While X25519 was already added with 1.1.0a, its use would be a lot more
complicated, as the helpers like EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key() were only
added in 1.1.1, which also added X448.
Because the file is not available on all platforms the inclusion comes
after the user options in order to disable including it. But that means
the inclusion also follows after the defined scanner states, which are
generated as simple #defines to numbers. If the included unistd.h e.g.
uses variables in function definitions with the same names this could
result in compilation errors.
Interactive mode has to be disabled too as it relies on isatty() from
unistd.h. Since we don't use the scanners interactively, this is not a
problem and might even make the scanners a bit faster.
Fixes#2806.
According to gcrypt.h these callbacks are not used anymore since
version 1.6 and with clang these actually cause deprecation warnings
that let the build on travis (-Werror) fail.
Checking for whitelisted functions in every backtrace is not very
efficient. And because OpenSSL 1.1 does no proper cleanup anymore until
the process is terminated there are now a lot more "leaks" to ignore.
For instance, in the openssl-ikev2/rw-cert scenario, just starting and
stopping the daemon (test vectors are checked) now causes 3594 whitelisted
leaks compared to the 849 before. This prolonged the shutdown of the
daemon on each guest in every scenario, amounting to multiple seconds of
additional runtime for every affected scenario. But even with this
patch there is still some overhead, compared to running the scenarios on
jessie.
SHA-384 is not supported but is selected by signature_schemes_for_key()
for keys between 3072 and 7680 bits.
Since this is only called for IKEv2 signature authentication we don't
even provide SHA-1 anymore. We always provide both schemes, though,
which is what pubkey-authenticator does too for RSA.
Older agents apparently just ignore the flags and always return a SHA-1
signature. If that's the case, charon.signature_authentication has to
be disabled.
Because `keylen` is unsigned the subtraction results in an integer
underflow if the key length is < 11 bytes.
This is only a problem when verifying signatures with a public key (for
private keys the plugin enforces a minimum modulus length) and to do so
we usually only use trusted keys. However, the x509 plugin actually
calls issued_by() on a parsed certificate to check if it is self-signed,
which is the reason this issue was found by OSS-Fuzz in the first place.
So, unfortunately, this can be triggered by sending an invalid client
cert to a peer.
Fixes: 5955db5b12 ("gmp: Don't parse PKCS1 v1.5 RSA signatures to verify them")
Fixes: CVE-2018-17540
Instead we generate the expected signature encoding and compare it to the
decrypted value.
Due to the lenient nature of the previous parsing code (minimum padding
length was not enforced, the algorithmIdentifier/OID parser accepts arbitrary
data after OIDs and in the parameters field etc.) it was susceptible to
Daniel Bleichenbacher's low-exponent attack (from 2006!), which allowed
forging signatures for keys that use low public exponents (i.e. e=3).
Since the public exponent is usually set to 0x10001 (65537) since quite a
while, the flaws in the previous code should not have had that much of a
practical impact in recent years.
Fixes: CVE-2018-16151, CVE-2018-16152
This also changes how unknown/corrupted memory is handled in the free()
and realloc() hooks in general.
Incorporates changes provided by Thomas Egerer who ran into a similar
issue.
Due to the mangled C++ function names it's tricky to be more specific. The
"leaked" allocations are from a static hashtable containing EC groups.
There is another leak caused by the locking allocator singleton
(triggered by the first function that uses it, usually initialization of
a cipher, but could be a hasher in other test runners), but we can avoid
that with a Botan config option.
Simplifies public key loading and this way unencrypted PKCS#8-encoded
keys can be loaded directly without pkcs8 plugin (code for encrypted
keys could probably later be added, if necessary).
It also simplifies the implementation of private_key_t::get_public_key()
a lot.
Without OID we can't generate an algorithmIdentifier when loading the
key again. And older versions of OpenSSL insist on a public key when
e.g. converting a key to PKCS#8.
Simply unwrapping the ECPrivateKey structure avoids log messages when
parsing other keys in the KEY_ANY case.
Support MD5 in the Botan plugin if supported by Botan.
MD5 is required for RADIUS and obviously EAP-MD5,
and also for non-PKCS#8 encoded, encrypted private keys.
Tobias Brunner