The pattern currently is to call get_cache(), generate the encoding
if that failed and then store it with cache(). The latter adopts the
passed encoding and frees any stored encoding. However, the latter means
that if two threads concurrently fail to get a cached encoding and then
both generate and store one, one of the threads might use an encoding
that was freed by the other thread.
Since encodings are not expected to change, we can avoid this issue by
not replacing an existing cache entry and instead return that (while
freeing the passed value instead of the cached one).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1231
Only the second was reported by the compiler (depending on the version
and similarly to the previous commit only with AddressSanitizer active).
The strncpy() call for UTUN_CONTROL_NAME was simply wrong.
As the cleanup function reads from the correct address on the parent frame,
it is currently unclear why AddressSanitizer complains about that pointer
dereference.
Some third party IKEv2 products expect an RSA-PSS ASN.1
algorithmIdentifier with an explicit trailerField value (CONTEXT3)
instead of the DEFAULT value if the trailerField is missing.
The setting charon.rsa_pss_trailerfield = yes enables the explicit
encoding.
When an X.509 certificate has to be renewed it is helpful to use
the old PKCS#10 certificate request as a template, so that the
distinguishedName (DN), the subjectAlternativeName (SAN) and
a certificate profile name don't have to be typed-in again.
The old public key in the existing certreq is replaced with the
new key and the signature is re-generated using the new private key.
The msCertificateTypeExtension OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2) can
be used in a PKCS#10 certificate request to define a certificate
profile. It consists of an UTF8 string.
pki: profile option
Rename `encrypt` methods to avoid the following build failure when wolfSSL
is built with --enable-opensslextra:
In file included from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils.h:59,
from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/library.h:101,
from wolfssl_common.h:29,
from wolfssl_aead.c:23:
wolfssl_aead.c:90:16: error: conflicting types for 'encrypt'; have '_Bool(union <anonymous>, chunk_t, chunk_t, chunk_t, chunk_t *)'
90 | METHOD(aead_t, encrypt, bool,
| ^~~~~~~
../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils/object.h:99:20: note: in definition of macro 'METHOD'
99 | static ret name(union {iface *_public; this;} \
| ^~~~
In file included from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_port.h:573,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h:35,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/logging.h:33,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/ssl.h:35,
from wolfssl_common.h:64,
from wolfssl_aead.c:23:
/home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/unistd.h:149:6: note: previous declaration of 'encrypt' with type 'void(char *, int)'
149 | void encrypt(char *, int);
| ^~~~~~~
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1201
The content field of type OCTET STRING of a ContentInfo object
with ContentType Data
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content
[0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
is optional and can be missing if no data is available
Making the variable volatile avoids a "variable ‘failure’ might be
clobbered by ‘longjmp’" warning (or error when compiling with
-Werror) that's triggered via -Wextra.
The 5.4.0 update changed the default bignum implementation to what
could explicitly be enabled via `--enable-sp-math-all`. Since this uses
fixed-sized buffers sufficient for key sizes of SP_INT_BITS, with a default
of 4096, modp6144 and modp8192 didn't work anymore (wc_DhGenerateKeyPair()
returned MP_EXPTMOD_E). So we have to adapt the feature checks for this.
To support the larger DH groups we can either increase the buffer size
via `--with-max-rsa-bits` or add `--enable-heapmath` so buffers get
(re-)allocated as needed. We go with the latter for now.
This avoids the use of a variable length array, which should probably
be avoided in general due to potential performance, portability and
security issues (not in this particular case, though).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1095
GCC assumes this->b is zero (or may be zero) and spits out the following
warning (or error with -Werror):
src/libstrongswan/plugins/fips_prf/fips_prf.c:124:12: error: array subscript 18446744073709551615 is above array bounds of ‘uint8_t[<U8090>]’ {aka ‘unsigned char[<U8090>]’} [-Werror=array-bounds]
124 | one[this->b - 1] = 0x01;
| ~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~
Even though the assignment of `removed` to `out_row` is tied to the
`found_removed` flag, which is only set if `removed` is set, the
compiler complains that it may be used uninitialized.
GCC 12 produces weird code when a callback is called directly (e.g.
parse_bool() via parse_option() in vici_config.c). Instead of the actual
pointer, it explicitly passes 0 as first argument, which likely causes
a segmentation fault. It doesn't happen when called indirectly via
function pointer that has void* as first argument, which this patch
kinda replicates for direct calls to avoid the issue.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1053
This should make it clearer to what the log messages generated by
verify_trust_chain() are related (in particular if building the chain
fails or the cert has expired).
Tobias Brunner