Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell
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@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
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/*
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/*
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* creation of first CHILD SA:
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* creation of first CHILD SA:
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* no nonce and no ke contexts because the ones from the IKE SA are re-used
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* no nonce and no ke contexts because the ones from the IKE SA are reused
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*/
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*/
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nonce_loc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce_loc);
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nonce_loc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce_loc);
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if (nonce_loc_id == 0 && esa.ke_ids.size == 0)
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if (nonce_loc_id == 0 && esa.ke_ids.size == 0)
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# 2.6.0 #
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# 2.6.0 #
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- Allow pre-selecting a user certificate via alias in managed profiles
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- Allow preselecting a user certificate via alias in managed profiles
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- Allow selecting a user certificate for managed profiles that don't install their own certificate
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- Allow selecting a user certificate for managed profiles that don't install their own certificate
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- Fix reading split-tunneling settings in managed profiles
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- Fix reading split-tunneling settings in managed profiles
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- Adapt to edge-to-edge display, which becomes mandatory when targeting Android 16
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- Adapt to edge-to-edge display, which becomes mandatory when targeting Android 16
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@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Sub CA cert is trusted, valid until Aug 12 15:51:34 2027, 'myca-1.crt'
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.EE
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.EE
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.PP
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.PP
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.B NOTE:
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.B NOTE:
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The trusthworthiness of the root CA certificate is either verified automatically
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The trustworthiness of the root CA certificate is either verified automatically
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if the Root CA certificate of the TLS trust chain is the same as that of the
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if the Root CA certificate of the TLS trust chain is the same as that of the
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Issuing CA. Otherwise trust has to be established manually by verifying the SHA256
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Issuing CA. Otherwise trust has to be established manually by verifying the SHA256
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or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is e.g. listed on the
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or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is e.g. listed on the
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@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ RA cert "C=CH, O=strongSwan Project, CN=SCEP RA"
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RA cert is trusted, valid until Aug 10 15:51:34 2023, 'myra.crt'
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RA cert is trusted, valid until Aug 10 15:51:34 2023, 'myra.crt'
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.EE
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.EE
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.PP
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.PP
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The trusthworthiness of the root CA certificate has to be established manually by
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The trustworthiness of the root CA certificate has to be established manually by
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verifying the SHA256 or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is
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verifying the SHA256 or SHA1 fingerprint of the DER-encoded certificate that is
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e.g. listed on the official PKI website or by some other means.
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e.g. listed on the official PKI website or by some other means.
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.P
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.P
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@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ The latest feature is an
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.B Online Certificate Status Protocol
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.B Online Certificate Status Protocol
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(OCSP) responder as defined by RFC 6960, interoperating with an
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(OCSP) responder as defined by RFC 6960, interoperating with an
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.B OpenXPKI
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.B OpenXPKI
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server by directly accessing its internal certificate datebase.
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server by directly accessing its internal certificate database.
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.
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.
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.SH "COMMANDS"
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.SH "COMMANDS"
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.
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.
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