The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some
peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error).
Fixes#819.
Some CAs don't use SHA-1 hashes of the public key as subjectKeyIdentifier and
authorityKeyIdentifier. If that's the case we can't force the
calculation of the hash to compare that to authorityKeyIdentifier in the CRL,
instead we use the subjectKeyIdentifier stored in the issuer certificate, if
available. Otherwise, we fall back to the SHA-1 hash (or comparing the
DNs) as before.
If many requests are sent to the kernel the events generated by these
requests may fill the receive buffer before the daemon is able to read
these messages.
Fixes#783.
If this is disabled the schemes configured in `rightauth` are only
checked against signature schemes used in the certificate chain and
signature schemes used during IKEv2 are ignored.
Disabling this could be helpful if existing connections with peers that
don't support RFC 7427 use signature schemes in `rightauth` to verify
certificate chains.
This enables late connection switching based on the signature scheme used
for IKEv2 and allows to enforce stronger signature schemes.
This may break existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427
if signature schemes are currently used in `rightauth` for certificate chain
validation and if the configured schemes are stronger than the default used
for IKE (e.g. SHA-1 for RSA).
We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not
backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support,
and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
There is a similar function to map key_type_t and hasher_t to an OID,
but this maps schemes directly (and to use the other function we'd
have to have a function to map schemes to hash algorithms first).
The previous code allowed an attacker to slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with
both SPIs and MID 1 set when an IKE_AUTH would be expected instead.
References #816.
It is mandated by the RFCs and it is expected by the task managers.
Initial messages with invalid MID will be treated like regular messages,
so no IKE_SA will be created for them. Instead, if the responder SPI is 0
no SA will be found and the message is rejected with ALERT_INVALID_IKE_SPI.
If an SPI is set and we do find an SA, then we either ignore the message
because the MID is unexpected, or because we don't allow initial messages
on established connections.
There is one exception, though, if an attacker can slip in an IKE_SA_INIT
with both SPIs set before the client's IKE_AUTH is handled by the server,
it does get processed (see next commit).
References #816.
This reverts 8f727d8007 ("Clean up IKE_SA state if IKE_SA_INIT request
does not have message ID 0") because it allowed to close any IKE_SA by
sending an IKE_SA_INIT with an unexpected MID and both SPIs set to those
of that SA.
The next commit will prevent SAs from getting created for IKE_SA_INIT messages
with invalid MID.
Fixes#816.
While the comment is rather clear that we should not adopt live CHILD_SAs
during reauthentication in IKEv2, the code does nonetheless. Add an additional
version check to fix reauthentication if the reauth responder has a replace
uniqueids policy.
Fixes#871.
This makes these CA certificates independent from the purge issued by reread
commands. Certificates loaded by CA sections can be removed through ipsec.conf
update/reread, while CA certificates loaded implicitly from ipsec.d/cacerts
can individually be reread using ipsec rereadcacerts.
Andreas Steffen