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Author SHA1 Message Date
Denozordec 42efc3191b fix(netflow): устранить двойной учёт потоков туннеля
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2026-11-22 13:48:18 +07:00
Denozordec c20b6b33c3 fix(ci): обновить тестовые фикстуры автономных планов
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2026-11-22 13:09:15 +07:00
Denozordec 79ab7b45aa feat(mcp): разрешить автономное выполнение планов сервисным ключом
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2026-11-22 12:59:36 +07:00
Denozordec 26249e1a4d fix(ci): проверять сокращённое окно при избытке потоков
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2026-11-22 11:42:20 +07:00
Denozordec 136474ba95 fix(ci): проверять тип отказа при превышении объёма потоков
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2026-11-22 11:34:08 +07:00
Denozordec f0e08f9731 fix(mcp): учитывать префиксы при проверке адресов соседей BGP
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2026-11-22 11:31:14 +07:00
29 changed files with 403 additions and 93 deletions

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+8 -3
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import { subscribeLogDevice } from "../../services/router-logs-collector.js"
import { ospfFilterFields, rosResources, readRosSnapshot, resourceById, routerClient, validateRosStep, splitOspfUnsetUpdate } from "./resources.js"
import { registerMcpOperation, listMcpOperations } from "./registry.js"
import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, MAX_MCP_PUBLIC_ARRAY_ITEMS, MAX_MCP_PUBLIC_STRING_LENGTH, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
import { effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
import type { McpAction, ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
import { registerRoutingActions } from "./routing-actions.js"
@@ -623,11 +624,15 @@ add("changes.read", "mm_change_get", "Просмотр своего плана",
const { loadPlan, publicPlan } = await import("./runtime.js")
const plan = await loadPlan(String(input.planId))
await assertPlanReadScope(plan, context)
return publicPlan(plan)
return publicPlan(plan, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(context.connection.policy) && plan.policy_version === context.connection.policy.version)
},
})
add("changes.apply", "mm_change_apply", "Применить свой план", "mcp", null, "write", "connection", z.object({ planId: z.string().uuid(), idempotencyKey: z.string().min(1).max(200) }).strict(), {
read: async (input, context) => (await import("./runtime.js")).applyPlan(context.principal, String(input.planId), String(input.idempotencyKey)),
add("changes.apply", "mm_change_apply", "Применить свой план", "mcp", null, "write", "connection", z.object({
planId: z.string().uuid(),
idempotencyKey: z.string().min(1).max(200),
announcedPlanDigest: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/).optional().describe("Значение announcement.digest. Передавайте только после отдельного видимого сообщения с точным планом в чате."),
}).strict(), {
read: async (input, context) => (await import("./runtime.js")).applyPlan(context.principal, String(input.planId), String(input.idempotencyKey), input.announcedPlanDigest as string | undefined),
})
add("changes.cancel", "mm_change_cancel", "Отменить свой незапущенный план", "mcp", null, "read", "connection", z.object({ planId: z.string().uuid() }).strict(), {
read: async (input, context) => {
+4 -2
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@@ -133,7 +133,9 @@ async function executeRestore(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal,origi
if (ids.some(id => !connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id) || !evidence.objects.some(object => object.kind === "server" && object.serverId === id))) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Область восстановления изменилась")
const { rows: grants } = await pool.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND payload->>'credentialId'=$2", [connection.id, principal.credentialId])
if (grants.some(grant => !grant.payload.scope?.allowGlobal || !grant.payload.scope?.operationIds?.includes("database.restore") || ids.some(id => !grant.payload.scope?.serverIds?.includes(id)))) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Временный допуск не разрешает восстановление")
if ((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'protection'='deny' LIMIT 1")).rows.length) throw new McpError("PROTECTED_OBJECT", "Восстановление заменяет запрещённый защищённый объект")
const { rows: [protection] } = await pool.query<{ denied: boolean }>("SELECT (object_ref->>'protection'='deny') AS denied FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'protection'='deny' OR $1::boolean ORDER BY denied DESC LIMIT 1", [!!plan.evidence.approvalSource])
if (protection?.denied) throw new McpError("PROTECTED_OBJECT", "Восстановление заменяет запрещённый защищённый объект")
if (protection) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Полное восстановление затрагивает объект с ручным подтверждением")
return { connection, ids }
}
try {
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ async function executeRestore(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal,origi
if (createHash("sha256").update(buffer).digest("hex") !== source.sha256) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Содержимое архива изменилось", 409)
if (!(await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='running' WHERE id=$1 AND state='pending' RETURNING id", [operationId])).rowCount) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Операция уже остановлена", 409)
stage = "restore"
const outcome = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds: ids, objects: evidence.objects, approved: true, serverWide: true }, () => restoreSystemDatabaseBackup(buffer, { beforeRestore: async () => {
const outcome = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds: ids, objects: evidence.objects, approved: true, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: true }, () => restoreSystemDatabaseBackup(buffer, { beforeRestore: async () => {
await assertAuthority(); await archive(payload.archiveRef, connection.owner_id)
await durableWrite(filename(source.id, ".used"), JSON.stringify({ operationId, at: new Date().toISOString() }), true)
await assertOriginalMcpTemporaryGrant(pool,principal.connectionId,principal.credentialId,originalGrant)
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { decryptSecret, decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinter
const MAX_BYTES = 2097152
const uuid = z.string().uuid()
const deny = (): never => { throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Исходная привязка отмены диагностики не подтверждена", 409) }
const sealedSchema = z.object({ sealed: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_BYTES) }).strict()
const sealedSchema = z.object({ sealed: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_BYTES), approvalSource: z.literal("connection-policy").optional() }).strict()
interface SourceCrypto { open(value: string): Promise<string>; proof(value: unknown): Promise<string> }
export interface DiagnosticCancellationOwner { connectionId: string; ownerId: string }
export interface DiagnosticCancellationSource {
@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ export function registerFlowAnalyticsActions(register: typeof add) {
analytics[key] = value.slice(offset, offset + limit)
pages[key] = { total: value.length, nextOffset: offset + limit < value.length ? offset + limit : null }
}
// Ring rates are server context, including when the retained rows are filtered by user/interface.
// Wire rate uses interface counters. Keep rate estimates separate from retained volume.
const { bpsNow: _bpsNow, bpsWire: _bpsWire, bpsOverlay: _bpsOverlay, bytesWire: _bytesWire, live: _live, ...retained } = analytics
await authorize()
if ((await readFlowSourceLimits()).topN !== limits.topN) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Предел источника NetFlow изменился во время чтения", 409)
await authorize()
const output = { serverId: server.id, minutes: sourceWindow?.effectiveMinutes ?? Number(input.minutes), sourceWindow, interface: input.interface ?? null, userId: input.userId ?? null,
analytics: retained, pages, contextRates: { bpsNowEstimate: _bpsNow, bpsWireEstimate: _bpsWire, bpsOverlayEstimate: _bpsOverlay, bytesWireEstimate: _bytesWire,
listenerBound: _live, userAttributionVerified: false, semantics: "REST estimates: current server/interface ring with retained-window fallback; wire projection uses current interface snapshots" },
listenerBound: _live, userAttributionVerified: false, semantics: "REST estimates: filtered or overlay-inclusive rates use the latest complete retained minute with a window-average fallback; wire uses current interface snapshots" },
readStartedAt: startedAt, observedAt: new Date().toISOString(), live: false,
source: "retained flow_buckets plus pending; same REST analytics engine with scoped topology",
rowLimit: 20000, topRowsPerBucketLimit: Math.max(20, limits.topN), engineTopListLimit: Math.min(50, Math.max(10, limits.topN)),
+1 -1
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export function registerFlowLiveActions(register: typeof add) {
source: "REST live sample engine: current ring estimates and rolling flow_buckets plus pending; uncached scoped reads",
rowLimit: 20000, incomplete: true, coverageVerified: false, forwardingVerified: false, rowSumIsNetworkTotal: false,
historicalOwnershipVerified: false, currentTrafficVerified: false,
rateSemantics: "REST live rates: current server/interface ring; retained-window fallback; user filter does not attribute ring rates",
rateSemantics: "REST live rates: filtered or overlay-inclusive rates use the latest complete retained minute with a window-average fallback",
liveMeaning: "events[].data.live means listener bound; it does not prove exporter freshness or forwarding",
attribution: "current named whole-interface bindings; users with hidden bindings excluded",
collectorStarted: false, backgroundEnrichmentStarted: false }
+81 -5
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { createMcpConnection, authenticateMcpToken, updateMcpSettings, rotateCon
import { invokeMcpTool, approvePlan, applyPlan, recoverMcpOperations } from "./runtime.js"
import { decryptSecret, encryptSecret, invalidateMcpAccess, tokenDigest } from "./security.js"
import { addRoutingDependencies } from "./routing-dependencies.js"
import { FlowSourceWindowTooLarge } from "../../services/traffic-flow-read-window.js"
import { acceptOspfRouteProofMcp } from "./ospf-route-proof-acceptance.js"
import { acceptNetworkNeighborsMcp } from "./network-neighbors-acceptance.js"
import { acceptIpv6NdWriteMcp } from "./ipv6-nd-write-acceptance.js"
@@ -1629,13 +1630,33 @@ try {
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(ospfPrincipal, "mm_ospf_instance_create_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: { name: "blocked-ospf", "router-id": "192.0.2.1", version: "3", vrf: "main" } }))
await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_protections WHERE id=$1", [vrfProtection])
bgpFixtures = true
const bgpAccess = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "BGP dependency test", mode: "approval", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1800000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:bgp:read", "mm:bgp:write", "mm:network:read"], scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ["ros.bgp_instance.delete", "ros.bgp_instance.update", "ros.bgp_connection.create", "ros.vrf.delete"], allowGlobal: false } }), actor)
const bgpAccess = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "BGP dependency test", mode: "approval", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1800000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:bgp:read", "mm:bgp:write", "mm:network:read"], scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ["ros.bgp_instance.delete", "ros.bgp_instance.update", "ros.bgp_connection.create", "ros.bgp_connection.update", "ros.vrf.delete"], allowGlobal: false } }), actor)
const bgpPrincipal = await authenticateMcpToken(bgpAccess.token)
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_instance_delete_plan", { serverId: 1, id: "*bgp" }), /используется подключением/)
const peerFields = { name: "new-peer", instance: "missing", "remote.address": "192.0.2.2", "local.address": "192.0.2.1", "remote.as": 64513, "local.role": "ebgp" }
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_connection_create_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: peerFields }), /Не подтверждена зависимость/)
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_connection_create_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: { ...peerFields, instance: "fixture-bgp", "local.address": "fd00::1" } }), /одного семейства/)
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_connection_create_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: { ...peerFields, instance: "fixture-bgp", "remote.address": "0.0.0.0/0" } }))
const savedPeer = fixtureBgp.connection[0]
const preparePassivePeer = () => invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_connection_update_plan", {
serverId: 1, id: savedPeer[".id"], fields: { connect: false, listen: true },
}) as Promise<{ state: string; changes: { steps: { step: { fields: unknown } }[] } }>
try {
for (const [local, remote] of [["10.255.255.100", "10.255.255.11/32"], ["2001:db8::1", "2001:db8::2/128"]]) {
fixtureBgp.connection[0] = { ...savedPeer, "local.address": local, "remote.address": remote }
const plan = await preparePassivePeer()
assert.equal(plan.state, "awaiting-approval")
assert.equal(plan.changes.steps.length, 1)
assert.deepEqual(plan.changes.steps[0].step.fields, { connect: "false", listen: "true" })
