These options disable validation as such, e.g. even from cached CRLs, not
only the fetching. Also made the plugin's validate() implementation a
no-op if both options are disabled.
Since the textual representation for a CRL is now standardized
in RFC 7468 one could argue that we should accept that too, even
though RFC 5280 explicitly demands CRLs fetched via HTTP/FTP to
be in DER format. But in particular for file URIs enforcing that
seems inconvenient.
Fixes#1203.
To avoid considering each cached OCSP response and evaluating its trustchain,
we limit the certificates considered for OCSP signing to:
- The issuing CA of the checked certificate
- A directly delegated signer by the same CA, having the OCSP signer constraint
- Any locally installed (trusted) certificate having the OCSP signer constraint
The first two options cover the requirements from RFC 6960 2.6. For
compatibility with non-conforming CAs, we allow the third option as exception,
but require the installation of such certificates locally.
This behavior was introduced with 6840a6fb to avoid key/signature strength
checking for the revocation trustchain as we do it for end entity certificates.
Unfortunately this breaks CA constraint checking under certain conditions, as
we merge additional intermediate/CA certificates to the auth config.
As key/signature strength checking of the revocation trustchain is a rather
exotic requirement we drop support for that to properly enforce CA constraints.
INCLUDES are now deprecated and throw warnings when using automake 1.13.
We now also differentiate AM_CPPFLAGS and AM_CFLAGS, where includes and
defines are passed to AM_CPPFLAGS only.
Certificates which are set on hold in a CRL might be removed from any
subsequent CRL. Hence you cannot conclude that a certificate is revoked
for good in this case, you would try to retrieve an update CRL to see if
the certificate on hold is still on it or not.
Tobias Brunner