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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import { subscribeLogDevice } from "../../services/router-logs-collector.js"
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import { ospfFilterFields, rosResources, readRosSnapshot, resourceById, routerClient, validateRosStep, splitOspfUnsetUpdate } from "./resources.js"
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import { registerMcpOperation, listMcpOperations } from "./registry.js"
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import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, MAX_MCP_PUBLIC_ARRAY_ITEMS, MAX_MCP_PUBLIC_STRING_LENGTH, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
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import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
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import { effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
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import type { McpAction, ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
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import { registerRoutingActions } from "./routing-actions.js"
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@@ -623,11 +624,15 @@ add("changes.read", "mm_change_get", "Просмотр своего плана",
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const { loadPlan, publicPlan } = await import("./runtime.js")
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const plan = await loadPlan(String(input.planId))
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await assertPlanReadScope(plan, context)
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return publicPlan(plan)
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return publicPlan(plan, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(context.connection.policy) && plan.policy_version === context.connection.policy.version)
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},
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})
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add("changes.apply", "mm_change_apply", "Применить свой план", "mcp", null, "write", "connection", z.object({ planId: z.string().uuid(), idempotencyKey: z.string().min(1).max(200) }).strict(), {
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read: async (input, context) => (await import("./runtime.js")).applyPlan(context.principal, String(input.planId), String(input.idempotencyKey)),
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add("changes.apply", "mm_change_apply", "Применить свой план", "mcp", null, "write", "connection", z.object({
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planId: z.string().uuid(),
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idempotencyKey: z.string().min(1).max(200),
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announcedPlanDigest: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/).optional().describe("Значение announcement.digest. Передавайте только после отдельного видимого сообщения с точным планом в чате."),
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}).strict(), {
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read: async (input, context) => (await import("./runtime.js")).applyPlan(context.principal, String(input.planId), String(input.idempotencyKey), input.announcedPlanDigest as string | undefined),
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})
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add("changes.cancel", "mm_change_cancel", "Отменить свой незапущенный план", "mcp", null, "read", "connection", z.object({ planId: z.string().uuid() }).strict(), {
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read: async (input, context) => {
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@@ -133,7 +133,9 @@ async function executeRestore(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal,origi
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if (ids.some(id => !connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id) || !evidence.objects.some(object => object.kind === "server" && object.serverId === id))) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Область восстановления изменилась")
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const { rows: grants } = await pool.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND payload->>'credentialId'=$2", [connection.id, principal.credentialId])
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if (grants.some(grant => !grant.payload.scope?.allowGlobal || !grant.payload.scope?.operationIds?.includes("database.restore") || ids.some(id => !grant.payload.scope?.serverIds?.includes(id)))) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Временный допуск не разрешает восстановление")
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if ((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'protection'='deny' LIMIT 1")).rows.length) throw new McpError("PROTECTED_OBJECT", "Восстановление заменяет запрещённый защищённый объект")
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const { rows: [protection] } = await pool.query<{ denied: boolean }>("SELECT (object_ref->>'protection'='deny') AS denied FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'protection'='deny' OR $1::boolean ORDER BY denied DESC LIMIT 1", [!!plan.evidence.approvalSource])
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if (protection?.denied) throw new McpError("PROTECTED_OBJECT", "Восстановление заменяет запрещённый защищённый объект")
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if (protection) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Полное восстановление затрагивает объект с ручным подтверждением")
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return { connection, ids }
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}
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try {
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@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ async function executeRestore(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal,origi
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if (createHash("sha256").update(buffer).digest("hex") !== source.sha256) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Содержимое архива изменилось", 409)
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if (!(await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='running' WHERE id=$1 AND state='pending' RETURNING id", [operationId])).rowCount) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Операция уже остановлена", 409)
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stage = "restore"
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const outcome = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds: ids, objects: evidence.objects, approved: true, serverWide: true }, () => restoreSystemDatabaseBackup(buffer, { beforeRestore: async () => {
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const outcome = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds: ids, objects: evidence.objects, approved: true, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: true }, () => restoreSystemDatabaseBackup(buffer, { beforeRestore: async () => {
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await assertAuthority(); await archive(payload.archiveRef, connection.owner_id)
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await durableWrite(filename(source.id, ".used"), JSON.stringify({ operationId, at: new Date().toISOString() }), true)
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await assertOriginalMcpTemporaryGrant(pool,principal.connectionId,principal.credentialId,originalGrant)
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { decryptSecret, decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinter
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const MAX_BYTES = 2097152
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const uuid = z.string().uuid()
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const deny = (): never => { throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Исходная привязка отмены диагностики не подтверждена", 409) }
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const sealedSchema = z.object({ sealed: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_BYTES) }).strict()
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const sealedSchema = z.object({ sealed: z.string().min(1).max(MAX_BYTES), approvalSource: z.literal("connection-policy").optional() }).strict()
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interface SourceCrypto { open(value: string): Promise<string>; proof(value: unknown): Promise<string> }
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export interface DiagnosticCancellationOwner { connectionId: string; ownerId: string }
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export interface DiagnosticCancellationSource {
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@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ export function registerFlowAnalyticsActions(register: typeof add) {
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analytics[key] = value.slice(offset, offset + limit)
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pages[key] = { total: value.length, nextOffset: offset + limit < value.length ? offset + limit : null }
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}
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// Ring rates are server context, including when the retained rows are filtered by user/interface.
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// Wire rate uses interface counters. Keep rate estimates separate from retained volume.