}
fixtureBgp.connection[0] = { ...savedPeer, "remote.address": "2001:db8::2/128" }
await assert.rejects(preparePassivePeer(), /одного семейства/)
fixtureBgp.connection[0] = { ...savedPeer, "remote.address": "192.0.2.2/33" }
await assert.rejects(preparePassivePeer(), /Некорректный адрес или префикс/)
} finally {
fixtureBgp.connection[0] = savedPeer
}
console.log("✓ MCP BGP dependency validation accepts stored IPv4/IPv6 CIDR for a passive-mode update and rejects mixed families and invalid prefix lengths")
const peerProtection = randomUUID()
await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_protections(id,object_ref,created_by) VALUES($1,$2::jsonb,'integration')", [peerProtection, JSON.stringify({ kind: "bgp_connection", id: "*peer", serverId: 1, protection: "deny" })])
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(bgpPrincipal, "mm_bgp_instance_update_plan", { serverId: 1, id: "*bgp", fields: { as: 64514 } }))
@@ -2033,7 +2054,7 @@ try {
assert.equal(badPeer.configurationMembershipVerified,false); assert.equal(badPeer.incomplete,true); assert.equal(badPeer.failures.length,1); assert.equal(badPeer.exporters[0].storedPeerRecord,null)
await pool.query("UPDATE traffic_flow_settings SET peers_json=jsonb_set(peers_json,'{0,publicKey}',$1::jsonb) WHERE id=1",[JSON.stringify("public-one")]); invalidateFlowSettings()
const rawWindow = await flowWindow(5,[1]); assert.equal(rawWindow.rows.length,4); assert.ok(rawWindow.rows.every(row=>row.serverId===1&&row.bucketAt<=rawWindow.until))
await assert.rejects(flowRows(rawWindow.since,1,{maxRows:1,untilIso:rawWindow.until}),/предел/)
await assert.rejects(flowRows(rawWindow.since,1,{maxRows:1,untilIso:rawWindow.until}),FlowSourceWindowTooLarge)
type TalkerPage = { items: {serverId:string;src:string;bytes:number;bps:number}[]; total:number; totalConversations:number; retainedRowsBytes:number; nextOffset:number|null; incomplete:boolean; serverIds:number[] }
const talkers = await invokeMcpTool(flowPrincipal,"mm_netflow_talkers_get",{minutes:5,limit:1}) as TalkerPage
assert.equal(talkers.retainedRowsBytes,3100); assert.equal(talkers.totalConversations,4); assert.equal(talkers.total,4); assert.equal(talkers.nextOffset,1); assert.equal(talkers.incomplete,true)
@@ -2099,8 +2120,14 @@ try {
assert.ok(restVisible.every((row:{src:string})=>row.src!=="198.18.242.6"),"Future rows must not enter REST talkers")
assert.equal((await flowHttp.inject({method:"GET",url:"/api/traffic/flows?range=5m"})).statusCode,200)
for(const path of ["/api/traffic/flow/exporters?range=5m","/api/traffic/flow/clients?range=5m","/api/traffic/flow/monthly?month="+flowMonth+"&serverId=1"]) { const response = await flowHttp.inject({method:"GET",url:path}); assert.equal(response.statusCode,200,response.body); assert.equal(typeof response.json(),"object") } } finally { await flowHttp.close() }
await pool.query("INSERT INTO flow_buckets(server_id,bucket_at,src,dst,bytes,packets,in_iface) SELECT 1,now()-interval '90 seconds'+n*interval '1 millisecond','198.18.242.11','8.8.8.8',1,1,'cap' FROM generate_series(1,50001) n")
await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(flowPrincipal,"mm_netflow_talkers_get",{minutes:5}), (error:{code?:string})=>error.code==="STATE_UNAVAILABLE")
await pool.query("INSERT INTO flow_buckets(server_id,bucket_at,src,dst,bytes,packets,in_iface) SELECT 1,now()-interval '90 seconds'+n*interval '1 microsecond','198.18.242.11','8.8.8.8',1,1,'cap' FROM generate_series(1,50001) n")
const denseReport = await invokeMcpTool(flowPrincipal, "mm_netflow_talkers_get", { minutes: 5 }) as TalkerPage & {
sourceWindow: { requestedMinutes: number; effectiveMinutes: number }; from: string; to: string
}
assert.equal(denseReport.sourceWindow.requestedMinutes, 5)
assert.equal(denseReport.sourceWindow.effectiveMinutes, 1)
assert.equal(Date.parse(denseReport.to) - Date.parse(denseReport.from), denseReport.sourceWindow.effectiveMinutes * 60_000)
assert(denseReport.items.every(row => row.src !== "198.18.242.11"), "The skipped dense window must not publish a partial page")
await pool.query("DELETE FROM flow_buckets WHERE server_id=1 AND src='198.18.242.11'")
const talkerRace = async (change:()=>Promise<unknown>, principal=flowPrincipal, signal?:AbortSignal) => {
const blocker = await pool.connect()
@@ -2134,7 +2161,7 @@ try {
assert.equal(catalogCalls,0,"Talker history and races must never poll RouterOS")
assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_plans WHERE connection_id=$1",[flowAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n,0)
assert.ok(!JSON.stringify((await pool.query("SELECT result FROM mcp_requests WHERE connection_id=$1",[flowAccess.connection.id])).rows).includes("NEVER_FLOW"))
console.log("✓ NetFlow talkers: shared REST parity, scoped SQL/pending, topN/pages, 50001-row refusal, real blocked-read source/topN/grant/owner/cancel/pause races, no global fields or network")
console.log("✓ NetFlow talkers: shared REST parity, scoped SQL/pending, topN/pages, bounded dense-window fallback, real blocked-read source/topN/grant/owner/cancel/pause races, no global fields or network")
} finally {
countCatalogCalls = false; clearPendingFlows(); resetFlowRipe()
await pool.query("DELETE FROM app_users WHERE id=ANY($1::text[])",[flowUsers])
@@ -3891,6 +3918,55 @@ try {
assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='owner.revoke' AND payload->>'eventId'=$1", [event.eventId])).rows[0].n, 1)
delete process.env.MCP_PORTAL_WEBHOOK_SECRET
console.log("✓ Signed portal revocation: tamper/stale rejection, one atomic event, revoked credentials and stale-JWT regrant prevention")
{
const serviceInput = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({
name: "Announced service plans", authority: "service", allowUnattendedPlans: true, mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null,
permissions: ["mm:network:write", "mm:settings:admin"],
scope: { serverIds: (await pool.query<{ id: number }>("SELECT id FROM servers")).rows.map(({ id }) => id),
allowGlobal: true, operationIds: ["ros.ip_settings.update", "logs.settings.update", "changes.read", "changes.apply"] },
limits: { mutationsPerHour: 500, objectsPerPlan: 500, serversPerPlan: 100 },
})
const { token } = await createMcpConnection(serviceInput, actor)
const service = await authenticateMcpToken(token)
const prepare = () => invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_ip_settings_update_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: { "rp-filter": "loose" } }) as Promise<{ planId: string; state: string; announcement?: { digest: string } }>
const beforeWrites = writes
const first = await prepare()
assert.equal(first.state, "draft")
assert.match(first.announcement!.digest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/)
const inspected = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_get", { planId: first.planId }) as { announcement: { digest: string } }
assert.equal(inspected.announcement.digest, first.announcement!.digest)
const apply = (planId: string, digest?: string) => invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_apply", {
planId, idempotencyKey: randomUUID(), ...(digest && { announcedPlanDigest: digest }),
}) as Promise<{ id: string }>
const denied = { code: "APPROVAL_REQUIRED" }
await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId), denied)
const second = await prepare()
await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId, second.announcement!.digest), denied)
const protection = randomUUID()
await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_protections(id,object_ref,created_by) VALUES($1,$2::jsonb,'integration')", [protection, JSON.stringify({ kind: "server", id: "1", serverId: 1, protection: "human-approval-required" })])
try {
await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId, first.announcement!.digest), denied)
const protectedPlan = await prepare()
assert.equal(protectedPlan.state, "awaiting-approval")
assert.equal(protectedPlan.announcement, undefined)
assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites)
} finally { await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_protections WHERE id=$1", [protection]) }
const operation = await apply(first.planId, first.announcement!.digest)
await awaitOperation(operation.id, "applied")
assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1)
const publicResult = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_get", { planId: first.planId }) as { approvalSource: string; approvedBy: string | null }
assert.equal(publicResult.approvalSource, "connection-policy")
assert.equal(publicResult.approvedBy, null)
const { rows: [start] } = await pool.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='operation.start' AND payload->>'planId'=$1", [first.planId])
assert.equal(start.payload.announcedPlanDigest, first.announcement!.digest)
assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='plan.approve' AND payload->>'planId'=$1", [first.planId])).rowCount, 0)
const { getLogSettings } = await import("../../services/router-logs-collector.js")
const retentionDays = Math.min(365, (await getLogSettings()).retentionDays + 1)
const global = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_logs_settings_update_plan", { settings: { retentionDays } }) as { planId: string; announcement: { digest: string } }
await awaitOperation((await apply(global.planId, global.announcement.digest)).id, "applied")
assert.equal((await getLogSettings()).retentionDays, retentionDays)
console.log("✓ Unattended MCP checks exact plan digest, current protections and delegated provenance for RouterOS and application writes")
}
await setConnectionStatus(issued.connection.id, "paused", actor)
await assert.rejects(authenticateMcpToken(rotated.token))
await setConnectionStatus(issued.connection.id, "active", actor)
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { assertNoOperationConfigurationLockContext } from "../../services/operat
import { validatePrincipal, audit, type McpPrincipal, type StoredOperation } from "./store.js"
import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError, mcpStateDirectory, privateFingerprinterExisting } from "./security.js"
import { findActionByOperation } from "./actions.js"
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
import { evaluateMcpPolicy, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority, operationApprovalRequirement } from "./policy.js"
import { changeMutationCost } from "./change-cost.js"
import { assertOriginalMcpTemporaryGrant, type OriginalServiceGrant } from "./temporary-grant-origin.js"
import type { ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ export const MCP_OPERATION_PRIVATE_CLAIM_KEY = "__mmappMcpOperationClaimV1"
export interface McpOperationExecutionMetadata {
readonly operationId: string; readonly planId: string; readonly connectionId: string; readonly ownerId: string
readonly operationName: string; readonly operationVersion: number; readonly policyVersion: number; readonly generation: string
readonly phase: "forward"; readonly approved: boolean; readonly principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>
readonly phase: "forward"; readonly approved: boolean; readonly approvalSource?: "connection-policy"; readonly principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>
readonly sealedEvidenceProof: string; readonly sealedPayloadProof: string
readonly originalTemporaryGrantProof: string; readonly originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt: number | null; readonly originalExpiresAt: number
readonly serverIds: readonly number[]; readonly resources: readonly McpObjectRef[]
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ declare const admissionBrand: unique symbol
export type McpOperationAdmissionStart = Readonly<{ [admissionStartBrand]: true }>
export type McpOperationAdmission = Readonly<{ [admissionBrand]: true }>
type Admission = { operationId: string; planId: string; connectionId: string; nonce: string; principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>; grant: Readonly<OriginalServiceGrant>
generation: string; directory: string; keyEpoch: string; operationName: string; operationVersion: number; policyVersion: number; evidenceProof: string; payloadProof: string }
generation: string; directory: string; keyEpoch: string; operationName: string; operationVersion: number; policyVersion: number; evidenceProof: string; payloadProof: string; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" }
const starts = new WeakMap<object, { principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>; wall: number; mono: number; directory: string; generation: string; keyEpoch: string }>(), admissions = new WeakMap<object, Admission>()
const deny = (): never => { throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Исходный MCP operation root недоступен", 403) }
const purpose = "mcp-operation-execution-origin-v1", keyMessage = "mcp-operation-execution-origin-key-epoch-v1"
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ export async function insertMcpOperationAdmission(client: PoolClient, start: Mcp
const admission = Object.freeze(Object.create(null)) as McpOperationAdmission
admissions.set(admission, { operationId: id, planId, connectionId: principal.connectionId, nonce: randomUUID(), principal, grant,
generation: row.generation, directory: anchor.directory, keyEpoch: anchor.keyEpoch, operationName: row.operation_id, operationVersion: row.operation_version, policyVersion: row.policy_version,
evidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), payloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed) })
evidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), payloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed), approvalSource: row.evidence.approvalSource })
return { operation: inserted.rows[0], admission, originalGrant: grant }
}
