If libcurl is built with MultiSSL support (not the case for e.g.
Debian/Ubuntu, which ship separate, conflicting libraries), this allows
selecting the SSL/TLS backend libcurl uses.
Only older versions of OpenSSL and GnuTLS need special treatment, so we
now accept all other backends (e.g. "(SecureTransport) OpenSSL/1.1.1s"
on macOS).
Whenever we remove support for the affected versions of the mentioned
libraries, we can remove the corresponding *-threading plugin feature
and the code here.
The x509 plugin retrieves serial numbers with two's complement
encoding whereas the openssl plugin partially returns them without
leading zeroes.
Serial numbers in X.509 certificates, X.509 CRL, X.509 attribute
certificates, OCSP Requests and OCSP responses are now returned in
canonical form without prepended zero octets.
At least since Ubuntu 22.04 there are lots of (apparently non-fatal)
"DWARF error: could not find variable specification" errors generated
by bfd_find_nearest_line(). This also happens with addr2line, which
internally uses libbfd. No idea what the actual issue is (it still
happens with binutils 2.39 in Ubuntu 22.10), but since it doesn't seem
to affect the functionality we need this avoids filling the test logs
with useless messages.
The wolfSSL's OpenSSL compatibility layer is not used by the plugin at
all and preventing its inclusion avoids conflicts with ASN1_ constants.
The inclusion of wolfssl/ssl.h is moved to the only file that requires
it as older wolfSSL versions defined a conflicting ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME.
Other changes address issues with the FIPS use case.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1332
A recent change added CALLBACK to PENUM_PAGE_FILE_CALLBACKW/A in psapi.h,
which conflicts with our own macro of the same name. Our compat/windows.h
header undefs the Windows definition, but that only works if Windows
headers are included before ours, which wasn't the case for psapi.h.
Malicious servers could otherwise block the fetching thread indefinitely
after the initial TCP handshake (which has a default timeout of 10s
in the curl and winhttp plugins, the soup plugin actually has a default
overall timeout of 10s).
This avoids querying URLs of potentially untrusted certificates, e.g. if
an attacker sends a specially crafted end-entity and intermediate CA
certificate with a CDP that points to a server that completes the
TCP handshake but then does not send any further data, which will block
the fetcher thread (depending on the plugin) for as long as the default
timeout for TCP. Doing that multiple times will block all worker threads,
leading to a DoS attack.
The logging during the certificate verification obviously changes. The
following example shows the output of `pki --verify` for the current
strongswan.org certificate:
new:
using certificate "CN=www.strongswan.org"
using trusted intermediate ca certificate "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
using trusted ca certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
reached self-signed root ca with a path length of 1
checking certificate status of "CN=www.strongswan.org"
requesting ocsp status from 'http://r3.o.lencr.org' ...
ocsp response correctly signed by "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
ocsp response is valid: until Jul 27 12:59:58 2022
certificate status is good
checking certificate status of "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
ocsp response verification failed, no signer certificate 'C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3' found
fetching crl from 'http://x1.c.lencr.org/' ...
using trusted certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
crl correctly signed by "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
crl is valid: until Apr 18 01:59:59 2023
certificate status is good
certificate trusted, lifetimes valid, certificate not revoked
old:
using certificate "CN=www.strongswan.org"
using trusted intermediate ca certificate "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
checking certificate status of "CN=www.strongswan.org"
requesting ocsp status from 'http://r3.o.lencr.org' ...
ocsp response correctly signed by "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
ocsp response is valid: until Jul 27 12:59:58 2022
certificate status is good
using trusted ca certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
checking certificate status of "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
ocsp response verification failed, no signer certificate 'C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3' found
fetching crl from 'http://x1.c.lencr.org/' ...
using trusted certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
crl correctly signed by "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
crl is valid: until Apr 18 01:59:59 2023
certificate status is good
reached self-signed root ca with a path length of 1
certificate trusted, lifetimes valid, certificate not revoked
Note that this also fixes an issue with the previous dual-use of the
`trusted` flag. It not only indicated whether the chain is trusted but
also whether the current issuer is the root anchor (the corresponding
flag in the `cert_validator_t` interface is called `anchor`). This was
a problem when building multi-level trust chains for pre-trusted
end-entity certificates (i.e. where `trusted` is TRUE from the start).