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const { bpsNow: _bpsNow, bpsWire: _bpsWire, bpsOverlay: _bpsOverlay, bytesWire: _bytesWire, live: _live, ...retained } = analytics
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await authorize()
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if ((await readFlowSourceLimits()).topN !== limits.topN) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Предел источника NetFlow изменился во время чтения", 409)
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await authorize()
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const output = { serverId: server.id, minutes: sourceWindow?.effectiveMinutes ?? Number(input.minutes), sourceWindow, interface: input.interface ?? null, userId: input.userId ?? null,
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analytics: retained, pages, contextRates: { bpsNowEstimate: _bpsNow, bpsWireEstimate: _bpsWire, bpsOverlayEstimate: _bpsOverlay, bytesWireEstimate: _bytesWire,
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listenerBound: _live, userAttributionVerified: false, semantics: "REST estimates: current server/interface ring with retained-window fallback; wire projection uses current interface snapshots" },
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listenerBound: _live, userAttributionVerified: false, semantics: "REST estimates: filtered or overlay-inclusive rates use the latest complete retained minute with a window-average fallback; wire uses current interface snapshots" },
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readStartedAt: startedAt, observedAt: new Date().toISOString(), live: false,
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source: "retained flow_buckets plus pending; same REST analytics engine with scoped topology",
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rowLimit: 20000, topRowsPerBucketLimit: Math.max(20, limits.topN), engineTopListLimit: Math.min(50, Math.max(10, limits.topN)),
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export function registerFlowLiveActions(register: typeof add) {
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source: "REST live sample engine: current ring estimates and rolling flow_buckets plus pending; uncached scoped reads",
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rowLimit: 20000, incomplete: true, coverageVerified: false, forwardingVerified: false, rowSumIsNetworkTotal: false,
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historicalOwnershipVerified: false, currentTrafficVerified: false,
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rateSemantics: "REST live rates: current server/interface ring; retained-window fallback; user filter does not attribute ring rates",
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rateSemantics: "REST live rates: filtered or overlay-inclusive rates use the latest complete retained minute with a window-average fallback",
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liveMeaning: "events[].data.live means listener bound; it does not prove exporter freshness or forwarding",
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attribution: "current named whole-interface bindings; users with hidden bindings excluded",
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collectorStarted: false, backgroundEnrichmentStarted: false }
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@@ -3918,6 +3918,55 @@ try {
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assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='owner.revoke' AND payload->>'eventId'=$1", [event.eventId])).rows[0].n, 1)
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delete process.env.MCP_PORTAL_WEBHOOK_SECRET
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console.log("✓ Signed portal revocation: tamper/stale rejection, one atomic event, revoked credentials and stale-JWT regrant prevention")
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{
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const serviceInput = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({
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name: "Announced service plans", authority: "service", allowUnattendedPlans: true, mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null,
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permissions: ["mm:network:write", "mm:settings:admin"],
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scope: { serverIds: (await pool.query<{ id: number }>("SELECT id FROM servers")).rows.map(({ id }) => id),
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allowGlobal: true, operationIds: ["ros.ip_settings.update", "logs.settings.update", "changes.read", "changes.apply"] },
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limits: { mutationsPerHour: 500, objectsPerPlan: 500, serversPerPlan: 100 },
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})
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const { token } = await createMcpConnection(serviceInput, actor)
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const service = await authenticateMcpToken(token)
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const prepare = () => invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_ip_settings_update_plan", { serverId: 1, fields: { "rp-filter": "loose" } }) as Promise<{ planId: string; state: string; announcement?: { digest: string } }>
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const beforeWrites = writes
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const first = await prepare()
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assert.equal(first.state, "draft")
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assert.match(first.announcement!.digest, /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/)
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const inspected = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_get", { planId: first.planId }) as { announcement: { digest: string } }
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assert.equal(inspected.announcement.digest, first.announcement!.digest)
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const apply = (planId: string, digest?: string) => invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_apply", {
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planId, idempotencyKey: randomUUID(), ...(digest && { announcedPlanDigest: digest }),
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}) as Promise<{ id: string }>
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const denied = { code: "APPROVAL_REQUIRED" }
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await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId), denied)
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const second = await prepare()
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await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId, second.announcement!.digest), denied)
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const protection = randomUUID()
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await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_protections(id,object_ref,created_by) VALUES($1,$2::jsonb,'integration')", [protection, JSON.stringify({ kind: "server", id: "1", serverId: 1, protection: "human-approval-required" })])
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try {
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await assert.rejects(apply(first.planId, first.announcement!.digest), denied)
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const protectedPlan = await prepare()
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assert.equal(protectedPlan.state, "awaiting-approval")