function grantFrom(row: Record<string, unknown>, principal: McpPrincipal) {
@@ -160,23 +160,25 @@ function source(entry: Entry, row: Record<string, unknown>, state: "pending" | "
|| state === "running" && row.claim_nonce !== entry.nonce || row.plan_state !== "executing" || row.owner_id !== m.ownerId
|| row.operation_id !== m.operationName || row.operation_version !== m.operationVersion || row.policy_version !== m.policyVersion
|| row.generation !== m.generation || row.connection_generation !== m.generation || !!row.approved_by !== m.approved
|| m.approvalSource && row.approved_by !== m.ownerId
|| !(row.expires_at instanceof Date) || row.expires_at.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt
|| !row.evidence || typeof row.evidence !== "object" || !row.payload || typeof row.payload !== "object") deny()
const evidence = row.evidence as { sealed?: unknown }, payload = row.payload as { sealed?: unknown }
if (typeof evidence.sealed !== "string" || typeof payload.sealed !== "string" || sha(evidence.sealed) !== m.sealedEvidenceProof || sha(payload.sealed) !== m.sealedPayloadProof) deny()
const evidence = row.evidence as { sealed?: unknown; approvalSource?: unknown }, payload = row.payload as { sealed?: unknown }
if (typeof evidence.sealed !== "string" || typeof payload.sealed !== "string" || evidence.approvalSource !== m.approvalSource || sha(evidence.sealed) !== m.sealedEvidenceProof || sha(payload.sealed) !== m.sealedPayloadProof) deny()
const action = findActionByOperation(m.operationName)
if (action.operation.version !== m.operationVersion) deny()
const grant = grantFrom(row, m.principal)
if (grant.proof !== m.originalTemporaryGrantProof || grant.expiresAt !== m.originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt || !Array.isArray(row.protections) || row.protections.length > 1000) deny()
const policy = row.policy as Parameters<typeof evaluateMcpPolicy>[0]["policy"]
const protections = row.protections as Parameters<typeof evaluateMcpPolicy>[0]["protections"]
if (policy.version !== m.policyVersion || !(row.owner_valid_until instanceof Date) || row.owner_valid_until.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt) deny()
if (policy.version !== m.policyVersion || m.approvalSource && !hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy) || !(row.owner_valid_until instanceof Date) || row.owner_valid_until.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt) deny()
const approval = operationApprovalRequirement(policy, m.operationName, m.evidence.target, m.evidence.requiresHuman)
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy({ operationId: m.operationName, policy, ownerPermissions: row.owner_permissions as string[], target: m.evidence.target,
objects: [...m.evidence.objects, ...(m.evidence.requiresHuman && m.evidence.target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: m.operationName }] : [])],
objects: [...m.evidence.objects, ...approval.objects],
objectCount: changeMutationCost(m.evidence) + (m.evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0),
protections: [...protections, ...(m.evidence.requiresHuman && m.evidence.target.scope === "servers" ? m.evidence.target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const })) : [])],
protections: [...protections, ...approval.protections],
usage: { callsInMinute: 0, mutationsInHour: 0, concurrentReads: Number(row.concurrent_reads) }, auditAvailable: true, temporaryGrant: grant.value })
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && !m.approved) deny()
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!m.approved || m.approvalSource)) deny()
}
/** Two current joined snapshots around real principal/grant checks. Nothing is
* cached across calls; the final SQL validates exact source + policy + grant. */
@@ -268,13 +270,14 @@ export async function withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin(admission: unknown, work:
if (row.operation_state !== "pending") { interruptOwn = false; return }
if (!row.evidence?.sealed || !row.payload?.sealed || row.connection_generation !== generation || row.generation !== generation
|| row.plan_id !== admitted.planId || generation !== admitted.generation || row.operation_id !== admitted.operationName || row.operation_version !== admitted.operationVersion
|| row.policy_version !== admitted.policyVersion || sha(row.evidence.sealed) !== admitted.evidenceProof || sha(row.payload.sealed) !== admitted.payloadProof) return deny()
|| row.policy_version !== admitted.policyVersion || row.evidence.approvalSource !== admitted.approvalSource
|| sha(row.evidence.sealed) !== admitted.evidenceProof || sha(row.payload.sealed) !== admitted.payloadProof) return deny()
const evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence, privateInput = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.payload.sealed)) as Record<string, unknown>
if (!Array.isArray(evidence.steps) || !Array.isArray(evidence.objects) || !Array.isArray(evidence.snapshots) || !privateInput || typeof privateInput !== "object" || Array.isArray(privateInput)) return deny()
const expiresAt = Math.min(originalGrant.admissionExpiresAt, row.expires_at.getTime(), Date.parse(capturedPrincipal.credentialExpiresAt), Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt), connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(), evidence.validUntil ? Date.parse(evidence.validUntil) : Infinity)
const metadata = frozen({ operationId, planId: String(row.plan_id), connectionId: capturedPrincipal.connectionId, ownerId: connection.owner_id,
operationName: String(row.operation_id), operationVersion: Number(row.operation_version), policyVersion: Number(row.policy_version), generation, phase: "forward" as const,
approved: !!row.approved_by, principal: capturedPrincipal, sealedEvidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), sealedPayloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed),
approved: !!row.approved_by, ...(admitted.approvalSource && { approvalSource: admitted.approvalSource }), principal: capturedPrincipal, sealedEvidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), sealedPayloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed),
originalTemporaryGrantProof: originalGrant.proof, originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt: originalGrant.expiresAt, originalExpiresAt: expiresAt,
serverIds: [...new Set([...(evidence.target.scope === "servers" ? evidence.target.serverIds : []), ...evidence.objects.flatMap(object => object.serverId === undefined ? [] : [object.serverId])])].sort((a, b) => a - b),
resources: structuredClone(evidence.objects), privateInput, evidence })
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import { decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinterExisting, redac
const uuid = z.string().uuid()
const positive = z.number().int().positive().safe()
const object = z.record(z.string(),z.unknown())
const sealed = z.object({sealed:z.string().min(1).max(262144)}).strict()
const sealed = z.object({sealed:z.string().min(1).max(262144),approvalSource:z.literal("connection-policy").optional()}).strict()
const ids = z.array(positive).max(1000)
const retention = z.number().int().min(1).max(365)
const bool = z.boolean()
+14 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import assert from "node:assert/strict"
import { test } from "node:test"
import { mcpOperationDescriptorSchema, mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema, mcpPolicyDecisionSchema, mcpTemporaryGrantSchema, type McpPolicyPreviewRequest } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
import { MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION, mcpConnectionPolicySchema, mcpOperationDescriptorSchema, mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema, mcpPolicyDecisionSchema, mcpTemporaryGrantSchema, type McpPolicyPreviewRequest } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
import { findMcpOperation, listMcpOperations } from "./registry.js"
@@ -42,6 +42,19 @@ test("mode × dangerous policy matrix never grants autonomy implicitly", () => {
}
})
test("unattended plans require an explicit service policy and retain server protections", () => {
const input = request()
assert.equal(mcpConnectionPolicySchema.safeParse({ ...input.policy, allowUnattendedPlans: true }).success, false)
input.policy = mcpConnectionPolicySchema.parse({ ...input.policy, authority: "service", expiresAt: MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION })
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "approval-required")
input.policy.allowUnattendedPlans = true
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "allowed")
input.protections = [{ kind: "server", id: "1", protection: "human-approval-required" }]
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "approval-required")
input.protections[0].protection = "deny"
denied(input, "PROTECTED_OBJECT")
})
test("observer reads permitted logs, but cannot run bandwidth or create users", () => {
const read = request("logs.query"); read.policy.mode = "observer"
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(read, now).decision, "allowed")
+13 -1
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,22 @@ import {
type McpPolicyDecision,
type McpPolicyPreviewRequest,
type McpPolicyReasonCode,
type McpConnectionPolicy,
} from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
import { hasPermission } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
import { findMcpOperation } from "./registry.js"
export function hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy: McpConnectionPolicy) {
return policy.authority === "service" && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.allowUnattendedPlans === true
}
export function operationApprovalRequirement(policy: McpConnectionPolicy, operationId: string, target: McpPolicyPreviewRequest["target"], requiresHuman?: boolean): Pick<McpPolicyPreviewRequest, "objects" | "protections"> {
if (!requiresHuman || hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy)) return { objects: [], protections: [] }
const objects = target.scope === "servers" ? [] : [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId }]
const protectedObjects = target.scope === "servers" ? target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId })) : objects
return { objects, protections: protectedObjects.map(object => ({ ...object, protection: "human-approval-required" })) }
}
/** Pure policy simulation. Does not grant authority, reserve budgets or execute handlers. */
export function evaluateMcpPolicy(payload: McpPolicyPreviewRequest, now = new Date()): McpPolicyDecision {
const input = mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema.parse(payload)
@@ -87,7 +99,7 @@ export function evaluateMcpPolicy(payload: McpPolicyPreviewRequest, now = new Da
else approve("Защищённый объект требует подтверждения человеком")
}
if (policy.mode === "approval") approve("Режим подключения требует подтверждения человеком")
if (operation.risk === "dangerous" && !(policy.dangerousPolicy === "explicit-allow" && policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.includes(operation.id))) {
if (operation.risk === "dangerous" && !hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy) && !(policy.dangerousPolicy === "explicit-allow" && policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.includes(operation.id))) {
approve("Опасная операция не разрешена для автономного выполнения")
}
return result()
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ts from "typescript"
import { z } from "zod"
import { routeAiControllerBlockReason, routeAiProfileSchema, usesScopedRouteAiContext } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
type Handler = { prepare?: (input: Record<string, unknown>, context: unknown) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>; execute?: (input: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<unknown> }
async function load(name: string, providers: Record<string, unknown>) {
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ async function fixture() {
"./path-proof-purpose.js": { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS: 90000 },
"./routing-controller-fence.js": { saveControllerProfileCas: async () => { casWrites++; return { id: "saved", version: 1 } } },
"./routing-reservation-store.js": { createRoutingReservationStore: () => { throw new Error("Overlap-only fixture must not read or mutate routing charges") } },
"./policy.js": { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority },
})
const register = profileModule.registerRoutingProfileActions as (register: (...args: unknown[]) => void) => void
register((...args) => operations.set(String(args[0]), args.at(-1) as Handler))
@@ -134,6 +134,15 @@ export async function resolveOspfInterfaceSelectors(serverId: number, selectors:
return names
}
function bgpAddressFamily(value: string): number {
if (!value.includes("/")) return isIP(value)
try {
return isIP(canonicalBgpPolicyPrefix(value).split("/")[0])
} catch {
return 0
}
}
export async function addRoutingDependencies(serverId: number, resource: string, action: RosStep["action"], current: ConfigurationRow | undefined, fields: Record<string, string>, snapshots: RosSnapshot[], objects: ChangeEvidence["objects"]) {
const read = async (id: string) => {
const existing = snapshots.find(snapshot => snapshot.resource === id)
@@ -227,7 +236,11 @@ export async function addRoutingDependencies(serverId: number, resource: string,
}
if (resource === "bgp_connection") {
const local = fields["local.address"] ?? current?.["local.address"], remote = fields["remote.address"] ?? current?.["remote.address"]
if (typeof local === "string" && typeof remote === "string" && isIP(local) !== isIP(remote)) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Адреса BGP-соединения должны быть одного семейства", 400)
if (typeof local === "string" && typeof remote === "string") {
