- import of strongswan-2.7.0

- applied patch for charon
2006-04-28 07:14:48 +00:00
parent 52923c9acb
commit 997358a6c4
2043 changed files with 346842 additions and 0 deletions
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+.TH IPSEC_PRNG 3 "1 April 2002"
+.\" RCSID $Id: prng.3,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:26 as Exp $
+.SH NAME
+ipsec prng_init \- initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
+.br
+ipsec prng_bytes \- get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
+.br
+ipsec prng_final \- close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B "#include <freeswan.h>
+.sp
+.B "void prng_init(struct prng *prng,"
+.ti +1c
+.B "const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);"
+.br
+.B "void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,"
+.ti +1c
+.B "size_t dstlen);"
+.br
+.B "unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);"
+.br
+.B "void prng_final(struct prng *prng);"
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.I Prng_init
+initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key;
+.I prng_bytes
+obtains pseudo-random bytes from it;
+.I prng_count
+reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date;
+.I prng_final
+closes it down.
+It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it,
+and not to use it again after it is closed down.
+.PP
+.I Prng_init
+initializes,
+or re-initializes,
+the specified
+.I prng
+from the
+.IR key ,
+whose length is given by
+.IR keylen .
+The user must allocate the
+.B "struct prng"
+pointed to by
+.IR prng .
+There is no particular constraint on the length of the key,
+although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because
+only the first 256 would be used.
+Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations,
+independent of key length.
+.PP
+.I Prng_bytes
+obtains
+.I dstlen
+pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in
+.IR buf .
+This is quite fast,
+on the order of 10 integer operations per byte.
+.PP
+.I Prng_count
+reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG
+since it was (last) initialized.
+.PP
+.I Prng_final
+closes down a PRNG by
+zeroing its internal memory,
+obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output.
+This requires on the order of 250 integer operations.
+.PP
+The
+.B <freeswan.h>
+header file supplies the definition of the
+.B prng
+structure.
+Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change.
+.PP
+The PRNG algorithm
+used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM).
+This algorithm is cryptographically strong,
+sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will
+have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history,
+provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of
+highly random bytes (see
+.IR random (4)).
+The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators
+(e.g.
+.IR random (3))
+are
+.I not
+cryptographically strong.
+.PP
+The well-known attacks against RC4(TM),
+e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system,
+apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys
+(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key).
+If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes
+from each PRNG should be discarded,
+to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly.
+No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+random(3), random(4)
+.br
+Bruce Schneier,
+\fIApplied Cryptography\fR, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9,
+pp. 397-8.
+.SH HISTORY
+Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer.
+.SH BUGS
+If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes
+between initializations,
+the PRNG will continue to work but
+.IR prng_count 's
+output will stick at
+.BR 4000000000 .
+Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does
+not seem worth the trouble,
+since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway...
+.PP
+``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc.