- import of strongswan-2.7.0

- applied patch for charon
2006-04-28 07:14:48 +00:00
parent 52923c9acb
commit 997358a6c4
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+.TH IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID 3 "25 March 2002"
+.\" RCSID $Id: keyblobtoid.3,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:26 as Exp $
+.SH NAME
+ipsec keyblobtoid, splitkeytoid \- generate key IDs from RSA keys
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B "#include <freeswan.h>
+.sp
+.B "size_t keyblobtoid(const unsigned char *blob,"
+.ti +1c
+.B "size_t bloblen, char *dst, size_t dstlen);"
+.br
+.B "size_t splitkeytoid(const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,"
+.ti +1c
+.B "const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, char *dst,
+.ti +1c
+.B "size_t dstlen);"
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.I Keyblobtoid
+and
+.I splitkeytoid
+generate
+key IDs
+from RSA keys,
+for use in messages and reporting,
+writing the result to
+.IR dst .
+A
+.I key ID
+is a short ASCII string identifying a key;
+currently it is just the first nine characters of the base64
+encoding of the RFC 2537/3110 ``byte blob'' representation of the key.
+(Beware that no finite key ID can be collision-proof:
+there is always some small chance of two random keys having the
+same ID.)
+.PP
+.I Keyblobtoid
+generates a key ID from a key which is already in the form of an
+RFC 2537/3110 binary key
+.I blob
+(encoded exponent length, exponent, modulus).
+.PP
+.I Splitkeytoid
+generates a key ID from a key given in the form of a separate
+(binary) exponent
+.I e
+and modulus
+.IR m .
+.PP
+The
+.I dstlen
+parameter of either
+specifies the size of the
+.I dst
+parameter;
+under no circumstances are more than
+.I dstlen
+bytes written to
+.IR dst .
+A result which will not fit is truncated.
+.I Dstlen
+can be zero, in which case
+.I dst
+need not be valid and no result is written,
+but the return value is unaffected;
+in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated.
+The
+.I freeswan.h
+header file defines a constant
+.B KEYID_BUF
+which is the size of a buffer large enough for worst-case results.
+.PP
+Both functions return
+.B 0
+for a failure, and otherwise
+always return the size of buffer which would 
+be needed to
+accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL;
+it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of
+the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred.
+.P
+With keys generated by
+.IR ipsec_rsasigkey (3),
+the first two base64 digits are always the same,
+and the third carries only about one bit of information.
+It's worse with keys using longer fixed exponents,
+e.g. the 24-bit exponent that's common in X.509 certificates.
+However, being able to relate key IDs to the full
+base64 text form of keys by eye is sufficiently useful that this
+waste of space seems justifiable.
+The choice of nine digits is a compromise between bulk and
+probability of collision.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+RFC 3110,
+\fIRSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)\fR,
+Eastlake, 2001
+(superseding the older but better-known RFC 2537).
+.SH DIAGNOSTICS
+Fatal errors are:
+key too short to supply enough bits to construct a complete key ID
+(almost certainly indicating a garbage key);
+exponent too long for its length to be representable.
+.SH HISTORY
+Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer.