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Use standard unsigned integer types

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This commit is contained in:
Andreas Steffen
2016-03-24 18:52:48 +01:00
parent b210369314
commit b12c53ce77
584 changed files with 3430 additions and 3430 deletions
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src/libcharon/sa/ikev1/keymat_v1.c
+24 -24
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ typedef struct private_keymat_v1_t private_keymat_v1_t;
*/
typedef struct {
/** message ID */
u_int32_t mid;
uint32_t mid;
/** current IV */
chunk_t iv;
/** last block of encrypted message */
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void iv_data_destroy(iv_data_t *this)
*/
typedef struct {
/** message ID */
u_int32_t mid;
uint32_t mid;
/** Ni_b (Nonce from first message) */
chunk_t n_i;
/** Nr_b (Nonce from second message) */
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static bool expand_skeyid_e(chunk_t skeyid_e, size_t key_size, prf_t *prf,
static aead_t *create_aead(proposal_t *proposal, prf_t *prf, chunk_t skeyid_e)
{
private_aead_t *this;
u_int16_t alg, key_size;
uint16_t alg, key_size;
crypter_t *crypter;
chunk_t ka;
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static aead_t *create_aead(proposal_t *proposal, prf_t *prf, chunk_t skeyid_e)
/**
* Converts integrity algorithm to PRF algorithm
*/
static u_int16_t auth_to_prf(u_int16_t alg)
static uint16_t auth_to_prf(uint16_t alg)
{
switch (alg)
{
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static u_int16_t auth_to_prf(u_int16_t alg)
/**
* Converts integrity algorithm to hash algorithm
*/
static u_int16_t auth_to_hash(u_int16_t alg)
static uint16_t auth_to_hash(uint16_t alg)
{
switch (alg)
{
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static u_int16_t auth_to_hash(u_int16_t alg)
/**
* Adjust the key length for PRF algorithms that expect a fixed key length.
*/
static void adjust_keylen(u_int16_t alg, chunk_t *key)
static void adjust_keylen(uint16_t alg, chunk_t *key)
{
switch (alg)
{
@@ -393,10 +393,10 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
{
chunk_t g_xy, g_xi, g_xr, dh_me, spi_i, spi_r, nonces, data, skeyid_e;
chunk_t skeyid;
u_int16_t alg;
uint16_t alg;
spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(uint64_t));
spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(uint64_t));
if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, &alg, NULL))
{ /* no PRF negotiated, use HMAC version of integrity algorithm instead */
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
}
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "shared Diffie Hellman secret %B", &g_xy);
*((u_int64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
*((u_int64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id);
*((uint64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
*((uint64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id);
nonces = chunk_cata("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r);
switch (auth)
@@ -585,11 +585,11 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
uint32_t spi_i, uint32_t spi_r, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
{
u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
u_int8_t protocol;
uint16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
uint8_t protocol;
prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
bool success = FALSE;
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ failure:
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, create_hasher, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal)
{
u_int16_t alg;
uint16_t alg;
if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &alg, NULL) ||
(alg = auth_to_hash(alg)) == HASH_UNKNOWN)
{
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, get_hash, bool,
ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id, chunk_t sa_i, chunk_t id, chunk_t *hash)
{
chunk_t data;
u_int64_t spi, spi_other;
uint64_t spi, spi_other;
/* HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, g^xi | g^xr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )
* HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, g^xr | g^xi | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b )
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ static chunk_t get_message_data(message_t *message, generator_t *generator)
{
payload_t *payload, *next;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
u_int32_t *lenpos;
uint32_t *lenpos;
if (message->is_encoded(message))
{ /* inbound, although the message is generated, we cannot access the
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static chunk_t get_message_data(message_t *message, generator_t *generator)
* Try to find data about a Quick Mode with the given message ID,
* if none is found, state is generated.
*/
static qm_data_t *lookup_quick_mode(private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid)
static qm_data_t *lookup_quick_mode(private_keymat_v1_t *this, uint32_t mid)
{
enumerator_t *enumerator;
qm_data_t *qm, *found = NULL;
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static qm_data_t *lookup_quick_mode(private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid)
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, get_hash_phase2, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, message_t *message, chunk_t *hash)
{
u_int32_t mid, mid_n;
uint32_t mid, mid_n;
chunk_t data = chunk_empty;
bool add_message = TRUE;
char *name = "Hash";
@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ static bool generate_iv(private_keymat_v1_t *this, iv_data_t *iv)
else
{
/* initial phase 2 IV = hash(last_phase1_block | mid) */
u_int32_t net;;
uint32_t net;;
chunk_t data;
net = htonl(iv->mid);
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ static bool generate_iv(private_keymat_v1_t *this, iv_data_t *iv)
/**
* Try to find an IV for the given message ID, if not found, generate it.
*/
static iv_data_t *lookup_iv(private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid)
static iv_data_t *lookup_iv(private_keymat_v1_t *this, uint32_t mid)
{
enumerator_t *enumerator;
iv_data_t *iv, *found = NULL;
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ static iv_data_t *lookup_iv(private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid)
}
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, get_iv, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t *out)
private_keymat_v1_t *this, uint32_t mid, chunk_t *out)
{
iv_data_t *iv;
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, get_iv, bool,
}
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, update_iv, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t last_block)
private_keymat_v1_t *this, uint32_t mid, chunk_t last_block)
{
iv_data_t *iv = lookup_iv(this, mid);
if (iv)
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, update_iv, bool,
}
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, confirm_iv, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid)
private_keymat_v1_t *this, uint32_t mid)
{
iv_data_t *iv = lookup_iv(this, mid);
if (iv)