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assert.equal(protectedPlan.announcement, undefined)
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assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites)
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} finally { await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_protections WHERE id=$1", [protection]) }
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const operation = await apply(first.planId, first.announcement!.digest)
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await awaitOperation(operation.id, "applied")
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assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1)
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const publicResult = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_change_get", { planId: first.planId }) as { approvalSource: string; approvedBy: string | null }
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assert.equal(publicResult.approvalSource, "connection-policy")
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assert.equal(publicResult.approvedBy, null)
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const { rows: [start] } = await pool.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='operation.start' AND payload->>'planId'=$1", [first.planId])
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assert.equal(start.payload.announcedPlanDigest, first.announcement!.digest)
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assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='plan.approve' AND payload->>'planId'=$1", [first.planId])).rowCount, 0)
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const { getLogSettings } = await import("../../services/router-logs-collector.js")
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const retentionDays = Math.min(365, (await getLogSettings()).retentionDays + 1)
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const global = await invokeMcpTool(service, "mm_logs_settings_update_plan", { settings: { retentionDays } }) as { planId: string; announcement: { digest: string } }
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await awaitOperation((await apply(global.planId, global.announcement.digest)).id, "applied")
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assert.equal((await getLogSettings()).retentionDays, retentionDays)
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console.log("✓ Unattended MCP checks exact plan digest, current protections and delegated provenance for RouterOS and application writes")
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}
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await setConnectionStatus(issued.connection.id, "paused", actor)
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await assert.rejects(authenticateMcpToken(rotated.token))
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await setConnectionStatus(issued.connection.id, "active", actor)
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@@ -62,11 +62,17 @@ const router = createServer(async (req, res) => {
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if (req.method === "GET") { res.end(JSON.stringify(catalogs[path] ?? [])); return }
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let raw = ""; for await (const chunk of req) raw += chunk
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const fields = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) as Row : {}
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if (path === "/file/get" || path === "/file/print") { res.end(JSON.stringify({ ret: fakeP12 })); return }
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if (path === "/file/get") {
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assert(catalogs["/file"].some(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"] && row[".id"].startsWith("**")))
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res.end(JSON.stringify({ ret: fakeP12 }))
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return
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}
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commands.push({ method: req.method!, path, ...(fields.name ? { name: fields.name } : {}) })
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if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/certificate/export-certificate") {
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assert(catalogs["/certificate"].some(row => row.name === fields.name))
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catalogs["/file"].push({ ".id": `*new${++serial}`, name: `${fields["file-name"]}.p12`, size: String(Buffer.byteLength(fakeP12)), type: "file" })
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const certificate = catalogs["/certificate"].find(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"])
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assert(certificate && !("name" in fields))
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commands.at(-1)!.name = certificate.name
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catalogs["/file"].unshift({ ".id": `**New${++serial}`, name: `${fields["file-name"]}.p12`, size: String(Buffer.byteLength(fakeP12)), type: "file" })
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if (mode === "lost") { req.socket.destroy(); return }
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} else if (req.method === "DELETE" && path.startsWith("/file/")) {
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catalogs["/file"] = catalogs["/file"].filter(row => row[".id"] !== path.slice("/file/".length))
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@@ -42,19 +42,30 @@ export async function acceptIpsecUserCreate(actor: AuthUser) {
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if (req.method === "GET") { res.end(JSON.stringify(catalogs[path] ?? [])); return }
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let raw = ""; for await (const chunk of req) raw += chunk
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const fields = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) as Row : {}
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if (path === "/file/get" || path === "/file/print") { res.end(JSON.stringify({ ret: fakeP12 })); return }
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if (path === "/file/get") {
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assert(catalogs["/file"].some(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"] && row[".id"].startsWith("**")))
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res.end(JSON.stringify({ ret: mode === "download-failed" ? "short" : fakeP12 }))
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return
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}
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commands.push({ method: req.method!, path, fields })
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// RouterOS 7.24 (stand probe 2026-11-21): no `comment` on /certificate; sign and export by `.id` only, no `name`/`days-valid`.
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const refusal = req.method === "PUT" && path === "/certificate" && "comment" in fields ? "unknown parameter comment"
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: path === "/certificate/sign" && ("days-valid" in fields || "name" in fields) ? ("days-valid" in fields ? "unknown parameter days-valid" : "missing =.id=")
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: path === "/certificate/export-certificate" && "name" in fields ? "unknown parameter name" : undefined
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if (refusal) { res.statusCode = 400; res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 400, message: "Bad Request", detail: refusal })); return }