This caused the main loop to get aborted after the first intermediate CA
certificate and the mentioned `anchor` flag wasn't correct in any calls
to `cert_validator_t` implementations.
Fixes: CVE-2022-40617
This forces the use of a semicolon after INIT() and makes existing ones,
which was the case for basically all instances, necessary so e.g.
sonarcloud won't complain about an empty statement after every one of
them.
By evaluating to the allocated object, it would theoretically also allow
constructs like this:
struct_t *this;
return INIT(this,
.a = x,
.b = y,
);
or this:
array_insert(a, ARRAY_TAIL, INIT(this,
.a = x,
.b = y,
));
The pattern currently is to call get_cache(), generate the encoding
if that failed and then store it with cache(). The latter adopts the
passed encoding and frees any stored encoding. However, the latter means
that if two threads concurrently fail to get a cached encoding and then
both generate and store one, one of the threads might use an encoding
that was freed by the other thread.
Since encodings are not expected to change, we can avoid this issue by
not replacing an existing cache entry and instead return that (while
freeing the passed value instead of the cached one).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1231
Only the second was reported by the compiler (depending on the version
and similarly to the previous commit only with AddressSanitizer active).
The strncpy() call for UTUN_CONTROL_NAME was simply wrong.
As the cleanup function reads from the correct address on the parent frame,
it is currently unclear why AddressSanitizer complains about that pointer
dereference.
Some third party IKEv2 products expect an RSA-PSS ASN.1
algorithmIdentifier with an explicit trailerField value (CONTEXT3)
instead of the DEFAULT value if the trailerField is missing.
The setting charon.rsa_pss_trailerfield = yes enables the explicit
encoding.
When an X.509 certificate has to be renewed it is helpful to use
the old PKCS#10 certificate request as a template, so that the
distinguishedName (DN), the subjectAlternativeName (SAN) and
a certificate profile name don't have to be typed-in again.
The old public key in the existing certreq is replaced with the
new key and the signature is re-generated using the new private key.
The msCertificateTypeExtension OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2) can
be used in a PKCS#10 certificate request to define a certificate
profile. It consists of an UTF8 string.
pki: profile option
Rename `encrypt` methods to avoid the following build failure when wolfSSL
is built with --enable-opensslextra:
In file included from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils.h:59,
from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/library.h:101,
from wolfssl_common.h:29,
from wolfssl_aead.c:23:
wolfssl_aead.c:90:16: error: conflicting types for 'encrypt'; have '_Bool(union <anonymous>, chunk_t, chunk_t, chunk_t, chunk_t *)'
90 | METHOD(aead_t, encrypt, bool,
| ^~~~~~~
../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils/object.h:99:20: note: in definition of macro 'METHOD'
99 | static ret name(union {iface *_public; this;} \
| ^~~~
In file included from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_port.h:573,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h:35,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/logging.h:33,
from /home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/wolfssl/ssl.h:35,
from wolfssl_common.h:64,
from wolfssl_aead.c:23:
/home/autobuild/autobuild/instance-5/output-1/host/powerpc64le-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/unistd.h:149:6: note: previous declaration of 'encrypt' with type 'void(char *, int)'
149 | void encrypt(char *, int);
| ^~~~~~~
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1201
The content field of type OCTET STRING of a ContentInfo object
with ContentType Data
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content
[0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
is optional and can be missing if no data is available
Making the variable volatile avoids a "variable ‘failure’ might be
clobbered by ‘longjmp’" warning (or error when compiling with
-Werror) that's triggered via -Wextra.
The 5.4.0 update changed the default bignum implementation to what
could explicitly be enabled via `--enable-sp-math-all`. Since this uses
fixed-sized buffers sufficient for key sizes of SP_INT_BITS, with a default
of 4096, modp6144 and modp8192 didn't work anymore (wc_DhGenerateKeyPair()
returned MP_EXPTMOD_E). So we have to adapt the feature checks for this.
To support the larger DH groups we can either increase the buffer size
via `--with-max-rsa-bits` or add `--enable-heapmath` so buffers get
(re-)allocated as needed. We go with the latter for now.
Andreas Steffen