Files
strongswan-ext/src/libtls/tls_aead_impl.c
T
Tobias Brunner dafb082ae0 libtls: Check padding and MAC in constant time
Seems difficult to exploit when wrapped in EAP/IKEv2, and the keys for
those TLS sessions are short-lived anyway.

Fixes: c0bf721357 ("tls: Check all bytes of the padding if they equal the padding length")
2026-07-24 08:47:35 +02:00

224 lines
5.4 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Martin Willi
*
* Copyright (C) secunet Security Networks AG
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#include "tls_aead.h"
typedef struct private_tls_aead_t private_tls_aead_t;
/**
* Private data of an tls_aead_t object.
*/
struct private_tls_aead_t {
/**
* Public tls_aead_t interface.
*/
tls_aead_t public;
/**
* traditional crypter
*/
crypter_t *crypter;
/**
* traditional signer
*/
signer_t *signer;
/**
* Next implicit IV
*/
chunk_t iv;
};
/**
* Associated header data to create signature over
*/
typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) {
uint64_t seq;
uint8_t type;
uint16_t version;
uint16_t length;
} sigheader_t;
METHOD(tls_aead_t, encrypt, bool,
private_tls_aead_t *this, tls_version_t version,
tls_content_type_t *type, uint64_t seq, chunk_t *data)
{
chunk_t assoc, mac, padding;
uint8_t bs, padlen;
sigheader_t hdr;
hdr.type = *type;
htoun64(&hdr.seq, seq);
htoun16(&hdr.version, version);
htoun16(&hdr.length, data->len);
assoc = chunk_from_thing(hdr);
if (!this->signer->get_signature(this->signer, assoc, NULL) ||
!this->signer->allocate_signature(this->signer, *data, &mac))
{
return FALSE;
}
bs = this->crypter->get_block_size(this->crypter);
padlen = pad_len(data->len + mac.len + 1, bs);
padding = chunk_alloca(padlen);
memset(padding.ptr, padlen, padding.len);
*data = chunk_cat("mmcc", *data, mac, padding, chunk_from_thing(padlen));
/* encrypt inline */
if (!this->crypter->encrypt(this->crypter, *data, this->iv, NULL))
{
return FALSE;
}
if (data->len < this->iv.len)
{
return FALSE;
}
/* next record IV is last ciphertext block of this record */
memcpy(this->iv.ptr, data->ptr + data->len - this->iv.len, this->iv.len);
return TRUE;
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, decrypt, bool,
private_tls_aead_t *this, tls_version_t version,
tls_content_type_t *type, uint64_t seq, chunk_t *data)
{
chunk_t assoc, mac, iv;
uint8_t bs, padlen, valid;
sigheader_t hdr;
size_t i;
bs = this->crypter->get_block_size(this->crypter);
if (data->len < bs || data->len < this->iv.len || data->len % bs)
{
return FALSE;
}
iv = chunk_alloca(this->iv.len);
memcpy(iv.ptr, this->iv.ptr, this->iv.len);
memcpy(this->iv.ptr, data->ptr + data->len - this->iv.len, this->iv.len);
if (!this->crypter->decrypt(this->crypter, *data, iv, NULL))
{
return FALSE;
}
/* check and remove padding in constant time */
padlen = data->ptr[data->len - 1];
valid = constant_time_lt64(padlen, data->len);
for (i = 1; i < min(data->len, 256); i++)
{
/* ignore comparison for bytes outside of padding */
valid &= constant_time_lt(padlen, i) |
constant_time_eq(data->ptr[data->len - 1 - i], padlen);
}
data->len = constant_time_select64(data->len - padlen - 1, data->len, valid);
/* make sure to always verify a MAC value */
bs = this->signer->get_block_size(this->signer);
valid &= constant_time_ge64(data->len, bs);
data->len = constant_time_select64(data->len - bs, data->len, valid);
mac = chunk_alloca(bs);
memset(mac.ptr, 0, mac.len);
memcpy(mac.ptr, data->ptr + constant_time_select64(data->len, 0, valid),
constant_time_select(mac.len, min(mac.len, data->len), valid));
hdr.type = *type;
htoun64(&hdr.seq, seq);
htoun16(&hdr.version, version);
htoun16(&hdr.length, data->len);
assoc = chunk_from_thing(hdr);
if (!this->signer->get_signature(this->signer, assoc, NULL) ||
!this->signer->verify_signature(this->signer, *data, mac))
{
return FALSE;
}
return valid;
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, get_mac_key_size, size_t,
private_tls_aead_t *this)
{
return this->signer->get_key_size(this->signer);
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, get_encr_key_size, size_t,
private_tls_aead_t *this)
{
return this->crypter->get_key_size(this->crypter);
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, get_iv_size, size_t,
private_tls_aead_t *this)
{
return this->iv.len;
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, set_keys, bool,
private_tls_aead_t *this, chunk_t mac, chunk_t encr, chunk_t iv)
{
if (iv.len != this->iv.len)
{
return FALSE;
}
memcpy(this->iv.ptr, iv.ptr, this->iv.len);
return this->signer->set_key(this->signer, mac) &&
this->crypter->set_key(this->crypter, encr);
}
METHOD(tls_aead_t, destroy, void,
private_tls_aead_t *this)
{
DESTROY_IF(this->crypter);
DESTROY_IF(this->signer);
chunk_free(&this->iv);
free(this);
}
/**
* See header
*/
tls_aead_t *tls_aead_create_implicit(integrity_algorithm_t mac,
encryption_algorithm_t encr, size_t encr_size)
{
private_tls_aead_t *this;
INIT(this,
.public = {
.encrypt = _encrypt,
.decrypt = _decrypt,
.get_mac_key_size = _get_mac_key_size,
.get_encr_key_size = _get_encr_key_size,
.get_iv_size = _get_iv_size,
.set_keys = _set_keys,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
.crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, encr, encr_size),
.signer = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, mac),
);
if (!this->crypter || !this->signer)
{
destroy(this);
return NULL;
}
this->iv = chunk_alloc(this->crypter->get_iv_size(this->crypter));
return &this->public;
}