|
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if ((mode === "export-refused" && path === "/certificate/export-certificate") || (mode === "cleanup-refused" && req.method === "DELETE" && path.startsWith("/file/"))) {
|
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res.statusCode = 400; res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 400, detail: "NEVER_NATIVE_ERROR_DETAILS" })); return
|
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}
|
||||
let result: Row = {}
|
||||
if (mode !== "ignored") {
|
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if (path === "/certificate/sign") {
|
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const row = catalogs["/certificate"].find(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"]); assert(row)
|
||||
Object.assign(row, { ca: fields.ca, "digest-algorithm": "sha256", fingerprint: "synthetic-fingerprint", "invalid-before": "2026-01-01", "invalid-after": "2030-01-01", "private-key": "true", "serial-number": "synthetic" })
|
||||
} else if (path === "/certificate/export-certificate") assert(catalogs["/certificate"].some(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"])), catalogs["/file"].push({ ".id": `*new${++serial}`, name: `${fields["file-name"]}.p12`, size: String(Buffer.byteLength(fakeP12)), type: "file" })
|
||||
} else if (path === "/certificate/export-certificate") {
|
||||
assert(catalogs["/certificate"].some(row => row[".id"] === fields[".id"]))
|
||||
catalogs["/file"].unshift({ ".id": `**New${++serial}`, name: `${fields["file-name"]}.p12`, size: String(Buffer.byteLength(fakeP12)), type: "file" })
|
||||
if (mode === "other-file-changed") catalogs["/file"][1].size = "99"
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const catalog = Object.keys(catalogs).find(value => path === value || path.startsWith(value + "/")); assert(catalog)
|
||||
if (req.method === "PUT") { result = { ".id": `*new${++serial}`, ...fields, "native-default": "NEVER_NATIVE_DEFAULT" }; catalogs[catalog].push(result) }
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +112,7 @@ export async function acceptIpsecUserCreate(actor: AuthUser) {
|
||||
const stored = (await query("SELECT * FROM mcp_artifacts WHERE id=$1", [saved.artifactId])).rows[0]; hidden(stored); assert.equal(stored.access_scope.kind, "ipsec-user-bundle"); assert(stored.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now() + 900000)
|
||||
const download = await portal.inject({ url: saved.downloadPath, headers }); assert.equal(download.statusCode, 200, download.body); assert.equal(download.headers["cache-control"], "private, no-store")
|
||||
const bundle = download.json(); assert.equal(Buffer.from(bundle.contentB64, "base64").toString(), fakeP12); assert.equal(bundle.passphrase, "NEVER_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE")
|
||||
assert.equal(JSON.parse(bundle.sswanContent).local.p12, bundle.contentB64)
|
||||
assert.equal((await portal.inject({ url: saved.downloadPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token("other-owner")}` } })).statusCode, 403)
|
||||
assert.equal((await portal.inject({ url: saved.downloadPath, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token(actor.id, ["mm:network:read"])}` } })).statusCode, 403)
|
||||
const listing: { statusCode: number; body: string; json: () => { items: Array<{ id: string; artifactReceipts: Array<{ artifactId: string }> }> } } = await portal.inject({ url: `/api/mcp/operations?connectionId=${connectionId}`, headers }); assert.equal(listing.statusCode, 200, listing.body); hidden(listing.json()); assert(listing.json().items.find((row: { id: string }) => row.id === result.operation.id)!.artifactReceipts.some((row: { artifactId: string }) => row.artifactId === saved.artifactId))
|
||||
@@ -110,6 +122,29 @@ export async function acceptIpsecUserCreate(actor: AuthUser) {
|
||||
const response = await rest.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/ipsec/users", payload: { serverId, name: "Alice", authMethod, ...(staticIp ? { staticIp } : {}), ...(authMethod === "certificate" ? { daysValid: 365, passphrase: "NEVER_EXPORT_PASSPHRASE" } : { psk: "NEVER_PSK_SECRET", remoteId: "alice.example.test" }) } }); assert.equal(response.statusCode, 201, response.body)
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(normalize(commands.slice(restStart)), accepted)
|
||||
}
|
||||
reset(); mode = "download-failed"
|
||||
const failedExport = await rest.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/ipsec/users", payload: { serverId, name: "Alice", staticIp: "192.0.2.7" } })
|
||||
assert.equal(failedExport.statusCode, 502, failedExport.body)
|
||||
assert.equal(failedExport.json().state, "partial")
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(catalogs["/ip/ipsec/identity"], base["/ip/ipsec/identity"])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(catalogs["/ip/ipsec/mode-config"], base["/ip/ipsec/mode-config"])
|
||||
reset(); mode = "other-file-changed"
|
||||
const unrelatedChange = await rest.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/ipsec/users", payload: { serverId, name: "Alice" } })
|
||||
assert.equal(unrelatedChange.statusCode, 502)
|
||||
assert.equal(unrelatedChange.json().completedCommands, 2)
|
||||
assert.equal(catalogs["/file"].length, 2, "failed proof must stop before deletion")
|
||||
for (const [fault, stage, completed] of [["export-refused", "экспорт .p12", 2], ["cleanup-refused", "удаление временного .p12", 3]] as const) {
|
||||
reset(); mode = fault
|
||||
const response = await rest.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/ipsec/users", payload: { serverId, name: "Alice", staticIp: "192.0.2.7" } })
|
||||
assert.equal(response.statusCode, 502)
|
||||
const error = response.json()
|
||||
assert.equal(error.completedCommands, completed)
|
||||
assert(error.error.includes(stage))
|
||||
assert(error.error.includes("HTTP 400"))
|
||||
hidden(error)
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(catalogs["/ip/ipsec/identity"], base["/ip/ipsec/identity"])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(catalogs["/ip/ipsec/mode-config"], base["/ip/ipsec/mode-config"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
reset(); const rawStart = commands.length
|
||||
for (const request of [{ name: "Alice" }, { name: "Alice", authMethod: "pre-shared-key", psk: "NEVER_RAW" }, { name: "Alice", privateKeyExport: true, staticIp: "bad" }]) await assert.rejects(prepare(request))
|
||||
assert.equal(commands.length, rawStart)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,5 +148,5 @@ export function createIpsecUserCreateAdapter(overrides: Partial<typeof productio
|
||||
export function registerIpsecUserCreateActions(register: typeof add) {
|
||||
const adapter = createIpsecUserCreateAdapter()
|
||||
registerMcpService(operation, adapter.service)
|
||||
register(operation, "mm_ipsec_user_create_plan", "Создать клиента IPsec с проверкой всех native-команд, явным приватным экспортом и managed-only историей", "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", ipsecUserCreateActionSchema, { version: 3, prepare: adapter.prepare })
|
||||
register(operation, "mm_ipsec_user_create_plan", "Создать клиента IPsec с проверкой всех native-команд, явным приватным экспортом и managed-only историей", "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", ipsecUserCreateActionSchema, { version: 4, prepare: adapter.prepare })
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { assertNoOperationConfigurationLockContext } from "../../services/operat
|
||||
import { validatePrincipal, audit, type McpPrincipal, type StoredOperation } from "./store.js"
|
||||
import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError, mcpStateDirectory, privateFingerprinterExisting } from "./security.js"
