The c_indices derived from the SHA-512 random oracle consist of
nine bits (0..511). The leftmost 8 bits of each index are taken
on an octet-by-octet basis from the 56 leftmost octets of the
SHA-512 hash. The 9th bit needed for the LSB is taken from the
extra_bits 64 bit unsigned integer which consists of the 8 rightmost
octets of the SHA-512 hash (in network order). If more than 56
indices must be derived then additional rounds of the random oracle
are executed until all kappa c_indices have been determined.
The bug fix shifts the extra_bits value by one bit in each loop
iteration so that the LSB of each index is random. Also iterate
through the hash array using the loop variable j not the c_indices
variable i.
The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to
the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in
the correct context.
A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch,
which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA
was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA,
that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected
by several plugins.
Fixes#862.
When flush() is called there might be threads in install() waiting for
trap policies to get installed (without holding the lock). We have to
wait until they updated the entries with the respective CHILD_SAs before
destroying the list.
We also have to prevent further trap policy installations (and wait until
threads in install() are really finished), otherwise we might end up
destroying CHILD_SA objects after the kernel interface implementations
have already been unloaded (avoiding this is the whole point of calling
flush() before unloading the plugins).
This fixes potential race conditions in case complete() or flush() is
executed before or concurrently with a thread that handles an acquire.
It will also simplify tracking multiple acquires created for the same
trap policy in the future.
Also fixes the behavior in some error situations.
This basically reverts f4e822c1b4 ("trap-manager: don't check-in
nonexisting IKE_SA if acquire fails"). As checkout_by_config() could
return an already existing and established IKE_SA we have to properly
destroy it, for instance, in case other threads are waiting to check
it out. checkin_and_destroy() should handle the case of a new SA
properly (it produces a log message on level 1, though).
In some situations it might be valid for a host that configures
right=%any to reestablish or reauthenticate an IKE_SA. Using %any would
immediately abort the initiation causing the new SA to fail (which
might already have the existing CHILD_SAs assigned).
Fixes#1027.
If static local addresses are configured we should use their address family
as a hint when resolving the remote address.
We don't do this if %any is configured as this might break existing
configurations (%any4 and %any6 are however used as hint).
CDP and OCSP URIs for a one or multiple certification authorities
can be added via the VICI interface. swanctl allows to read
definitions from a new authorities section.
Threads might still be allocating SPIs (e.g. triggered by an acquire or
an inbound message) while the main thread calls flush(). If there is a
context switch right after such a thread successfully checked this->rng
in get_spi() and the main thread destroys the RNG instance right then,
that worker thread will cause a segmentation fault when it continues and
attempts to call get_bytes().
Fixes#1014.
The vici logger uses the listener_t.log() callback to raise vici events.
When doing so, it holds the bus lock as reader while acquiring the vici socket
mutex (1). If at the same time the vici socket enables a writer, that thread
tries to lock the watcher mutex (2). The watcher thread uses debugging while
holding the lock, i.e. acquires the bus read lock (3).
(1) bus.rlock -> vici.lock!
(2) vici.lock -> watcher.lock!
(3) watcher.lock -> bus.rlock!
This all actually would resolve just fine, as we have a shared read lock on the
bus. However, under Windows we seem to have a strict writer preference when
acquiring the rwlock (4). This results in blocking read locks until any pending
write lock can be fulfilled, and makes the constellation deadlock. The relevant
threads are:
Thread (1)
6 0x71313d25 in wait_ at threading/windows/mutex.c:137
7 0x7054c8a2 in find_entry at vici_socket.c:201
8 0x7054d690 in send_ at vici_socket.c:624
9 0x7054f6c1 in send_op at vici_dispatcher.c:119
10 0x705502c1 in raise_event at vici_dispatcher.c:469
12 0x704c3878 in log_cb at bus/bus.c:332
13 0x712c7c3a in invoke_function at collections/linked_list.c:414
14 0x704c3a63 in vlog at bus/bus.c:400
15 0x704c3b36 in log_ at bus/bus.c:430
18 0x70508f1f in process_response at sa/ikev2/task_manager_v2.c:664
20 0x704f5430 in process_message at sa/ike_sa.c:1369
21 0x704e3823 in execute at processing/jobs/process_message_job.c:74
22 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (2)
4 0x71313b61 in lock at threading/windows/mutex.c:66
5 0x712e81fd in add at processing/watcher.c:441
6 0x712e1ab9 in add_watcher at networking/streams/stream.c:213
7 0x712e1b4d in on_write at networking/streams/stream.c:237
8 0x7054d606 in _cb_enable_writer at vici_socket.c:609
9 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
10 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (3)
3 0x71313f38 in read_lock at threading/windows/rwlock.c:74
4 0x704c3971 in vlog at bus/bus.c:373
5 0x704cc156 in dbg_bus at daemon.c:126
6 0x712e7bf9 in watch at processing/watcher.c:316
7 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
8 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (4)
3 0x71313f70 in write_lock at threading/windows/rwlock.c:82
4 0x704c378b in remove_logger at bus/bus.c:290
5 0x704cb284 in listener_unregister at control/controller.c:166
6 0x713136cd in thread_cleanup_pop at threading/windows/thread.c:558
8 0x704cb94e in initiate at control/controller.c:435
9 0x70553996 in _cb_initiate at vici_control.c:187
12 0x7054d200 in _cb_process_queue at vici_socket.c:508
13 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
14 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
To avoid such a situation, we dissolve the (1) lock sequence. It's actually
never good practice to acquire shared locks during bus hooks, as it is
problematic if we raise bus events while holding the lock. We do so by
raising vici events for log message asynchronously, but of curse must keep
log order as is using a synchronized queue.
By using a derived key r^2 we can improve performance, as we can do loop
unrolling and slightly better utilize SIMD instructions.
Overall ChaCha20-Poly1305 performance increases by ~12%.
Converting integers to/from our 5-word representation in SSE does not seem
to pay off, so we work on individual words.
We always build the driver on x86/x64, but enable it only if SSSE3 support
is detected during runtime.
Poly1305 uses parallel 32-bit multiplication operands yielding a 64-bit result,
for which two can be done in parallel in SSE. This is minimally faster than
multiplication with 64-bit operands, and also works on 32-bit builds not having
a __int128 result type.
On a 32-bit architecture, this is more than twice as fast as the portable
driver, and on 64-bit it is ~30% faster.
As it turns out, getpwnam_r, getgrnam_r, and friends will return
ERANGE if _any_ user or group on the system is larger than will fit
into the scratch buffer you pass to them.
This reworks the resolve_uid and resolve_gid methods plus
init_supplementary_groups to use a variable-size buffer that is grown
until the results fit.
Based on a patch by Evan Broder.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#12.
Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an
initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were
complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK
authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate
and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid
certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted.
Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other
aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not
enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue
responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client.
And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into
sending plaintext passwords.
This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's
authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator
starts with its own authentication.
Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
Global reqid allocation (94eb09ac) broke fixed reqid allocation. Resupport them
by bypassing allocation in the kernel if a fixed reqid has been configured.
Fixes#976.
Markku-Juhani Olavi Saarinen