Each private key object created to access a key residing in a TPM 2.0
creates a context structure used for communication with the TSS.
When multiple IKE SAs are established at the same time and using the
same private key, it is possible to make concurrent calls to the
TSS with the same context which results in multiple threads writing
to the same place in memory causing undefined behaviour.
Fix this by protecting calls to the TSS with a mutex unique for
each TPM 2.0 context object.
By default, charon and its derivatives internally handle the SIGSEGV,
SIGILL, and SIGBUS signals raised by threads (segv_handler). Add a compile
option so that the signal handling can optionally be done externally.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#132.
If CHILD_SAs are created while waiting for the third QM message we'd not
notice the redundancy and updown events would be triggered unevenly.
This is consistent with the behavior on the initiator, which already does
this check right before installation. Moving the existing check is not
possible due to the narrow hook and moving the installation changes which
peer installs the SAs first and could have other side-effects (e.g. in
error or conflict cases). Still, this might result in CHILD_SA state
discrepancies between the two peers.
Fixes#3060.
If the key type was specified but the ID was NULL or matched a subject, it
was possible that a certificate was returned that didn't actually match
the requested key type.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#141.
Checking specifically for /proc/net/pfkey is not ideal as af_key will
eventually be removed in Linux kernels. Support for KLIPS is long gone.
The detection also wasn't used for anything anymore (failures were just
ignored since the ports to BSD-based systems). And modprobing doesn't seem
to be necessary either (charon-systemd doesn't do that, for instance).
Usually, changing this won't be necessary (actually, some plugins
specifically use different DRGBs for RNG_WEAK in order to separate
the public nonces from random data used for e.g. DH).
But for experts with special plugin configurations this might be
more flexible and avoids code changes.
Also expose a method to call arbitrary commands, which allows calling not
yet wrapped commands. Exceptions are raised for all commands if the response
includes a negative "success" key (similar to how it's done in the Python
bindings).
Luckily, the type is only used once when generating payloads and there it
doesn't matter because the encoding rules are the same.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#135.
The main fixes are
* the generation of fingerprints for RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA
* the encoding of ECDSA private keys
* calculating p and q for RSA private keys
* deriving the public key for raw Ed25519 private keys
Also, instead of numeric literals for buffer lengths ASN.1 related
constants are used.
Tobias Brunner