|
||||
import { findActionByOperation } from "./actions.js"
|
||||
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
import { evaluateMcpPolicy, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority, operationApprovalRequirement } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
import { changeMutationCost } from "./change-cost.js"
|
||||
import { assertOriginalMcpTemporaryGrant, type OriginalServiceGrant } from "./temporary-grant-origin.js"
|
||||
import type { ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ export const MCP_OPERATION_PRIVATE_CLAIM_KEY = "__mmappMcpOperationClaimV1"
|
||||
export interface McpOperationExecutionMetadata {
|
||||
readonly operationId: string; readonly planId: string; readonly connectionId: string; readonly ownerId: string
|
||||
readonly operationName: string; readonly operationVersion: number; readonly policyVersion: number; readonly generation: string
|
||||
readonly phase: "forward"; readonly approved: boolean; readonly principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>
|
||||
readonly phase: "forward"; readonly approved: boolean; readonly approvalSource?: "connection-policy"; readonly principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>
|
||||
readonly sealedEvidenceProof: string; readonly sealedPayloadProof: string
|
||||
readonly originalTemporaryGrantProof: string; readonly originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt: number | null; readonly originalExpiresAt: number
|
||||
readonly serverIds: readonly number[]; readonly resources: readonly McpObjectRef[]
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ declare const admissionBrand: unique symbol
|
||||
export type McpOperationAdmissionStart = Readonly<{ [admissionStartBrand]: true }>
|
||||
export type McpOperationAdmission = Readonly<{ [admissionBrand]: true }>
|
||||
type Admission = { operationId: string; planId: string; connectionId: string; nonce: string; principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>; grant: Readonly<OriginalServiceGrant>
|
||||
generation: string; directory: string; keyEpoch: string; operationName: string; operationVersion: number; policyVersion: number; evidenceProof: string; payloadProof: string }
|
||||
generation: string; directory: string; keyEpoch: string; operationName: string; operationVersion: number; policyVersion: number; evidenceProof: string; payloadProof: string; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" }
|
||||
const starts = new WeakMap<object, { principal: Readonly<McpPrincipal>; wall: number; mono: number; directory: string; generation: string; keyEpoch: string }>(), admissions = new WeakMap<object, Admission>()
|
||||
const deny = (): never => { throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Исходный MCP operation root недоступен", 403) }
|
||||
const purpose = "mcp-operation-execution-origin-v1", keyMessage = "mcp-operation-execution-origin-key-epoch-v1"
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ export async function insertMcpOperationAdmission(client: PoolClient, start: Mcp
|
||||
const admission = Object.freeze(Object.create(null)) as McpOperationAdmission
|
||||
admissions.set(admission, { operationId: id, planId, connectionId: principal.connectionId, nonce: randomUUID(), principal, grant,
|
||||
generation: row.generation, directory: anchor.directory, keyEpoch: anchor.keyEpoch, operationName: row.operation_id, operationVersion: row.operation_version, policyVersion: row.policy_version,
|
||||
evidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), payloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed) })
|
||||
evidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), payloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed), approvalSource: row.evidence.approvalSource })
|
||||
return { operation: inserted.rows[0], admission, originalGrant: grant }
|
||||
}
|
||||
function grantFrom(row: Record<string, unknown>, principal: McpPrincipal) {
|
||||
@@ -160,23 +160,25 @@ function source(entry: Entry, row: Record<string, unknown>, state: "pending" | "
|
||||
|| state === "running" && row.claim_nonce !== entry.nonce || row.plan_state !== "executing" || row.owner_id !== m.ownerId
|
||||
|| row.operation_id !== m.operationName || row.operation_version !== m.operationVersion || row.policy_version !== m.policyVersion
|
||||
|| row.generation !== m.generation || row.connection_generation !== m.generation || !!row.approved_by !== m.approved
|
||||
|| m.approvalSource && row.approved_by !== m.ownerId
|
||||
|| !(row.expires_at instanceof Date) || row.expires_at.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt
|
||||
|| !row.evidence || typeof row.evidence !== "object" || !row.payload || typeof row.payload !== "object") deny()
|
||||
const evidence = row.evidence as { sealed?: unknown }, payload = row.payload as { sealed?: unknown }
|
||||
if (typeof evidence.sealed !== "string" || typeof payload.sealed !== "string" || sha(evidence.sealed) !== m.sealedEvidenceProof || sha(payload.sealed) !== m.sealedPayloadProof) deny()
|
||||
const evidence = row.evidence as { sealed?: unknown; approvalSource?: unknown }, payload = row.payload as { sealed?: unknown }
|
||||
if (typeof evidence.sealed !== "string" || typeof payload.sealed !== "string" || evidence.approvalSource !== m.approvalSource || sha(evidence.sealed) !== m.sealedEvidenceProof || sha(payload.sealed) !== m.sealedPayloadProof) deny()
|
||||
const action = findActionByOperation(m.operationName)
|
||||
if (action.operation.version !== m.operationVersion) deny()
|
||||
const grant = grantFrom(row, m.principal)
|
||||
if (grant.proof !== m.originalTemporaryGrantProof || grant.expiresAt !== m.originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt || !Array.isArray(row.protections) || row.protections.length > 1000) deny()
|
||||
const policy = row.policy as Parameters<typeof evaluateMcpPolicy>[0]["policy"]
|
||||
const protections = row.protections as Parameters<typeof evaluateMcpPolicy>[0]["protections"]
|
||||
if (policy.version !== m.policyVersion || !(row.owner_valid_until instanceof Date) || row.owner_valid_until.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt) deny()
|
||||
if (policy.version !== m.policyVersion || m.approvalSource && !hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy) || !(row.owner_valid_until instanceof Date) || row.owner_valid_until.getTime() < m.originalExpiresAt) deny()
|
||||
const approval = operationApprovalRequirement(policy, m.operationName, m.evidence.target, m.evidence.requiresHuman)
|
||||
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy({ operationId: m.operationName, policy, ownerPermissions: row.owner_permissions as string[], target: m.evidence.target,
|
||||
objects: [...m.evidence.objects, ...(m.evidence.requiresHuman && m.evidence.target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: m.operationName }] : [])],
|
||||
objects: [...m.evidence.objects, ...approval.objects],
|
||||
objectCount: changeMutationCost(m.evidence) + (m.evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0),
|
||||
protections: [...protections, ...(m.evidence.requiresHuman && m.evidence.target.scope === "servers" ? m.evidence.target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const })) : [])],
|
||||
protections: [...protections, ...approval.protections],
|
||||
usage: { callsInMinute: 0, mutationsInHour: 0, concurrentReads: Number(row.concurrent_reads) }, auditAvailable: true, temporaryGrant: grant.value })
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && !m.approved) deny()
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!m.approved || m.approvalSource)) deny()
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Two current joined snapshots around real principal/grant checks. Nothing is