const localFamily = bgpAddressFamily(local), remoteFamily = bgpAddressFamily(remote)
if (!localFamily || !remoteFamily) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Некорректный адрес или префикс BGP-соединения", 400)
if (localFamily !== remoteFamily) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Адреса BGP-соединения должны быть одного семейства", 400)
}
}
if (resource === "bgp_instance" && current && ["as", "router-id", "disabled"].some(key => fields[key] !== undefined && fields[key] !== current[key])) {
for (const row of (await read("bgp_connection")).rows.filter(row => [current.name, current[".id"]].includes(row.instance))) objects.push({ kind: "bgp_connection", id: String(row[".id"]), serverId })
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import type { ActionContext } from "./action-types.js"
import { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
import { controllerProfileCurrent, publishControllerState, saveControllerProfileCas, withControllerProfileLease } from "./routing-controller-fence.js"
import { assertIdentifiedRoutingCompletion, createRoutingReservationStore } from "./routing-reservation-store.js"
import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
const targetIds = (profile: RouteAiProfile) => [...new Set([profile.serverId, ...profile.candidates.flatMap(candidate => [candidate.jumpHostId, candidate.exitNodeId])])]
const profilePublicColumns = "id,version,config,state,enabled,grant_expires_at,updated_at"
@@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ async function tickAdmittedRoutingProfiles() {
next.reason = "Изменение конфигурации проверено; ожидаются новые измерения сети"
} else if (plan.operation_id) next.reason = "Операция выполняется"
else if (plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) { await stop("План истёк без подтверждения"); return }
else if (plan.state === "draft" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)) next.reason = "Ожидается публикация плана клиентом MCP"
else if (["approved", "draft"].includes(plan.state)) {
await current()
await assertRoutingControllerBaseline(state.baseline,row.id,row.version,profile,row.grant_expires_at.toISOString(),{principal,connection})
+41 -22
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import { readPollRuntimePolicySource, type PollRuntimePolicySource } from "./pol
import { withVerifiedConfigurationChange, assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess } from "../../services/config-mutation-policy.js"
import { beginMcpOperationAdmission, insertMcpOperationAdmission, retireMcpOperationAdmission, withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin, stripMcpOperationExecutionPrivateResult, type McpOperationAdmission } from "./operation-execution-origin.js"
import { createOspfOwnerSourceGuard, verifyOspfOwnerGraph, verifyOspfOwnerGraphAtPhase } from "./ospf-owner-graph.js"
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
import { evaluateMcpPolicy, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority, operationApprovalRequirement } from "./policy.js"
import { findAction, findActionByOperation } from "./actions.js"
import { refuseExpiredOperationReplay } from "./operation-replay-tombstones.js"
import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
@@ -105,14 +105,11 @@ async function policyInput(client: Pick<PoolClient, "query">, connection: Connec
SELECT COALESCE((SELECT used FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=$1 AND kind='calls' AND bucket=date_trunc('minute',now())),0) AS calls,
COALESCE((SELECT used FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=$1 AND kind='mutations' AND bucket=date_trunc('hour',now())),0) AS mutations,
(SELECT count(*)::int FROM mcp_read_leases WHERE connection_id=$1 AND expires_at>now()) AS reads`, [connection.id])
const approval = operationApprovalRequirement(connection.policy, operationId, target, evidence?.requiresHuman)
return {
operationId, policy: connection.policy, ownerPermissions: connection.owner_permissions, target,
objects: [...(evidence?.objects ?? []), ...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId }] : [])], objectCount: evidence ? changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0) : 0,
protections: [
...protections.map(row => mcpProtectedObjectSchema.parse(row.object_ref)),
...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope === "servers" ? target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const })) : []),
...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const }] : []),
],
objects: [...(evidence?.objects ?? []), ...approval.objects], objectCount: evidence ? changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0) : 0,
protections: [...protections.map(row => mcpProtectedObjectSchema.parse(row.object_ref)), ...approval.protections],
usage: { callsInMinute: Number(usage.calls), mutationsInHour: Number(usage.mutations), concurrentReads: Number(usage.reads) }, auditAvailable: true,
}
}
@@ -209,7 +206,8 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
const id = randomUUID(), expiresAt = preparedPlanExpiry(action.operation.id, action.operation.section, evidence)
if (!expiresAt) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Срок исходных данных плана истёк или недоступен; подготовьте новый план", 409)
const generation = await accessGeneration()
await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7::jsonb,$8::jsonb,$9,$10)", [id, connection.id, action.operation.id, action.operation.version, connection.policy.version, generation, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(input)) }), JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence)) }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", expiresAt])
let sealedEvidence = await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence))
await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7::jsonb,$8::jsonb,$9,$10)", [id, connection.id, action.operation.id, action.operation.version, connection.policy.version, generation, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(input)) }), JSON.stringify({ sealed: sealedEvidence }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", expiresAt])
const vrfTicket = await prepareRuntimeVrfTicket({ operationId: action.operation.id, operationVersion: action.operation.version, planId: id, connectionId: connection.id, ownerId: connection.owner_id, evidence, sql: client,
assertAuthority: async () => {
if (signal?.aborted || generation !== await accessGeneration() || expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Подготовка VRF отменена или устарела", 409)
@@ -238,11 +236,14 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
finalCheck.usage.callsInMinute = Math.max(0, finalCheck.usage.callsInMinute - 1)
decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(finalCheck)
if (decision.decision === "denied") throw new McpError(decision.reasons[0].code, decision.reasons.map(reason => reason.message).join("; "))
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET evidence=$2::jsonb,state=$3 WHERE id=$1", [id, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence)) }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft"])
sealedEvidence = await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence))
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET evidence=$2::jsonb,state=$3 WHERE id=$1", [id, JSON.stringify({ sealed: sealedEvidence }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft"])
}
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "plan.create", connection.id, { planId: id, operationId: action.operation.id, decision })
assertActive()
return { planId: id, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(), state: decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", decision, changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(action.operation.id, evidence)), ...(vrfTicket ? { vrfTicket } : {}), executionAvailable: true }
const announcement = decision.decision === "allowed" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)
? planAnnouncement(id, sealedEvidence) : undefined
return { planId: id, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(), state: decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", decision, changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(action.operation.id, evidence)), ...(announcement && { operationId: action.operation.id, announcement }), ...(vrfTicket ? { vrfTicket } : {}), executionAvailable: true }
})
vrfPreparing = false
} else throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Нет обработчика операции", 409)
@@ -278,10 +279,19 @@ export async function loadPlan(id: string, client: Pick<PoolClient, "query"> = p
if (!plan) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "План не найден", 404)
return plan
}
export async function publicPlan(plan: StoredPlan) {
function planAnnouncement(planId: string, sealedEvidence: string) {
return {
digest: fingerprint({ planId, sealedEvidence }),
instruction: "Сначала отправьте пользователю отдельное видимое сообщение в чате с ID плана, целями, конкретными изменениями и предупреждениями из changes. Затем вызовите mm_change_apply с announcedPlanDigest. Ответ пользователя для этого плана не требуется.",
}
}
export async function publicPlan(plan: StoredPlan, unattended = false) {
const evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
return { id: plan.id, connectionId: plan.connection_id, operationId: plan.operation_id, state: plan.state,
expiresAt: plan.expires_at.toISOString(), createdAt: plan.created_at.toISOString(), approvedBy: plan.approved_by,
expiresAt: plan.expires_at.toISOString(), createdAt: plan.created_at.toISOString(), approvedBy: plan.evidence.approvalSource ? null : plan.approved_by,
...(plan.evidence.approvalSource && { approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, authorizedBy: plan.approved_by }),
...(unattended && plan.state === "draft" && plan.expires_at.getTime() > Date.now() && { announcement: planAnnouncement(plan.id, plan.evidence.sealed) }),
changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(plan.operation_id, evidence)), input: redact(JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.payload.sealed))) }
}
export async function approvePlan(id: string, actor: AuthUser, approve: boolean) {
@@ -378,10 +388,10 @@ export async function verifyStep(step: ChangeStep, result: unknown, before?: Ros
if (!before) return false
return verifyRosStepSnapshots(step.step, result, before, after ?? await readRosSnapshot(step.step.serverId, step.step.resource))
}
export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
return withMcpDatabaseRequest(() => admitPlan(principal, planId, idempotencyKey))
export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string, announcedPlanDigest?: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
return withMcpDatabaseRequest(() => admitPlan(principal, planId, idempotencyKey, announcedPlanDigest))
}
async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string, announcedPlanDigest?: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
const operationAdmissionStart = beginMcpOperationAdmission(principal)
let reservedRouting = false
let originalServiceGrant:OriginalServiceGrant|undefined
@@ -408,6 +418,10 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
const action = findActionByOperation(plan.operation_id)
if (plan.policy_version !== connection.policy.version || plan.operation_version !== action.operation.version || plan.generation !== await accessGeneration() || plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "План или его разрешения устарели", 409)
if (!["draft", "approved"].includes(plan.state)) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "План требует подтверждения или недоступен", 409)
const delegated = plan.state === "draft" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)
if (delegated && announcedPlanDigest !== planAnnouncement(plan.id, plan.evidence.sealed).digest) {
throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Сначала опубликуйте точный план в чате и передайте его announcedPlanDigest", 409)
}
for (const change of evidence.steps) {
if (change.kind === "ros" && change.step.resource === "ip_settings" && change.step.fields["rp-filter"] === "strict") {
checkRpfPolicy(change.step.serverId, evidence.snapshots, "strict")
@@ -415,7 +429,7 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
}
let scopedPathExpiresAt: number | undefined
if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" && requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval(evidence)) {
if (plan.approved_by !== connection.owner_id) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 409)
if (!delegated && plan.approved_by !== connection.owner_id) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 409)
scopedPathExpiresAt = await readScopedRoutingPathAdmissionDeadline(client, evidence, connection.id)
}
if (evidence.validUntil && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(evidence.validUntil)) || Date.now() >= Date.parse(evidence.validUntil))) {
@@ -449,18 +463,23 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
const mutationCost = reservedRouting ? 2 : changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0)
if (input.usage.mutationsInHour + mutationCost > connection.policy.limits.mutationsPerHour) throw new McpError("BUDGET_EXCEEDED", "Недостаточно бюджета для всех шагов плана", 429)
if (!reservedRouting) await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_budget_buckets(connection_id,kind,bucket,used) VALUES($1,'mutations',date_trunc('hour',now()),$2) ON CONFLICT(connection_id,kind,bucket) DO UPDATE SET used=mcp_budget_buckets.used+EXCLUDED.used", [connection.id, mutationCost])
if (delegated) {
// Execution receipts use the delegating owner's ID. Object protections still require a human decision.
