These rules don't depend on traffic selectors, so for SAs with multiple
traffic selectors we'd install several duplicate rules. Since this
plugin is used for transport mode SAs, it probably never was an issue
in practice.
Fixes: b8973b2661 ("connmark: Add CONNMARK rules to select correct output SA based on conntrack")
This ensures that secrets that are associated with the server identity,
usually they are assigned to the username exclusively, will only be tried
if the username also matched. Otherwise, it could be possible for users
who know at least one password to impersonate another user.
Fixes: 462c9a4f72 ("Try all matching XAuth secrets we find, not only the first one")
The code was written with `child_sa_t::destroy` in mind, which deletes
the inbound SA before the outbound SA. The problem is that the rekeying
code was changed meanwhile so the outbound SA is removed before the
inbound SA in order to avoid traffic loss. That could cause a
use-after-free as the already destroyed item remained in the `isas` list.
This change fixes this so the SAs can be removed in any order. The SPIs
are used as marker for whether a specific direction is installed. It
also fixes an issue in `expire_job()`, which removed the entry from
`osas` without holding the lock.
Fixes: f351d9ef7d ("kernel-wfp: Reference SA/SP sets by SPI and destination, not reqid")
Fixes: 44107cb7b7 ("child-delete: Delay the removal of the inbound SA of rekeyed CHILD_SAs")
This prevents other processes from binding the same ports and
misusing the protocol/port-specific bypass rules installed in WFP to
bypass the VPN.
Fixes: 11e7d0677c ("socket-win: Install IKE bypass policies using bypass_socket()")
The previous code checked in the IKE_SA before using it again to
add attributes based on it to the interim update message. This
change ensures the IKE_SA is only accessed while it is checked out.
The Acct-Status-Type attribute is still sent first, but the
Acct-Session-Id and Class attributes are now sent after the IKE
parameters, which shouldn't really matter, though.
Fixes: d019764ab6 ("Add support for RADIUS Interim accounting updates")
On typical systems that have overcommitting enabled, the 16 MiB maximum
that's allocated via the 24-bit length field in the AVP header shouldn't
be an issue as there are various limits that affect how much data can
actually be written to the allocated buffer (e.g. the maximum IKE message
size, the maximum TLS record size, or the maximum number of accepted
EAP-TTLS payloads), so this is primarily a defense-in-depth measure.
The length field of an EAP payload, which is the only type of AVP we
accept, is 16 bits, so that's what we now enforce as maximum.
Same as the previous commit for consistency, but not an issue here as
only transport mode SAs are handled.
Fixes: b8973b2661 ("connmark: Add CONNMARK rules to select correct output SA based on conntrack")
Not an issue in typical scenarios where the plugin is used on a gateway
with roadwarriors that use /32 addresses. But could be an issue if used
on a client that tunnels everything to the gateway.
Fixes: e5ad2e6614 ("forecast: Add the broadcast/multicast forwarding plugin called forecast")
The policies reference the provider, so it might not actually get removed
and be left dangling in the WFP system (maybe Windows refcounts it and
still removes it).
This avoids accepting expired certificates again should the time get
rolled back for some reason.
Fixes: c81b87ac26 ("systime-fix: Add timeout option to stop waiting for valid system time")
Fixes: 295e42a47f ("systime-fix disables certificate lifetime validation if system time not synced")
This is documented as a requirement in the man page, so the caller of the
conversation function might expect such an array. Although, since we
only accept non-interactive requests, for which no response is expected,
it's doubtful whether it will actually try to access elements in the
array. And if the passed pointer was initialized to NULL, passing it to
free() is probably also fine.
Fixes: 2312504d1e ("xauth-pam: Open/close a PAM session for each connected client")
These were never correct. And the first referenced commit, unfortunately,
just simplified the incorrect code.
Fixes: 08a3ee0cce ("bus: Change ike_update() signature and only call it once")
Fixes: b8973b2661 ("connmark: Add CONNMARK rules to select correct output SA based on conntrack")
The `transaction` variable was previously still set to the one that
was enumerated last even if the received DHCP OFFER did not match
it. So the transaction was incorrectly modified. Once the real
DHCP OFFER would arrive, it would get modified again, but it could
allow adding unintended DNS servers.