|
||||
* cached across calls; the final SQL validates exact source + policy + grant. */
|
||||
@@ -268,13 +270,14 @@ export async function withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin(admission: unknown, work:
|
||||
if (row.operation_state !== "pending") { interruptOwn = false; return }
|
||||
if (!row.evidence?.sealed || !row.payload?.sealed || row.connection_generation !== generation || row.generation !== generation
|
||||
|| row.plan_id !== admitted.planId || generation !== admitted.generation || row.operation_id !== admitted.operationName || row.operation_version !== admitted.operationVersion
|
||||
|| row.policy_version !== admitted.policyVersion || sha(row.evidence.sealed) !== admitted.evidenceProof || sha(row.payload.sealed) !== admitted.payloadProof) return deny()
|
||||
|| row.policy_version !== admitted.policyVersion || row.evidence.approvalSource !== admitted.approvalSource
|
||||
|| sha(row.evidence.sealed) !== admitted.evidenceProof || sha(row.payload.sealed) !== admitted.payloadProof) return deny()
|
||||
const evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence, privateInput = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.payload.sealed)) as Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(evidence.steps) || !Array.isArray(evidence.objects) || !Array.isArray(evidence.snapshots) || !privateInput || typeof privateInput !== "object" || Array.isArray(privateInput)) return deny()
|
||||
const expiresAt = Math.min(originalGrant.admissionExpiresAt, row.expires_at.getTime(), Date.parse(capturedPrincipal.credentialExpiresAt), Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt), connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(), evidence.validUntil ? Date.parse(evidence.validUntil) : Infinity)
|
||||
const metadata = frozen({ operationId, planId: String(row.plan_id), connectionId: capturedPrincipal.connectionId, ownerId: connection.owner_id,
|
||||
operationName: String(row.operation_id), operationVersion: Number(row.operation_version), policyVersion: Number(row.policy_version), generation, phase: "forward" as const,
|
||||
approved: !!row.approved_by, principal: capturedPrincipal, sealedEvidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), sealedPayloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed),
|
||||
approved: !!row.approved_by, ...(admitted.approvalSource && { approvalSource: admitted.approvalSource }), principal: capturedPrincipal, sealedEvidenceProof: sha(row.evidence.sealed), sealedPayloadProof: sha(row.payload.sealed),
|
||||
originalTemporaryGrantProof: originalGrant.proof, originalTemporaryGrantExpiresAt: originalGrant.expiresAt, originalExpiresAt: expiresAt,
|
||||
serverIds: [...new Set([...(evidence.target.scope === "servers" ? evidence.target.serverIds : []), ...evidence.objects.flatMap(object => object.serverId === undefined ? [] : [object.serverId])])].sort((a, b) => a - b),
|
||||
resources: structuredClone(evidence.objects), privateInput, evidence })
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ assert.equal(findMcpOperation(fullFlowSettings.operation.id)?.version, 3)
|
||||
assert.equal(fullFlowSettings.schema.safeParse({ settings: { collectorIp: "10.255.254.1", enabled: false, mapServiceMinSharePct: 0 } }).success, true)
|
||||
assert.equal(fullFlowSettings.schema.safeParse({ topN: 10 }).success, false)
|
||||
assert.equal(findAction("mm_netflow_host_keys_generate_plan").operation.id, "traffic.flow.settings.generate-keys")
|
||||
assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_user_create_plan").operation.version, 3)
|
||||
assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_user_create_plan").operation.version, 4)
|
||||
assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_server_init_plan").operation.version, 5)
|
||||
// RouterOS 7.24 certificate bodies (no comment, sign/export by .id): earlier prepared plans need a new approval.
|
||||
assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_existing_certificate_export_plan").operation.version, 2)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import { decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinterExisting, redac
|
||||
const uuid = z.string().uuid()
|
||||
const positive = z.number().int().positive().safe()
|
||||
const object = z.record(z.string(),z.unknown())
|
||||
const sealed = z.object({sealed:z.string().min(1).max(262144)}).strict()
|
||||
const sealed = z.object({sealed:z.string().min(1).max(262144),approvalSource:z.literal("connection-policy").optional()}).strict()
|
||||
const ids = z.array(positive).max(1000)
|
||||
const retention = z.number().int().min(1).max(365)
|
||||
const bool = z.boolean()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict"
|
||||
import { test } from "node:test"
|
||||
import { mcpOperationDescriptorSchema, mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema, mcpPolicyDecisionSchema, mcpTemporaryGrantSchema, type McpPolicyPreviewRequest } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
|
||||
import { MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION, mcpConnectionPolicySchema, mcpOperationDescriptorSchema, mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema, mcpPolicyDecisionSchema, mcpTemporaryGrantSchema, type McpPolicyPreviewRequest } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
|
||||
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
import { findMcpOperation, listMcpOperations } from "./registry.js"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +42,19 @@ test("mode × dangerous policy matrix never grants autonomy implicitly", () => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("unattended plans require an explicit service policy and retain server protections", () => {
|
||||
const input = request()
|
||||
assert.equal(mcpConnectionPolicySchema.safeParse({ ...input.policy, allowUnattendedPlans: true }).success, false)
|
||||
input.policy = mcpConnectionPolicySchema.parse({ ...input.policy, authority: "service", expiresAt: MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION })
|
||||
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "approval-required")
|
||||
input.policy.allowUnattendedPlans = true
|
||||
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "allowed")
|
||||
input.protections = [{ kind: "server", id: "1", protection: "human-approval-required" }]
|
||||
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(input, now).decision, "approval-required")
|
||||
input.protections[0].protection = "deny"
|
||||
denied(input, "PROTECTED_OBJECT")
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("observer reads permitted logs, but cannot run bandwidth or create users", () => {
|
||||
const read = request("logs.query"); read.policy.mode = "observer"
|
||||
assert.equal(evaluateMcpPolicy(read, now).decision, "allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,10 +3,22 @@ import {
|
||||
type McpPolicyDecision,
|
||||
type McpPolicyPreviewRequest,
|
||||
type McpPolicyReasonCode,
|
||||
type McpConnectionPolicy,
|
||||
} from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
|
||||
import { hasPermission } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
|
||||
import { findMcpOperation } from "./registry.js"
|
||||
|
||||
export function hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy: McpConnectionPolicy) {
|
||||
return policy.authority === "service" && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.allowUnattendedPlans === true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function operationApprovalRequirement(policy: McpConnectionPolicy, operationId: string, target: McpPolicyPreviewRequest["target"], requiresHuman?: boolean): Pick<McpPolicyPreviewRequest, "objects" | "protections"> {
|
||||