plan.evidence.approvalSource = "connection-policy"
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing',approved_by=$2,approved_at=now(),evidence=$3::jsonb WHERE id=$1", [planId, connection.owner_id, JSON.stringify(plan.evidence)])
plan.approved_by = connection.owner_id
} else await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing' WHERE id=$1", [planId])
const inserted = await insertMcpOperationAdmission(client, operationAdmissionStart, planId, idempotencyKey, originalServiceGrant)
const row = inserted.operation, id = row.id
operationAdmission = inserted.admission; originalServiceGrant = inserted.originalGrant
if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" || plan.operation_id === "operations.recover") {
bindRoutingChargeAdmission(client, connection.id, principal.credentialId, inserted.originalGrant)
}
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing' WHERE id=$1", [planId])
if (reservedRouting) await reserveRouting(id)
else if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch") await admitPersistentRoutingForwardWithinOwner(client, id)
else if (plan.operation_id === "operations.recover") await admitManualInverseWithinOwner(client, id, plan, evidence, principal,
(profileId, current, observedAt, deadlineAt) => readHistoricalChargesWithinOwner(client, profileId, current, observedAt, deadlineAt))
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "operation.start", connection.id, { operationId: id, planId })
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "operation.start", connection.id, { operationId: id, planId, ...(delegated && { approvalSource: "connection-policy", announcedPlanDigest }) })
return row
}).catch(async error => { await retireMcpOperationAdmission(operationAdmission); throw error })
const operation = admitted.value
@@ -568,7 +587,7 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
policy.usage.callsInMinute = 0; policy.usage.mutationsInHour = 0
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(policy)
if (decision.decision === "denied") throw new McpError(decision.reasons[0].code, decision.reasons.map(reason => reason.message).join("; "))
if (decision.decision === "approval-required" && !plan.approved_by) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение теперь требует подтверждения", 409)
if (decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!plan.approved_by || plan.evidence.approvalSource)) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение теперь требует подтверждения", 409)
}
if (policyLoan) await executeRuntimePollPolicyTransaction(policyLoan, checkPolicy)
else await transaction(checkPolicy)
@@ -681,7 +700,7 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
}
stepDispatches++
} : undefined
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, serverWide: step.kind === "service", ...(serviceExecution?{serviceExecution}:{}), authorize: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? authorizeCatalog() : authorize()) }, authorizeWrite: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? catalogStage.fresh() : authorizeStage.fresh()) }, beforeDispatch },
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: step.kind === "service", ...(serviceExecution?{serviceExecution}:{}), authorize: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? authorizeCatalog() : authorize()) }, authorizeWrite: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? catalogStage.fresh() : authorizeStage.fresh()) }, beforeDispatch },
async () => {
vrfDiagnosticFallback?.executorEntered()
if (step.kind === "ros") {
@@ -830,7 +849,7 @@ async function performReservedRecovery(operation: StoredOperation, plan: StoredP
input.temporaryGrant = await temporaryScope(client, connection, principal.credentialId)
input.usage.callsInMinute = 0; input.usage.mutationsInHour = 0
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(input)
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && !plan.approved_by) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Текущая защита или допуск запрещает восстановление")
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!plan.approved_by || plan.evidence.approvalSource)) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Текущая защита или допуск запрещает восстановление")
})
for (const channel of evidence.managementChannels ?? []) await verifyManagementChannel(channel.serverId, channel.channelId)
if (!evidence.managementChannels?.length) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Восстановление требует независимого канала")
@@ -847,7 +866,7 @@ async function performReservedRecovery(operation: StoredOperation, plan: StoredP
await audit(pool, connection.owner_id, "recovery.intent", connection.id, { operationId: operation.id, authorityProfileId: recovery.authorityProfileId })
attempted = true
const step = recovery.step
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, serverWide: true }, () => serviceExecute(step.service, step.input, { operationId: operation.id, phase: "recovery" }))
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: true }, () => serviceExecute(step.service, step.input, { operationId: operation.id, phase: "recovery" }))
if (!await verifyStep(step, result)) throw new McpError("VERIFICATION_FAILED", "Проверка восстановления не прошла", 409)
await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_recovery_intents SET state='verified',finished_at=now() WHERE operation_id=$1", [operation.id])
await audit(pool, connection.owner_id, "recovery.verified", connection.id, { operationId: operation.id })
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export async function effectiveMcpConnection(principal: McpPrincipal, client: Pi
}
export interface StoredPlan extends QueryResultRow {
id: string; connection_id: string; operation_id: string; operation_version: number; policy_version: number;
generation: string; payload: { sealed: string }; evidence: { sealed: string }; state: string;
generation: string; payload: { sealed: string }; evidence: { sealed: string; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" }; state: string;
expires_at: Date; approved_by: string | null; created_at: Date
}
export interface StoredOperation extends QueryResultRow {
+5 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ function makeMcpServerWithBindings(principal: McpPrincipal, bindings: ReturnType
for (const action of bindings) {
const descriptor = action.operation
server.registerTool(descriptor.toolName, {
title: descriptor.title, description: `${descriptor.title}. ${action.prepare ? "Подготавливает неизменяемый план; применение отдельным вызовом после проверки политики." : "Возвращает данные только из разрешённой области."}`,
title: descriptor.title, description: `${descriptor.title}. ${action.prepare
? "Подготавливает неизменяемый план. Если возвращён announcement, опубликуйте точные изменения отдельным сообщением в чате до вызова применения."
: descriptor.id === "changes.apply"
? "Если план содержит announcement, сначала отправьте точные изменения пользователю в чат, затем передайте announcedPlanDigest."
: "Возвращает данные только из разрешённой области."}`,
inputSchema: action.schema, annotations: descriptor.annotations,
}, async (input, sdkContext) => {
const execute = async () => {
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export interface VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata {
}
// `authorize` guards reads inside a stage and may reuse a recent proof; `authorizeWrite`, when given, is a
// fresh check before every native or application write (each write is a stage boundary).
interface VerifiedChange { active: boolean; actorId: string; connectionId: string; approved: boolean; serverIds: number[]; objects: McpObjectRef[]; serverWide: boolean; authorize?: () => Promise<void>; authorizeWrite?: () => Promise<void>; beforeDispatch?: () => Promise<void>; serviceExecution?:VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata }
interface VerifiedChange { active: boolean; actorId: string; connectionId: string; approved: boolean; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" | null; serverIds: number[]; objects: McpObjectRef[]; serverWide: boolean; authorize?: () => Promise<void>; authorizeWrite?: () => Promise<void>; beforeDispatch?: () => Promise<void>; serviceExecution?:VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata }
const verified = new AsyncLocalStorage<VerifiedChange>()
declare const serviceExecutionBrand:unique symbol
export type VerifiedMcpServiceExecution=Readonly<{[serviceExecutionBrand]:true}>
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export async function assertDatabaseRestoreAllowed() {
const inherited = verified.getStore(), context = inherited?.active ? inherited : undefined
const { rows } = await pool.query("SELECT object_ref FROM mcp_protections")
for (const row of rows) {
if (row.object_ref.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
if (row.object_ref.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
const code = row.object_ref.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED"
await audit(pool, context?.actorId ?? actor.getStore() ?? "system", "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { domain: "database.restore", code })
throw new McpError(code, "Полное восстановление затрагивает защищённый объект", 409)
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export async function executeGuardedConfigurationWrite<T>(serverId: number, meth
// typed plan instead of guessing that their writes miss a protected object.
const matches = !context || context.serverWide || protection.kind === "server" || context.objects.some(object => object.serverId === serverId && object.kind === protection.kind && object.id === protection.id)
if (!matches) continue
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
const code = protection.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED"
await auditConfiguration(actorId, "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { serverId, method, path, code })
throw new McpError(code, protection.protection === "deny" ? "Изменение заблокировано защитой объекта. Используйте план с проверкой зависимостей." : "Защищённый объект требует подтверждённого плана изменений.", 409)
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ export async function executeGuardedApplicationWrite<T>(object: { kind: string;
const { rows } = await pool.query("SELECT object_ref FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'serverId'=ANY($1::text[]) OR (object_ref->>'kind'='server' AND object_ref->>'id'=ANY($1::text[])) OR (object_ref->>'kind'=$2 AND object_ref->>'id'=$3) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM jsonb_array_elements($4::jsonb) AS target WHERE target->>'kind'=object_ref->>'kind' AND target->>'id'=object_ref->>'id')", [serverIds.map(String), object.kind, object.id, JSON.stringify(objects)])
for (const row of rows) {
const protection = row.object_ref as { protection: string }
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
await auditConfiguration(actorId, "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { domain: "application", object, serverIds })
throw new McpError(protection.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение приложения затрагивает защищённый объект; нужен проверенный план", 409)
}
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ const admissionSchema = z.object({ receipt_id: uuid, identity_kind: z.literal("m
const operationSchema = z.object({ id: uuid, plan_id: uuid, connection_id: uuid, state: z.literal("applied"), verification: z.literal("passed"),
error_code: z.null(), result: z.unknown(), created_at: time, finished_at: time }).passthrough()
const planSchema = z.object({ id: uuid, connection_id: uuid, operation_id: z.literal("servers.poll"), operation_version: z.literal(1),
state: z.literal("completed"), created_at: time, approved_by: actor, approved_at: time, expires_at: time, payload: sealed, evidence: sealed }).passthrough()
state: z.literal("completed"), created_at: time, approved_by: actor, approved_at: time, expires_at: time, payload: sealed,
evidence: sealed.extend({ approvalSource: z.literal("connection-policy").optional() }) }).passthrough()
const stepSchema = z.object({ operation_id: uuid, step_index: z.literal(0), server_id: z.null(), state: z.literal("verified"), intended_state: z.unknown(),
result: z.unknown(), finished_at: time }).passthrough()
const inputSchema = z.object({ serverId: sid, receiptId: uuid, inputDigest: hash, bindingCiphertext: z.string().min(1).max(2097152) }).strict()
+40 -21
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ import {
listFlowRowsForWindow,
type PendingFlowRow,
} from "./traffic-flow-ingest.js"
import { flowDataEpoch, MAX_PENDING, RING_OVERLAY } from "./traffic-flow-engine.js"
import { flowDataEpoch, MAX_PENDING } from "./traffic-flow-engine.js"
import { resolveIfaceName } from "./traffic-flow-ifaces.js"
import { getTrafficFlowSettingsRow } from "./traffic-flow-settings.js"
import { applicationName, flowRowMatchesFilter } from "./traffic-flow-apps.js"
import { dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes, flowTupleKey } from "./traffic-flow-dedup.js"
import { collapseGreEspRows, dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes, flowTupleKey } from "./traffic-flow-dedup.js"
import { enqueueRipeMisses } from "./traffic-flow-ripe.js"
import { classifyFlowPlane, flowBps, shouldKeepPlane } from "./traffic-flow-planes.js"
import { flowRateDirection, resolveInternetDest } from "./traffic-flow-dest.js"
@@ -215,6 +215,23 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
if (!scope) refreshFlowCatalogInBackground()
const matchesIngress = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRowMatchesFilter(row, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name, q, allow)
const matchesEgress = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: row.serverId, inIface: row.outIface }, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name, q, allow)
const serverDirection = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRateDirection(row.serverId, row, topo, catalog.byId.get(row.serverId)?.host)
const interfaceDirection = (row: PendingFlowRow) => {
const ingress = matchesIngress(row), egress = matchesEgress(row)
return ingress === egress ? null : ingress ? "rx" : "tx"
}
const selected = ifaceFilter || allow ? raw.filter(row => matchesIngress(row) || matchesEgress(row)) : raw
const { rows, espDirections } = collapseGreEspRows(selected, ifaceFilter ? interfaceDirection : serverDirection)
const previousMinute = new Date(Math.floor(Date.now() / 60_000) * 60_000 - 60_000).toISOString()
const ifacesForWire = new Set<string>()
for (const row of selected) {
ifacesForWire.add(resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name)
const egress = resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name
if (egress && egress !== "—") ifacesForWire.add(egress)
}
const applications = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
const protocols = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
const sources = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
@@ -234,16 +251,12 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
const skipHeavy = Boolean(q.skipHeavy)
let bytesPayload = 0
let bytesOverlay = 0
let recentOverlayBytes = 0
let bytesMesh = 0
const ifacesForWire = new Set<string>()
for (const r of raw) {
for (const r of rows) {
const resolved = resolveIfaceName(r.serverId, r.inIface)
const outResolved = resolveIfaceName(r.serverId, r.outIface)
if (!flowRowMatchesFilter(r, resolved.name, q, allow)
&& !flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: r.serverId, inIface: r.outIface }, outResolved.name, q, allow)) continue
ifacesForWire.add(resolved.name)
if (outResolved.name && outResolved.name !== "—") ifacesForWire.add(outResolved.name)
const plane = classifyFlowPlane({
src: r.src,
dst: r.dst,
@@ -254,7 +267,10 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
outIface: outResolved.name,
}, topo.plane)
if (plane === "payload") bytesPayload += r.bytes
else if (plane === "overlay") bytesOverlay += r.bytes
else if (plane === "overlay") {
bytesOverlay += r.bytes
if (r.bucketAt === previousMinute) recentOverlayBytes += r.bytes
}
else if (plane === "client_mesh") bytesMesh += r.bytes
if (!shouldKeepPlane(plane, { excludeMesh, excludeOverlay })) continue
matched.push(r)
@@ -444,9 +460,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
const topCategory = topLabel(categories)
const ringServer = q.serverId ?? (matched[0]?.serverId ?? 0)
const ring = ringServer
? getRingMbps(ringServer, ifaceFilter === "" ? "__all__" : (ifacesMap.get(ifaceFilter)?.index || ifaceFilter))
: { rx: Array(60).fill(0) as number[], tx: Array(60).fill(0) as number[], rxNow: 0, txNow: 0 }
const ring = ringServer && !ifaceFilter && !allow && excludeOverlay ? getRingMbps(ringServer) : null
// The live ring covers about one minute; historical charts must use the requested window.