EAP-PEAP transports results as separate AVPs, we expect one after the
first phase 2 authentication (if not using certificates). However, with
the previous caching of the result of that, the client could then send
another confirmation as response to the EAP-TNC request to skip it.
Since no group membership is set if EAP-TNC is not complete, it shouldn't
really affect its outcome, though.
Fixes: 1be296dfb2 ("implemented the PEAP tunneling protocol as an EAP plugin")
The entry was updated and the previous EAP method and IKE SA destroyed
under a read lock, which is not safe (there could be threads in
get_state(), or even some that called it before and now still hold
that read lock while interacting with the EAP method).
Fixes: 37884ab10f ("Add locking to TNC-PDP connections")
As `tv_sec` is a `time_t`, i.e. typically 64 bits, assigning the result
of `htonl()` leaves the upper 32 bits zero. Copying from the
`sizeof(time_t) - 4` offset then copies those zeroes on little-endian
systems, which is not what was intended according to the comments.
Another issue was that the type of `tv_usec`, `suseconds_t`, is typically
a `long`, i.e. signed, so shifting the maximum value 0x000f423f (999'999)
by 12 bits technically overflows this. The cast fixes that.
Fixes: 1aba82bfd7 ("eap-aka-3gpp: Add plugin that implements 3GPP MILENAGE algorithm in software")
Basically the same as the previous commit.
Fixes: edcb2dd35b ("Moved reauth/pseudonym functionality from eap-sim-file to separate plugins, usable by any SIM/AKA backend")
This also protects access to the RNG, which is not always thread-safe.
Fixes: edcb2dd35b ("Moved reauth/pseudonym functionality from eap-sim-file to separate plugins, usable by any SIM/AKA backend")
Due to the `sleep()` call, a continuous stream of failed authentication
attempts can potentially exhaust the thread pool. While delays can also
happen due to RADIUS or DHCP on the server side, this can directly be
triggered by clients. It's questionable whether the delay ever had the
intended effect. But since the retry functionality is also quite
strange, let's just remove it so retries will require creating an IKE_SA
from scratch. To avoid leaking much of a timing difference if no secret
is found now that the two second delay is gone, we do the calculations
with a dummy NT hash.
Fixes: f98cdf7a47 ("adding plugin for EAP-MS-CHAPv2")
Using the same `hasher_t` instance from different threads concurrently
is not safe. The underlying implementation might e.g. use a single
shared state for multiple API calls within `get_hash()` (e.g. the openssl
plugin does that).
Fixes: 007c47088c ("Implemented permanent certificate coupling plugin")
If there are lots of SAs to be synced, the default might be too low
and messages and SAs get dropped. The new default is already 8 MiB,
which should work fine for lots of SAs. The code mirrors the one in
the kernel-netlink plugin (but with a guard around SO_RCVBUFFORCE, even
though this plugin is mostly used on Linux as well).
This prevents an OOB read if the AT_RAND data is shorter than the
expected 16 bytes.
The check for AT_AUTN is changed for consistency even though its length
is already enforced by the parser (for AT_RAND it isn't because EAP-SIM
expects a length of either 32 or 48 bytes).
Fixes: aea334ec1c ("Splitted EAP-AKA in peer and server implementations, use libsimaka helper library")
This allows clients to distinguish between algorithms of different
transform types more easily. The names are similar to those used
when returning the algorithms of the selected proposal in list-sas (except
for `ke` instead of `dh` and `sn` instead of `esn` to reflect the
latest IETF/IANA changes).
The missing parentheses around the additions when calculating optlen
in the previous code can cause an out-of-bound read of up to 228 bytes
if no DHCP_OPTEND is found in the message (the calculation basically
evaluated to `- 20 + 8 + 240`).
Since the buffer for the received packet (via pf_handler_t) is located
on the stack, this shouldn't cause much of an issue in practice.
Tobias Brunner