if (!requiresHuman || hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy)) return { objects: [], protections: [] }
|
||||
const objects = target.scope === "servers" ? [] : [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId }]
|
||||
const protectedObjects = target.scope === "servers" ? target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId })) : objects
|
||||
return { objects, protections: protectedObjects.map(object => ({ ...object, protection: "human-approval-required" })) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Pure policy simulation. Does not grant authority, reserve budgets or execute handlers. */
|
||||
export function evaluateMcpPolicy(payload: McpPolicyPreviewRequest, now = new Date()): McpPolicyDecision {
|
||||
const input = mcpPolicyPreviewRequestSchema.parse(payload)
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +99,7 @@ export function evaluateMcpPolicy(payload: McpPolicyPreviewRequest, now = new Da
|
||||
else approve("Защищённый объект требует подтверждения человеком")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (policy.mode === "approval") approve("Режим подключения требует подтверждения человеком")
|
||||
if (operation.risk === "dangerous" && !(policy.dangerousPolicy === "explicit-allow" && policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.includes(operation.id))) {
|
||||
if (operation.risk === "dangerous" && !hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(policy) && !(policy.dangerousPolicy === "explicit-allow" && policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.includes(operation.id))) {
|
||||
approve("Опасная операция не разрешена для автономного выполнения")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return result()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ts from "typescript"
|
||||
import { z } from "zod"
|
||||
import { routeAiControllerBlockReason, routeAiProfileSchema, usesScopedRouteAiContext } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
|
||||
import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
|
||||
import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
|
||||
type Handler = { prepare?: (input: Record<string, unknown>, context: unknown) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>; execute?: (input: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<unknown> }
|
||||
async function load(name: string, providers: Record<string, unknown>) {
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ async function fixture() {
|
||||
"./path-proof-purpose.js": { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS: 90000 },
|
||||
"./routing-controller-fence.js": { saveControllerProfileCas: async () => { casWrites++; return { id: "saved", version: 1 } } },
|
||||
"./routing-reservation-store.js": { createRoutingReservationStore: () => { throw new Error("Overlap-only fixture must not read or mutate routing charges") } },
|
||||
"./policy.js": { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority },
|
||||
})
|
||||
const register = profileModule.registerRoutingProfileActions as (register: (...args: unknown[]) => void) => void
|
||||
register((...args) => operations.set(String(args[0]), args.at(-1) as Handler))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import type { ActionContext } from "./action-types.js"
|
||||
import { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
|
||||
import { controllerProfileCurrent, publishControllerState, saveControllerProfileCas, withControllerProfileLease } from "./routing-controller-fence.js"
|
||||
import { assertIdentifiedRoutingCompletion, createRoutingReservationStore } from "./routing-reservation-store.js"
|
||||
import { hasUnattendedPlanAuthority } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
|
||||
const targetIds = (profile: RouteAiProfile) => [...new Set([profile.serverId, ...profile.candidates.flatMap(candidate => [candidate.jumpHostId, candidate.exitNodeId])])]
|
||||
const profilePublicColumns = "id,version,config,state,enabled,grant_expires_at,updated_at"
|
||||
@@ -142,6 +143,7 @@ async function tickAdmittedRoutingProfiles() {
|
||||
next.reason = "Изменение конфигурации проверено; ожидаются новые измерения сети"
|
||||
} else if (plan.operation_id) next.reason = "Операция выполняется"
|
||||
else if (plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) { await stop("План истёк без подтверждения"); return }
|
||||
else if (plan.state === "draft" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)) next.reason = "Ожидается публикация плана клиентом MCP"
|
||||
else if (["approved", "draft"].includes(plan.state)) {
|
||||
await current()
|
||||
await assertRoutingControllerBaseline(state.baseline,row.id,row.version,profile,row.grant_expires_at.toISOString(),{principal,connection})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import { readPollRuntimePolicySource, type PollRuntimePolicySource } from "./pol
|
||||
import { withVerifiedConfigurationChange, assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess } from "../../services/config-mutation-policy.js"
|
||||
import { beginMcpOperationAdmission, insertMcpOperationAdmission, retireMcpOperationAdmission, withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin, stripMcpOperationExecutionPrivateResult, type McpOperationAdmission } from "./operation-execution-origin.js"
|
||||
import { createOspfOwnerSourceGuard, verifyOspfOwnerGraph, verifyOspfOwnerGraphAtPhase } from "./ospf-owner-graph.js"
|
||||
import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
import { evaluateMcpPolicy, hasUnattendedPlanAuthority, operationApprovalRequirement } from "./policy.js"
|
||||
import { findAction, findActionByOperation } from "./actions.js"
|
||||
import { refuseExpiredOperationReplay } from "./operation-replay-tombstones.js"
|
||||
import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
|
||||
@@ -105,14 +105,11 @@ async function policyInput(client: Pick<PoolClient, "query">, connection: Connec
|
||||
SELECT COALESCE((SELECT used FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=$1 AND kind='calls' AND bucket=date_trunc('minute',now())),0) AS calls,
|
||||
COALESCE((SELECT used FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=$1 AND kind='mutations' AND bucket=date_trunc('hour',now())),0) AS mutations,
|
||||
(SELECT count(*)::int FROM mcp_read_leases WHERE connection_id=$1 AND expires_at>now()) AS reads`, [connection.id])
|
||||
const approval = operationApprovalRequirement(connection.policy, operationId, target, evidence?.requiresHuman)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
operationId, policy: connection.policy, ownerPermissions: connection.owner_permissions, target,
|
||||
objects: [...(evidence?.objects ?? []), ...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId }] : [])], objectCount: evidence ? changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0) : 0,
|
||||
protections: [
|
||||
...protections.map(row => mcpProtectedObjectSchema.parse(row.object_ref)),
|
||||
...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope === "servers" ? target.serverIds.map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const })) : []),
|
||||
...(evidence?.requiresHuman && target.scope !== "servers" ? [{ kind: "mcp-operation", id: operationId, protection: "human-approval-required" as const }] : []),
|
||||
],
|
||||
objects: [...(evidence?.objects ?? []), ...approval.objects], objectCount: evidence ? changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0) : 0,
|
||||
protections: [...protections.map(row => mcpProtectedObjectSchema.parse(row.object_ref)), ...approval.protections],
|
||||
usage: { callsInMinute: Number(usage.calls), mutationsInHour: Number(usage.mutations), concurrentReads: Number(usage.reads) }, auditAvailable: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -209,7 +206,8 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
