signature-params: Provide option for maximum RSA/PSS salt length

However, the length now has to be resolved early, so we don't operate on
the negative constant values e.g. when generating the encoding.
This commit is contained in:
Tobias Brunner
2018-10-26 09:03:26 +02:00
parent dd4bd21c5a
commit ecfe67550d
15 changed files with 119 additions and 71 deletions
@@ -84,13 +84,8 @@ bool botan_emsa_pss_identifier(rsa_pss_params_t *params, char *id, size_t len)
{
return FALSE;
}
if (params->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
return snprintf(id, len, "EMSA-PSS(%s,MGF1,%zd)", hash,
params->salt_len) < len;
}
return snprintf(id, len, "EMSA-PSS(%s,MGF1)", hash) < len;
return snprintf(id, len, "EMSA-PSS(%s,MGF1,%zd)", hash,
params->salt_len) < len;
}
/**
@@ -187,11 +187,7 @@ static bool sign_pkcs1(private_gcrypt_rsa_private_key_t *this,
}
else
{
u_int slen = hasher_hash_size(hash_algorithm);
if (pss->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
slen = pss->salt_len;
}
u_int slen = pss->salt_len;
err = gcry_sexp_build(&in, NULL,
"(data(flags pss)(salt-length %u)(hash %s %b))",
slen, hash_name, hash.len, hash.ptr);
@@ -139,11 +139,7 @@ static bool verify_pkcs1(private_gcrypt_rsa_public_key_t *this,
if (pss)
{
u_int slen = hasher_hash_size(algorithm);
if (pss->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
slen = pss->salt_len;
}
u_int slen = pss->salt_len;
err = gcry_sexp_build(&in, NULL,
"(data(flags pss)(salt-length %u)(hash %s %b))",
slen, hash_name, hash.len, hash.ptr);
@@ -393,15 +393,11 @@ static bool build_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_private_key_t *this,
goto error;
}
salt.len = hash.len;
salt.len = params->salt_len;
if (params->salt.len)
{
salt = params->salt;
}
else if (params->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
salt.len = params->salt_len;
}
if (emlen < (hash.len + salt.len + 2))
{ /* too long */
goto error;
@@ -205,12 +205,7 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,
{
goto error;
}
/* determine salt length */
salt.len = hash.len;
if (params->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
salt.len = params->salt_len;
}
salt.len = params->salt_len;
/* verify general structure of EM */
maskbits = (8 * em.len) - embits;
if (em.len < (hash.len + salt.len + 2) || em.ptr[em.len-1] != 0xbc ||
@@ -103,13 +103,8 @@ static bool build_signature(private_openssl_rsa_private_key_t *this,
if (pss)
{
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = openssl_get_md(pss->mgf1_hash);
int slen = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (pss->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
slen = pss->salt_len;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, slen) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, pss->salt_len) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
{
goto error;
@@ -95,13 +95,8 @@ static bool verify_signature(private_openssl_rsa_public_key_t *this,
if (pss)
{
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = openssl_get_md(pss->mgf1_hash);
int slen = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (pss->salt_len > RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DEFAULT)
{
slen = pss->salt_len;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, slen) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, pss->salt_len) <= 0 ||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
{
goto error;