// Keep the winning interface's individual minute buckets when deduplicating.
@@ -454,13 +468,16 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
const chartRows = chosenIfaces ? matched.filter(r => chosenIfaces.get(flowTupleKey(r)) === r.inIface) : matched
const fromBuckets = seriesFromRows(chartRows, q.minutes, row => {
if (ifaceFilter || allow) {
const ingress = flowRowMatchesFilter(row, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name, q, allow)
const egress = flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: row.serverId, inIface: row.outIface }, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name, q, allow)
if (ingress && egress) return "both"
const ingress = matchesIngress(row), egress = matchesEgress(row)
if (ingress && egress) {
// A repeated WAN interface in an overlay record does not prove two wire directions.
if (ifaceFilter && (row.proto === 47 || row.proto === 50)) return espDirections.get(row) ?? serverDirection(row)
return "both"
}
// At a client binding, ingress is the client's upload.
return allow && !ifaceFilter ? (ingress ? "tx" : "rx") : (ingress ? "rx" : "tx")
}
return flowRateDirection(row.serverId, row, topo, catalog.byId.get(row.serverId)?.host)
return espDirections.get(row) ?? serverDirection(row)
})
const rxSeries = fromBuckets.rx
const txSeries = fromBuckets.tx
@@ -499,9 +516,11 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
.sort((a, b) => b.bytes - a.bytes)
.slice(0, top)
const overlayRing = ringServer
? getRingMbps(ringServer, RING_OVERLAY)
: { rxNow: 0, txNow: 0 }
// Filtered and overlay-inclusive rates must use the same records as their totals.
const recentBytes = ring ? 0 : chartRows.reduce((sum, row) => sum + (row.bucketAt === previousMinute ? row.bytes : 0), 0)
const bpsNow = ring
? (!fromBuckets.undirectedBytes && (ring.rxNow + ring.txNow) * 1_000_000) || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec
: (recentBytes * 8) / 60 || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec
const greNames = ringServer ? enGreIfaceNames(topo, ringServer, [...ifacesForWire]) : []
await authorize()
const wire = ringServer ? await latestWireBps(ringServer, greNames, Boolean(scope)) : { bps: 0, bytes: 0 }
@@ -511,7 +530,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
if (scope && (!isDeepStrictEqual(topo, await loadFlowTopology(scope.serverIds, authorize)) || (await readFlowSourceLimits()).topN !== settings.topN)) throw new Error("Топология или предел источника NetFlow изменились во время чтения")
await authorize()
return {
bpsNow: (!fromBuckets.undirectedBytes && (ring.rxNow + ring.txNow) * 1_000_000) || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec,
bpsNow,
bytes: totalBytes,
packets: totalPackets,
conversations: conv.size,
@@ -549,7 +568,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
bytesOverlay,
bytesMesh,
bytesWire: wire.bytes,
bpsOverlay: (overlayRing.rxNow + overlayRing.txNow) * 1_000_000 || (bytesOverlay * 8) / windowSec,
bpsOverlay: (recentOverlayBytes * 8) / 60 || (bytesOverlay * 8) / windowSec,
bpsWire: wire.bps,
excludeMeshApplied: excludeMesh,
excludeOverlayApplied: excludeOverlay,
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import assert from "node:assert/strict"
import {
collapseGreEspRows,
dedupFlowRowsAcrossExporters,
dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes,
flowConversationKey,
@@ -36,4 +37,28 @@ assert.equal(across.length, 1)
assert.equal(across[0]?.serverId, 7)
assert.equal(across[0]?.bytes, 9_000)
const minute = "2026-11-22T06:26:00.000Z"
const nextMinute = "2026-11-22T06:27:00.000Z"
const gre = { ...a, bucketAt: minute, proto: 47, srcPort: 0, dstPort: 0 }
const esp = { ...gre, proto: 50, bytes: gre.bytes + gre.packets * 40, inIface: "10" }
const plain = { ...gre, dst: "198.51.100.3" }
const reverse = { ...esp, src: esp.dst, dst: esp.src }
const foreign = { ...esp, serverId: 9 }
const collapse = (rows: typeof gre[]) => collapseGreEspRows(rows, row => row.inIface === "2" ? "tx" : null)
const layerPair = collapse([gre, esp, plain, reverse, foreign])
assert.deepEqual(layerPair.rows, [esp, plain, reverse, foreign])
assert.equal(layerPair.espDirections.get(esp), "tx")
const splitGre = [{ ...gre, bytes: 8_400, packets: 7 }, { ...gre, bucketAt: nextMinute, bytes: 3_600, packets: 3 }]
const laterEsp = { ...esp, bucketAt: nextMinute }
assert.deepEqual(collapse([...splitGre, laterEsp]).rows, [laterEsp])
for (const unrelated of [
{ ...esp, packets: esp.packets - 1 },
{ ...esp, bytes: gre.bytes },
{ ...esp, bytes: gre.bytes + gre.packets * 500 },
{ ...esp, bucketAt: "2026-11-22T06:29:00.000Z" },
{ ...esp, srcPort: 123 },
]) assert.deepEqual(collapse([gre, unrelated]).rows, [gre, unrelated])
assert.deepEqual(collapseGreEspRows([gre, esp], row => row.proto === 47 ? "rx" : "tx").rows, [gre, esp])
console.log("traffic-flow-dedup.test.ts: ok")
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
import { isUnspecifiedIp } from "./traffic-flow-ip.js"
export interface FlowTupleRow {
serverId: number
src: string
@@ -68,3 +70,66 @@ export function dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes<T extends FlowTupleRow>(rows: T[]): T[] {
}
return [...byTuple.values()]
}
type TimedFlowRow = FlowTupleRow & { bucketAt: string }
type FlowDirection = "rx" | "tx"
type OverlayRows<T> = { gre: T[]; esp: T[] }
function account(rows: readonly FlowTupleRow[]) {
return rows.reduce((total, row) => ({ bytes: total.bytes + row.bytes, packets: total.packets + row.packets }), { bytes: 0, packets: 0 })
}
/** GRE and its IPsec envelope can both be exported for the same packet sequence. */
export function collapseGreEspRows<T extends TimedFlowRow>(rows: readonly T[], direction: (row: T) => FlowDirection | null) {
const groups = new Map<string, OverlayRows<T>>()
for (const row of rows) {
if ((row.proto !== 47 && row.proto !== 50) || row.srcPort !== 0 || row.dstPort !== 0 ||
row.packets <= 0 || isUnspecifiedIp(row.src) || isUnspecifiedIp(row.dst) || row.src === row.dst) continue
const key = JSON.stringify([row.serverId, row.src, row.dst])
const group = groups.get(key) ?? { gre: [], esp: [] }
if (row.proto === 47) group.gre.push(row)
else group.esp.push(row)
groups.set(key, group)
}
const copies = new Set<T>()
const espDirections = new Map<T, FlowDirection>()
const match = (gre: T[], esp: T[]) => {
if (!gre.length || !esp.length) return
const inner = account(gre), outer = account(esp)
if (inner.packets !== outer.packets) return
const overhead = (outer.bytes - inner.bytes) / inner.packets
// Keep ambiguous records. An ESP envelope adds its headers, trailer and padding.
if (overhead < 8 || overhead > 128) return
const directions = new Set([...gre, ...esp].map(direction).filter(side => side !== null))
if (directions.size > 1) return
const [side] = directions
if (side) for (const row of esp) espDirections.set(row, side)
for (const row of gre) copies.add(row)
}
for (const group of groups.values()) {
if (!group.gre.length || !group.esp.length) continue
const byMinute = new Map<string, OverlayRows<T>>()
for (const plane of ["gre", "esp"] as const) for (const row of group[plane]) {
const bucket = byMinute.get(row.bucketAt) ?? { gre: [], esp: [] }
bucket[plane].push(row)
byMinute.set(row.bucketAt, bucket)
}
const unmatched: OverlayRows<T> = { gre: [], esp: [] }
for (const [, bucket] of [...byMinute].sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b))) {
match(bucket.gre, bucket.esp)
if (!bucket.gre.length || !copies.has(bucket.gre[0])) {
unmatched.gre.push(...bucket.gre)
unmatched.esp.push(...bucket.esp)
}
}
// The exporter can flush the two layers in different minute buckets.
