This can be useful if the DHCP server runs on the same server. On Linux,
the response is then sent via `lo`, so packets won't be received if both
sockets are bound to e.g. a bridge interface.
In some setups the responses from the DHCP server are sent via lo, which
does not have an address of type `ARPHRD_ETHER` (the address length is
the same, though, just all zeros, by default). Note that the dhcp plugin
doesn't actually care for the MAC address or interface details, that's
only used by the farp plugin.
Fixes: 187c72d1af ("dhcp: Port the plugin to FreeBSD/macOS")
When serving as a responder and receiving an INFORMATIONAL exchange
containing INVALID_SYNTAX after IKE_AUTH, the IKE_SA should be deleted.
Currently, it only gets deleted after receiving AUTHENTICATION_FAILED.
RFC7296 section 2.21.2 says:
In an IKE_AUTH exchange, or in the INFORMATIONAL exchange immediately
following it (in case an error happened when processing a response to
IKE_AUTH), the UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD, INVALID_SYNTAX, and
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED notifications are the only ones to cause the
IKE SA to be deleted or not created, without a Delete payload.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2636
Also enables the `kdf` plugin automatically if building against an older
version of OpenSSL.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2602
Co-authored-by: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]>
This avoids the following warning/error:
tnc_imv_manager.c:244:39: error: passing arguments to 'tnc_imv_recommendations_create' without a prototype is deprecated in all versions of C and is not supported in C23 [-Werror,-Wdeprecated-non-prototype]
244 | return tnc_imv_recommendations_create(this->imvs);
| ^
Useless and causes a compiler warning/error:
error: a function declaration without a prototype is deprecated in all versions of C and is treated as a zero-parameter prototype in C23, conflicting with a subsequent declaration [-Werror,-Wdeprecated-non-prototype]
Self-signed trust anchors are not part of the certificate path validation
according to RFC 8280, section 6.1:
When the trust anchor is provided in the form of a self-signed
certificate, this self-signed certificate is not included as part of
the prospective certification path.
But policies in them could still be used, as stated in section 6.2:
Where a CA distributes self-signed certificates to specify trust
anchor information, certificate extensions can be used to specify
recommended inputs to path validation. For example, a policy
constraints extension could be included in the self-signed
certificate to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor
should be trusted only for the specified policies. [...]
Implementations that use self-signed certificates to specify trust
anchor information are free to process or ignore such information.
So unconditionally enforcing that self-signed root certificates contain
the policies is probably too strict. Often they won't contain the
extension at all. With this change, we allow that but still enforce the
policies in case such a certificate contains them. The other
policy-related constraints are also enforced still should they be
contained.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2601
Directly calling setup.py is deprecated (apparently has been for a while,
but now we get large warnings). Direct installation is also discouraged.
So this removes that option. The built wheel (the old egg format is not
used/built anymore) can be installed manually in a venv or the like.
The previous approach had two drawbacks:
First, it caused duplicate public keys because when the `certificate_t`
object was created and added to the credential set it had no subject
assigned yet. So it defaulted to the key ID. However, all previously
loaded keys had their subject already changed to an identity, so there
never was a match and new objects were always added whenever a config
with raw public keys was loaded.
Second, the subject was replaced in a way that's not thread-safe on an
object that's already shared in the public credential set. So other
threads could potentially access the `identification_t` object that's
destroyed during that process.
References strongswan/strongswan#853Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2561
If a migrate of a child-create occurs then labels_i and labels_r are
freed, but the pointers are left set. If the task is subsequently
destroyed without being reused, then both of these will be double
freed.
Fix this by setting labels_i and labels_r to NULL in the migrate
method after freeing, similar to other fields that are freed.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2552
Fixes: f9b895b49f ("child-create: Add support to handle security labels")
Both variables `inbound_installed` and `outbound_state` are used in
`child_sa_t::destroy()` to determine whether inbound and outbound state
have to be deleted. They are assigned prior to the call to
`kernel_interface_t::add_sa()`. As this call may fail, the destructor may
try to delete a state which it has not been added.
By making the assignment of these variables dependent on the success of
the state addition, we can make sure, a `child_sa_t::destroy()` only
deletes states it has added.
Also removed the redundant checks for `my_spi` and `other_spi` being set
along with the check for the above flags. It seems that when the flags
are set, the SPIs *must* be set.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <[email protected]>
If the lifetime of an issuing or sub CA is twice the lifetime of
the end entity certificates issued by it and the renewal cycle of
the issuing CAs is a little shorter than the validity of the end
entity certificates then three generations of CA certificates have
to be handled by the cert-enroll scripts.
These have been discouraged for a long time and there are now more and
more crypto libraries that have them disabled by default. However, for
some we only can detect this at runtime, in particular in FIPS mode, so
tests would fail as the plugins would still announce them. So instead
we just remove the schemes from these tests for now (at least for RSA,
removing signatures with SHA-1 completely isn't an option yet as that's
still the default with some clients).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2523
When compiling with -O3 with GCC 14, we get the following warning/error:
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:29:10: error: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [0, 3] is out of the bounds [0, 0] [-Werror=array-bounds=]
29 | return __builtin___memcpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
30 | __glibc_objsize0 (__dest));
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Which seems completely bogus as that array has a fixed size of 16 and
some weird workarounds remove the warning (e.g. adding an assignment
to `subset->netbits` before the `memcpy()`). This is also the only
place GCC complains about and we use `memcpy()` all over the place
in this file to set those addresses.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2509
While this does require quite a bit of memory, on initiators there are
usually fewer concurrent SAs getting created so this should be less of
an issue than on a gateway that handles lots of SAs as responder.
The speed up is about 30% on the initiator during the decapsulation,
while the key generation does take a bit more time (about 3%).
This follows FIPS 203 relatively closely but takes some ideas from the
reference implementation. In particular, how to avoid potential
side-channels via direct C division/modulo operations. However, it just
uses Barrett reduction (no Montgomery reduction) and no negative
coefficients to avoid number format conversions and keep the
implementation clearer.
This registers support for the ML_KEM_{512,768,1024} key exchange
algorithms in the `openssl` plugin when built using AWS-LC as the
libcrypto. To do this, we introduce the `openssl_kem` source files
which implement the key exchange algorithm using the Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) API. Future KEM algorithms can be implemented
generically using this interface by substituting the appropriate NIDs.
It also supports both seeded (via DRBG) and unseeded modes depending
on the user's requirements for KATs or entropy sources.
It should be noted that this does not add support for KEM algorithms
within upstream OpenSSL and is API incompatible. Future work will need
to condition out the incompatibilities as-appropriate. However, the
high-level logic should be the same for all KEMs and KEM APIs.
References strongswan/strongswan#2228Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2490
Tobias Brunner