_t*, diffie_hellman_group_t group))create_dh;
|
||||
this->public.derive_ike_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id, pseudo_random_function_t,chunk_t))derive_ike_keys;
|
||||
this->public.derive_child_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r))derive_child_keys;
|
||||
this->public.get_skd = (pseudo_random_function_t(*)(keymat_t*, chunk_t *skd))get_skd;
|
||||
this->public.get_signer = (signer_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_signer;
|
||||
this->public.get_crypter = (crypter_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_crypter;
|
||||
this->public.get_auth_octets = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t *, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id))get_auth_octets;
|
||||
this->public.get_psk_sig = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t*, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id))get_psk_sig;
|
||||
this->public.destroy = (void(*)(keymat_t*))destroy;
|
||||
|
||||
this->initiator = initiator;
|
||||
|
||||
this->signer_in = NULL;
|
||||
this->signer_out = NULL;
|
||||
this->crypter_in = NULL;
|
||||
this->crypter_out = NULL;
|
||||
this->prf = NULL;
|
||||
this->prf_alg = PRF_UNDEFINED;
|
||||
this->skd = chunk_empty;
|
||||
this->skp_verify = chunk_empty;
|
||||
this->skp_build = chunk_empty;
|
||||
|
||||
return &this->public;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user