if (unmatched.gre.length && unmatched.esp.length &&
Math.abs(Date.parse(unmatched.gre[0].bucketAt) - Date.parse(unmatched.esp[0].bucketAt)) <= 60_000 &&
Math.abs(Date.parse(unmatched.gre.at(-1)!.bucketAt) - Date.parse(unmatched.esp.at(-1)!.bucketAt)) <= 60_000) {
match(unmatched.gre, unmatched.esp)
}
}
return { rows: rows.filter(row => !copies.has(row)), espDirections }
}
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { applySqlMigrations } from '../db/migrate.js'
import { ensurePartitionFor } from '../db/partitions.js'
import { createMcpConnection,updateMcpSettings,setConnectionStatus } from '../modules/mcp/store.js'
import { mcpConnectionCreateSchema } from '@mmapp/contracts/mcp'
import type { FlowAnalyticsDto } from '@mmapp/contracts/traffic-flow'
import mcpTransport from '../routes/mcp-transport.js'
import trafficFlowRoutes from '../routes/traffic-flow.js'
import logsRoutes from '../routes/logs.js'
@@ -167,6 +168,38 @@ try{
invalidateFlowAnalyticsCache()
}
console.log('PASS five-minute REST analysis uses one latest counter per interface despite 50,010 historical samples')
const overlayBucket = new Date(Math.floor(Date.now()/60000)*60000-120000)
await ensurePartitionFor(pool,'flow_buckets','day',overlayBucket)
await pool.query(`INSERT INTO flow_buckets(server_id,bucket_at,src,dst,proto,src_port,dst_port,bytes,packets,in_iface,out_iface) VALUES
(1,$1,'192.0.2.1','203.0.113.9',47,0,0,12000,10,'gre-test','ether1'),
(1,$1,'192.0.2.1','203.0.113.9',50,0,0,12400,10,'ether1','ether1'),
(1,$1,'203.0.113.9','192.0.2.1',47,0,0,24000,20,'ether1','gre-test'),
(1,$1,'203.0.113.9','192.0.2.1',50,0,0,24800,20,'ether1','ether1'),
(1,$1,'203.0.113.10','192.0.2.1',47,0,0,1000,1,'ether1','gre-other'),
(1,$1,'203.0.113.11','203.0.113.12',50,0,0,2000,2,'ether1','ether1')`,[overlayBucket])
try {
const args={serverId:1,interface:'ether1',dedup:false,excludeOverlay:false}
const rest=await fetch(endpoint+'/api/traffic/flow/analytics?range=5m&serverId=1&iface=ether1&dedup=false&excludeOverlay=false')
assert.equal(rest.status,200,await rest.clone().text())
const filtered=await client.callTool({name:'mm_netflow_analytics_report_get',arguments:{...args,minutes:5}})
const live=await client.callTool({name:'mm_netflow_live_observe',arguments:args})
assert.ok(!filtered.isError,JSON.stringify(filtered))
assert.ok(!live.isError,JSON.stringify(live))
const mcp=(filtered.structuredContent as {result:{analytics:FlowAnalyticsDto}}).result.analytics
const sample=(live.structuredContent as {result:{events:{data:FlowAnalyticsDto}[]}}).result.events[0].data
const fromSeries=(series:number[])=>Math.round(series.reduce((sum,value)=>sum+value,0)*60*1e6/8)
for(const analytics of [await rest.json() as FlowAnalyticsDto,mcp,sample]){
assert.equal(analytics.bytes,40300,'Each overlay packet sequence contributes only the ESP bytes')
assert.equal(analytics.bytesOverlay,40200,'Plain GRE and undirected ESP remain part of the volume')
assert.equal(fromSeries(analytics.rxSeries),25900)
assert.equal(fromSeries(analytics.txSeries),12400)
}
assert.equal(sample.bpsOverlay,40200*8/300)
}finally{
await pool.query("DELETE FROM flow_buckets WHERE server_id=1 AND bucket_at=$1 AND proto IN (47,50)",[overlayBucket])
invalidateFlowAnalyticsCache()
}
console.log('PASS REST and MCP history and live analytics collapse GRE/ESP and place each confirmed ESP direction once')
const globalAccess=await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({name:'owned global telemetry',mode:'observer',permissions:['mm:traffic:read'],expiresAt:new Date(Date.now()+600000).toISOString(),scope:{serverIds:[1],operationIds:['traffic.flow.talkers.read','netflow.settings.read'],allowGlobal:true},limits:{callsPerMinute:240}}),actor)
const globalClient=new Client({name:'owned-global-quality',version:'1'})
try{
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ for(const mode of ['runtime-policy-entry','policy-authorize','executor-entry','e
const error=Object.assign(Error('PRIVATE_RUNTIME_POLICY_FAILURE'),{code:'ECONNRESET'}),events=[]
const env={failure:error,failAfterWrapper:mode==='after-wrapper',productionVrf:mode!=='non-production',
operationId:id,connection:{owner_id:'owner',id:'connection'},serverIds:[1],evidence:{objects:[],snapshots:[{resource:'vrf',serverId:1,sourceProof:'a'.repeat(64)}]},serviceExecution:undefined,reservedStep:{},
plan:{id:'plan',operation_id:'ros.vrf.create',operation_version:1,approved_by:'owner'},step:{kind:'ros',step:{serverId:1,resource:'vrf',action:'create',fields:{name:'customers',interfaces:'none'}}},
plan:{id:'plan',operation_id:'ros.vrf.create',operation_version:1,approved_by:'owner',evidence:{sealed:'fixture-ciphertext'}},step:{kind:'ros',step:{serverId:1,resource:'vrf',action:'create',fields:{name:'customers',interfaces:'none'}}},
prefix:{async check(){}},async authorize(){},async authorizeCatalog(){if(mode==='policy-authorize')throw error},McpError,createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary:diagnostic.createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary,
console:{error(raw){events.push(JSON.parse(raw));if(loggerThrows)throw Error('PRIVATE_LOGGER_FAILURE')}},
async executeRosStep(){throw error},
+2 -1
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { ensurePartitionFor } from "../db/partitions.js"
import { createMcpConnection, authenticateMcpToken, setConnectionStatus } from "../modules/mcp/store.js"
import { invokeMcpTool } from "../modules/mcp/runtime.js"
import { buildFlowAnalytics, invalidateFlowAnalyticsCache } from "../services/traffic-flow-analytics.js"
import { FlowSourceWindowTooLarge } from "../services/traffic-flow-read-window.js"
import { loadFlowTopology, invalidateFlowCatalogCache } from "../services/traffic-flow-topology.js"
import { resetFlowRingsForTests as clearPendingFlows } from "../services/traffic-flow-ingest.js"
import { disableRipeEnqueueForTests, resetRipeCacheForTests } from "../services/traffic-flow-ripe.js"
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ export async function verifyMcpFlowAnalytics(actor: AuthUser) {
await pool.query("DELETE FROM flow_buckets WHERE server_id=110 AND in_iface='analytics-duplicate-in'")
await assert.rejects(read({userId:users[1]})); await assert.rejects(read({userId:users[2]}))
await assert.rejects(read({serverId:111})); await assert.rejects(read({minutes:1441})); await assert.rejects(read({interface:"__all__"})); await assert.rejects(read({skipHeavy:true}))
await assert.rejects(buildFlowAnalytics({serverId:110,minutes:5},{serverIds:[110],maxRows:1,authorize:async()=>{}}),/предел/)
await assert.rejects(buildFlowAnalytics({serverId:110,minutes:5},{serverIds:[110],maxRows:1,authorize:async()=>{}}),FlowSourceWindowTooLarge)
const cancelled = new AbortController(); cancelled.abort(); await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(principal,"mm_netflow_analytics_report_get",{serverId:110},cancelled.signal))
const duringQuery = (match: string, action: () => Promise<unknown>) =>
duringFlowSourceQuery(pool, match, action, () => assert.rejects(read()))
+2 -1
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { ensurePartitionFor } from "../db/partitions.js"
import { createMcpConnection, authenticateMcpToken, setConnectionStatus } from "../modules/mcp/store.js"
import { invokeMcpTool } from "../modules/mcp/runtime.js"
import { buildFlowMapHops, invalidateFlowMapHopsCache } from "../services/traffic-flow-map-hops.js"
import { FlowSourceWindowTooLarge } from "../services/traffic-flow-read-window.js"
import { invalidateFlowCatalogCache } from "../services/traffic-flow-topology.js"
import { resetFlowRingsForTests, ingestParsedFlowsForServerForTests } from "../services/traffic-flow-ingest.js"
import { disableRipeEnqueueForTests, resetRipeCacheForTests } from "../services/traffic-flow-ripe.js"
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ export async function verifyMcpFlowMap(actor: AuthUser) {
ingestParsedFlowsForServerForTests(113,[{src:"198.18.240.6",dst:"8.8.4.4",proto:6,srcPort:1,dstPort:443,bytes:999,packets:1,inIface:"NEVER_MAP_PENDING",outIface:""}])
assert.equal((await read()).map.totalBytes,600)
for (const input of [{userId:users[2]},{userId:users[3]},{serverId:113},{minutes:1441},{interface:"__all__"},{minSharePct:0},{nestedLimit:51}]) await assert.rejects(read(input))
await assert.rejects(buildFlowMapHops({serverId:112,minutes:5},{serverIds:[112],maxRows:1,authorize:async()=>{}}),/предел/)
await assert.rejects(buildFlowMapHops({serverId:112,minutes:5},{serverIds:[112],maxRows:1,authorize:async()=>{}}),FlowSourceWindowTooLarge)
const cancelled=new AbortController();cancelled.abort();await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(principal,"mm_netflow_map_hops_get",{serverId:112},cancelled.signal))
const duringQuery = (match: string, action: () => Promise<unknown>) =>
duringFlowSourceQuery(pool, match, action, () => assert.rejects(read()))
+8 -4
View File
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
const [step, setStep] = useState(1), [busy, setBusy] = useState(false), [error, setError] = useState("")
const [name, setName] = useState(editing?.name ?? ""), [mode, setMode] = useState<McpConnection["policy"]["mode"]>(editing?.policy.mode ?? "observer")
const [service, setService] = useState(editing?.policy.authority === "service")
const [unattended, setUnattended] = useState(editing?.policy.allowUnattendedPlans === true)
const [selectAllServers, setSelectAllServers] = useState(false)
const [serverIds, setServerIds] = useState(editing?.policy.scope.serverIds ?? []), [selected, setSelected] = useState<string[]>(editing?.policy.scope.operationIds ?? [])
const serverCatalog = useQuery(useCallback(signal => api.serverChoices(undefined, signal), [api]))
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
const save = async () => {
setBusy(true); setError("")
try {
const input = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name, ...(service ? { authority: "service", mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null } : { mode, expiresAt: new Date(expires + "Z").toISOString() }), permissions: [...new Set(eligible.filter(operation => selected.includes(operation.id)).flatMap(operation => operation.requiredPermissions))], ...(selectAllServers && { selectAllServers: true }), scope: { serverIds: selectAllServers ? [] : serverIds, operationIds: selected, allowGlobal: global }, dangerousPolicy: service ? "approval" : danger, autonomousDangerousOperationIds: service || danger !== "explicit-allow" ? [] : autonomousDangerIds, limits })
const input = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name, ...(service ? { authority: "service", mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null, ...(unattended && { allowUnattendedPlans: true }) } : { mode, expiresAt: new Date(expires + "Z").toISOString() }), permissions: [...new Set(eligible.filter(operation => selected.includes(operation.id)).flatMap(operation => operation.requiredPermissions))], ...(selectAllServers && { selectAllServers: true }), scope: { serverIds: selectAllServers ? [] : serverIds, operationIds: selected, allowGlobal: global }, dangerousPolicy: service ? "approval" : danger, autonomousDangerousOperationIds: service || danger !== "explicit-allow" ? [] : autonomousDangerIds, limits })
if (editing) { await api.update(editing.id, input); created() }
else { const result = await api.create(input); created(result.token) }
} catch (failure) { setError(errorText(failure)) } finally { setBusy(false) }
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
return <Dialog open onOpenChange={open => { if (!open && !busy) close() }}><DialogContent className="max-h-[90dvh] overflow-y-auto sm:max-w-3xl"><DialogHeader><DialogTitle>{editing ? "Изменить разрешения" : "Новое подключение"}</DialogTitle><DialogDescription>Шаг {step} из 4 · доступ ограничивается правами текущего владельца.</DialogDescription></DialogHeader><ErrorMessage message={error} />
