BoringSSL only supports a limited list of (hard-coded) algorithms via
EVP_get_cipherbyname(), which does not include AES-GCM. While BoringSSL
deprecated these functions they are also supported by OpenSSL (in BoringSSL
a completely new interface for AEADs was added, which OpenSSL currently does
not support).
There is currently no way to compare the outer and inner algorithms
encoded in a parsed CRL. X509_CRL_verify() does not seem to check that
either, though (unlike X509_verify()).
We can't call OPENSSL_cleanup() as that would prevent us from
re-initializing the library again (which we use in the Android app, that
loads/unloads plugins).
The default ESP cipher suite is now
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128
and requires SHA-2 HMAC support in the Linux kernel (correctly implemented
since 2.6.33).
The default IKE cipher suite is now
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
if the openssl plugin is loaded or
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_3072
if ECC is not available.
The use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm and the MODP_2048 DH group has been
deprecated and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 has been added to the default
IKE AEAD algorithms.
If OpenSSL is compiled with OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED some of the headers
we include don't include openssl/bn.h anymore. Therefore, we have to
explicitly include it ourselves where we use BN_* functions.
Fixes#1113.
While DES-ECB is not registered by the plugin in this case (so the
function will never actually be called), the compiler still warns
about the implicitly declared function.
With OpenSSL commit 929b0d70c19f60227f89fac63f22a21f21950823 setting an empty
key fails if no previous key has been set on that HMAC.
In 9138f49e we explicitly added the check we remove now, as HMAC_Update()
might crash if HMAC_Init_ex() has not been called yet. To avoid that, we
set and check a flag locally to let any get_mac() call fail if set_key() has
not yet been called.
Before this fix it was possible to crash charon with an IKE_SA_INIT
message containing a KE payload with DH group MODP_CUSTOM(1025).
Defining MODP_CUSTOM outside of the two byte IKE DH identifier range
prevents it from getting negotiated.
Fixes CVE-2014-9221.
To use SSL in curl, we need to initialize the SSL library in a thread-safe
manner and provide the appropriate callbacks. As we already do that in our
crypto plugins using these libraries, we depend on these features.
This implies that we need the same plugin enabled (openssl, gcrypt) as the
curl backend is configured to use to fetch from HTTPS URIs.
If FIPS mode has been enabled by other means, under some environments it can't
be entered again. It fails with "FIPS mode already set". To avoid it, we first
check the mode before changing it.
The salt, or often called implicit nonce, varies between AEAD algorithms and
their use in protocols. For IKE and ESP, GCM uses 4 bytes, while CCM uses
3 bytes. With TLS, however, AEAD mode uses 4 bytes for both GCM and CCM.
Our GCM backends currently support 4 bytes and CCM 3 bytes only. This is fine
until we go for CCM mode support in TLS, which requires 4 byte nonces.
We still try to calculate these directly as it can avoid a dependency on
the pkcs1 or other plugins. But for e.g. PGPv3 keys we need to delegate the
actual fingerprint calculation to the pgp plugin.