{step === 1 && <><Field label="Название"><Input value={name} onChange={event => setName(event.target.value)} placeholder="Агент диагностики" /></Field>{!editing && <NativeSelect label="Тип подключения" value={service ? "service" : "personal"} onChange={value => setService(value === "service")}><option value="personal">Личное</option><option value="service">Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ</option></NativeSelect>}
{service
? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Подключение действует до отзыва. Агент выполняет разрешённые обычные операции автономно, а опасные действия требуют подтверждения.</p>
? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Подключение действует до отзыва. Способ подтверждения планов можно выбрать на шаге 3.</p>
: <><Field label="Срок действия (UTC)"><Input type="datetime-local" value={expires} onChange={event => setExpires(event.target.value)} /></Field><NativeSelect label="Режим управления" value={mode} onChange={value => setMode(value as typeof mode)}>{Object.entries(modeLabels).map(([value, title]) => <option key={value} value={value}>{title}</option>)}</NativeSelect></>}</>}
{step === 2 && <>
<ServerChoices catalog={serverCatalog} selected={serverIds} onChange={setServerIds} all={selectAllServers} onAllChange={setSelectAllServers} />
@@ -269,11 +270,14 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
<OperationChoices operations={eligible} selected={selected} onChange={setSelected} />
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">Выбор операций учитывает права владельца. Режим, список серверов и глобальный доступ задаются отдельно. Новые инструменты нужно добавлять вручную. Для применения планов выберите также инструменты просмотра и применения.</p>
</>}
{step === 3 && <><div className="grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2">{Object.entries(limits).map(([key, value]) => <Field key={key} label={({ callsPerMinute: "Вызовов в минуту", concurrentReads: "Одновременных чтений", mutationsPerHour: "Изменений в час", serversPerPlan: "Серверов на план", objectsPerPlan: "Объектов на план" } as Record<string, string>)[key]}><Input type="number" min={1} value={value} onChange={event => setLimits(current => ({ ...current, [key]: Number(event.target.value) }))} /></Field>)}</div>{service ? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Опасные действия всегда требуют подтверждения.</p> : <><NativeSelect label="Опасные действия" value={danger} onChange={value => setDanger(value as typeof danger)}><option value="approval">Всегда подтверждать</option><option value="explicit-allow">Автономно для явно выбранных действий</option></NativeSelect>{danger === "explicit-allow" && <>
{step === 3 && <><div className="grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2">{Object.entries(limits).map(([key, value]) => <Field key={key} label={({ callsPerMinute: "Вызовов в минуту", concurrentReads: "Одновременных чтений", mutationsPerHour: "Изменений в час", serversPerPlan: "Серверов на план", objectsPerPlan: "Объектов на план" } as Record<string, string>)[key]}><Input type="number" min={1} value={value} onChange={event => setLimits(current => ({ ...current, [key]: Number(event.target.value) }))} /></Field>)}</div>{service ? <>
<Choice label="Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения" checked={unattended} onChange={setUnattended} />
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Действует для всех операций, выданных ключу. Клиент должен сначала показать точный план в чате. Сервер проверяет контрольную сумму плана, а публикацию сообщения обеспечивает клиент. Защита объектов сохраняется.</p>
</> : <><NativeSelect label="Опасные действия" value={danger} onChange={value => setDanger(value as typeof danger)}><option value="approval">Всегда подтверждать</option><option value="explicit-allow">Автономно для явно выбранных действий</option></NativeSelect>{danger === "explicit-allow" && <>
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">В автономном режиме выбранные здесь опасные операции смогут выполняться без подтверждения, если этого не требует защита объекта или сама операция.</p>
<OperationChoices operations={dangerous} selected={autonomousDangerIds} onChange={setDangerIds} selectAllLabel="Выбрать все опасные операции" />
</>}</>}</>}
{step === 4 && <div className="space-y-3 text-sm"><p><strong>{name || "Без названия"}</strong> · {service ? "Сервисное, бессрочное" : modeLabels[mode]}</p><p>Серверы: {selectAllServers ? "все на момент сохранения" : serverIds.join(", ") || "не выбраны"}. Операций: {selected.length}. Глобальный доступ: {global ? "да" : "нет"}.</p>{!service && mode === "autonomous" && danger === "explicit-allow" && <p>Опасных операций выбрано для автономного выполнения: {autonomousDangerIds.length}.</p>}<p>Защита объектов продолжает действовать независимо от автономных разрешений.</p><p>После сохранения проверьте конкретное действие в симуляторе на вкладке «Разрешения».</p></div>}
{step === 4 && <div className="space-y-3 text-sm"><p><strong>{name || "Без названия"}</strong> · {service ? "Сервисное, бессрочное" : modeLabels[mode]}</p><p>Серверы: {selectAllServers ? "все на момент сохранения" : serverIds.join(", ") || "не выбраны"}. Операций: {selected.length}. Глобальный доступ: {global ? "да" : "нет"}.</p>{service && unattended && <p>Ручное подтверждение планов отключено. Клиент публикует план в чате перед применением.</p>}{!service && mode === "autonomous" && danger === "explicit-allow" && <p>Опасных операций выбрано для автономного выполнения: {autonomousDangerIds.length}.</p>}<p>Защита объектов продолжает действовать независимо от автономных разрешений.</p><p>После сохранения проверьте конкретное действие в симуляторе на вкладке «Разрешения».</p></div>}
<div className="flex flex-wrap justify-between gap-2"><Button variant="outline" disabled={busy} onClick={() => step > 1 ? setStep(step - 1) : close()}>{step > 1 ? "Назад" : "Отмена"}</Button>{step < 4 ? <Button onClick={() => setStep(step + 1)}>Далее</Button> : <Button disabled={busy} onClick={() => { void save() }}>{busy ? "Сохранение…" : "Сохранить доступ"}</Button>}</div>
</DialogContent></Dialog>
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -121,7 +121,11 @@
### Сервисное подключение
В «Подключения» → «Выдать доступ» администратор MCP может выбрать «Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ». Выберите нужные серверы и операции. Доступ действует до отзыва и переживает истечение обычной сессии портала. Опасные операции всегда требуют подтверждения человеком, а лимиты и защита объектов действуют как обычно.
В «Подключения» → «Выдать доступ» администратор MCP может выбрать «Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ». Выберите нужные серверы и операции. Доступ действует до отзыва и переживает истечение обычной сессии портала. По умолчанию опасные действия требуют ручного подтверждения.
На шаге 3 можно включить «Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения». Режим действует на все выданные ключу операции. Списки серверов, права, лимиты и правила защиты объектов продолжают действовать.
Если план содержит `announcement`, клиент сначала публикует отдельное сообщение в чате с ID плана, целями, изменениями и предупреждениями из `changes`. Затем вызывает `mm_change_apply` с `planId`, `idempotencyKey` и `announcedPlanDigest`, равным `announcement.digest`. Manager проверяет контрольную сумму сохранённого плана. Публикацию сообщения обеспечивает клиент. В аудите такой запуск отмечается как допуск по политике подключения.
Сервисный токен можно заменить, приостановить вместе с подключением или отозвать. Явный отзыв прав выдавшего доступ администратора в портале также отзывает его сервисные подключения. Чтобы сменить тип подключения, выдайте новый токен через новое подключение.
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@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ export const mcpConnectionPolicySchema = z.object({
version: z.number().int().positive(),
status: z.enum(["active", "paused", "revoked"]),
authority: z.literal("service").optional(),
allowUnattendedPlans: z.literal(true).optional(),
expiresAt: instant,
mode: mcpModeSchema,
permissions: uniqueStrings,
@@ -42,8 +43,9 @@ export const mcpConnectionPolicySchema = z.object({
dangerousPolicy: z.enum(["approval", "explicit-allow"]).default("approval"),
autonomousDangerousOperationIds: uniqueStrings.default([]),
limits: mcpLimitsSchema.default(() => mcpLimitsSchema.parse({})),
}).strict().refine(policy => policy.authority !== "service" ||
policy.expiresAt === MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length,
}).strict().refine(policy => policy.authority === "service"
? policy.expiresAt === MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length
: !policy.allowUnattendedPlans,
"Некорректная политика сервисного подключения")
export const mcpTargetSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("scope", [
@@ -133,6 +135,7 @@ export type McpPolicyReasonCode = z.infer<typeof mcpPolicyReasonCodeSchema>
export const mcpConnectionCreateSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().trim().min(1).max(100),
authority: z.literal("service").optional(),
allowUnattendedPlans: z.literal(true).optional(),
expiresAt: instant.nullable(),
mode: mcpModeSchema.default("observer"),
permissions: uniqueStrings,
@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ export const mcpConnectionCreateSchema = z.object({
limits: mcpLimitsSchema.default(() => mcpLimitsSchema.parse({})),
}).strict().refine(input => input.authority === "service"
? input.expiresAt === null && input.mode === "autonomous" && input.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !input.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length
: input.expiresAt !== null, "Для сервисного подключения выберите автономный режим с подтверждением опасных действий. Для личного подключения укажите срок действия.")
: input.expiresAt !== null && !input.allowUnattendedPlans, "Опция доступна только бессрочному сервисному подключению. Для личного подключения укажите срок действия.")
.refine(input => !input.selectAllServers || !input.scope.serverIds.length, "Выберите все серверы или укажите конкретные ID")
export const mcpConnectionSchema = z.object({
id: z.string().uuid(), name: z.string(), ownerId: z.string(),
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@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ test('synthetic: edit autonomous dangerous operations by group or all at once',
}) })])
})
test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of dangerous actions', async ({ page }) => {
for (const unattended of [false, true]) test(`synthetic: issue service access with unattended plans ${unattended ? 'enabled' : 'disabled'}`, async ({ page }) => {
const state = await setup(page, ['mm:mcp:admin', 'mm:servers:read'])
await page.goto('/mcp?tab=connections')
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Выдать доступ', exact: true }).click()
@@ -402,7 +402,9 @@ test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of d
await dialog.getByRole('button', { name: 'CHR WAN', exact: true }).click()
await dialog.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'Все операции группы «Журналы»' }).check()
await next.click()
await expect(dialog.getByText('Опасные действия всегда требуют подтверждения.')).toBeVisible()
const unattendedChoice = dialog.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения', exact: true })
await expect(unattendedChoice).not.toBeChecked()
if (unattended) await unattendedChoice.check()
await next.click()
await expect(dialog.getByText('Сервисное, бессрочное', { exact: false })).toBeVisible()
await dialog.getByRole('button', { name: 'Сохранить доступ', exact: true }).click()
@@ -411,6 +413,7 @@ test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of d
authority: 'service', expiresAt: null, mode: 'autonomous', dangerousPolicy: 'approval', autonomousDangerousOperationIds: [],
scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ['logs.query'], allowGlobal: false },
}) })])
expect(state.mutations[0].body.allowUnattendedPlans).toBe(unattended ? true : undefined)
})
test('synthetic: pause, resume, cancelled revoke, revoke, monitor denied outcome, stop automation', async ({ page }) => {