|
||||
const id = randomUUID(), expiresAt = preparedPlanExpiry(action.operation.id, action.operation.section, evidence)
|
||||
if (!expiresAt) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Срок исходных данных плана истёк или недоступен; подготовьте новый план", 409)
|
||||
const generation = await accessGeneration()
|
||||
await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7::jsonb,$8::jsonb,$9,$10)", [id, connection.id, action.operation.id, action.operation.version, connection.policy.version, generation, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(input)) }), JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence)) }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", expiresAt])
|
||||
let sealedEvidence = await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence))
|
||||
await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7::jsonb,$8::jsonb,$9,$10)", [id, connection.id, action.operation.id, action.operation.version, connection.policy.version, generation, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(input)) }), JSON.stringify({ sealed: sealedEvidence }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", expiresAt])
|
||||
const vrfTicket = await prepareRuntimeVrfTicket({ operationId: action.operation.id, operationVersion: action.operation.version, planId: id, connectionId: connection.id, ownerId: connection.owner_id, evidence, sql: client,
|
||||
assertAuthority: async () => {
|
||||
if (signal?.aborted || generation !== await accessGeneration() || expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Подготовка VRF отменена или устарела", 409)
|
||||
@@ -238,11 +236,14 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
|
||||
finalCheck.usage.callsInMinute = Math.max(0, finalCheck.usage.callsInMinute - 1)
|
||||
decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(finalCheck)
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied") throw new McpError(decision.reasons[0].code, decision.reasons.map(reason => reason.message).join("; "))
|
||||
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET evidence=$2::jsonb,state=$3 WHERE id=$1", [id, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence)) }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft"])
|
||||
sealedEvidence = await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence))
|
||||
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET evidence=$2::jsonb,state=$3 WHERE id=$1", [id, JSON.stringify({ sealed: sealedEvidence }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "plan.create", connection.id, { planId: id, operationId: action.operation.id, decision })
|
||||
assertActive()
|
||||
return { planId: id, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(), state: decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", decision, changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(action.operation.id, evidence)), ...(vrfTicket ? { vrfTicket } : {}), executionAvailable: true }
|
||||
const announcement = decision.decision === "allowed" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)
|
||||
? planAnnouncement(id, sealedEvidence) : undefined
|
||||
return { planId: id, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(), state: decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", decision, changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(action.operation.id, evidence)), ...(announcement && { operationId: action.operation.id, announcement }), ...(vrfTicket ? { vrfTicket } : {}), executionAvailable: true }
|
||||
})
|
||||
vrfPreparing = false
|
||||
} else throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Нет обработчика операции", 409)
|
||||
@@ -278,10 +279,19 @@ export async function loadPlan(id: string, client: Pick<PoolClient, "query"> = p
|
||||
if (!plan) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "План не найден", 404)
|
||||
return plan
|
||||
}
|
||||
export async function publicPlan(plan: StoredPlan) {
|
||||
function planAnnouncement(planId: string, sealedEvidence: string) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
digest: fingerprint({ planId, sealedEvidence }),
|
||||
instruction: "Сначала отправьте пользователю отдельное видимое сообщение в чате с ID плана, целями, конкретными изменениями и предупреждениями из changes. Затем вызовите mm_change_apply с announcedPlanDigest. Ответ пользователя для этого плана не требуется.",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function publicPlan(plan: StoredPlan, unattended = false) {
|
||||
const evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
|
||||
return { id: plan.id, connectionId: plan.connection_id, operationId: plan.operation_id, state: plan.state,
|
||||
expiresAt: plan.expires_at.toISOString(), createdAt: plan.created_at.toISOString(), approvedBy: plan.approved_by,
|
||||
expiresAt: plan.expires_at.toISOString(), createdAt: plan.created_at.toISOString(), approvedBy: plan.evidence.approvalSource ? null : plan.approved_by,
|
||||
...(plan.evidence.approvalSource && { approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, authorizedBy: plan.approved_by }),
|
||||
...(unattended && plan.state === "draft" && plan.expires_at.getTime() > Date.now() && { announcement: planAnnouncement(plan.id, plan.evidence.sealed) }),
|
||||
changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(plan.operation_id, evidence)), input: redact(JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.payload.sealed))) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
export async function approvePlan(id: string, actor: AuthUser, approve: boolean) {
|
||||
@@ -378,10 +388,10 @@ export async function verifyStep(step: ChangeStep, result: unknown, before?: Ros
|
||||
if (!before) return false
|
||||
return verifyRosStepSnapshots(step.step, result, before, after ?? await readRosSnapshot(step.step.serverId, step.step.resource))
|
||||
}
|
||||
export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
|
||||
return withMcpDatabaseRequest(() => admitPlan(principal, planId, idempotencyKey))
|
||||
export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string, announcedPlanDigest?: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
|
||||
return withMcpDatabaseRequest(() => admitPlan(principal, planId, idempotencyKey, announcedPlanDigest))
|
||||
}
|
||||
async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
|
||||
async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey: string, announcedPlanDigest?: string): Promise<StoredOperation> {
|
||||
const operationAdmissionStart = beginMcpOperationAdmission(principal)
|
||||
let reservedRouting = false
|
||||
let originalServiceGrant:OriginalServiceGrant|undefined
|
||||
@@ -408,6 +418,10 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
|
||||
const action = findActionByOperation(plan.operation_id)
|
||||
if (plan.policy_version !== connection.policy.version || plan.operation_version !== action.operation.version || plan.generation !== await accessGeneration() || plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "План или его разрешения устарели", 409)
|
||||
if (!["draft", "approved"].includes(plan.state)) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "План требует подтверждения или недоступен", 409)
|
||||
const delegated = plan.state === "draft" && hasUnattendedPlanAuthority(connection.policy)
|
||||
if (delegated && announcedPlanDigest !== planAnnouncement(plan.id, plan.evidence.sealed).digest) {
|
||||
throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Сначала опубликуйте точный план в чате и передайте его announcedPlanDigest", 409)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const change of evidence.steps) {
|
||||
if (change.kind === "ros" && change.step.resource === "ip_settings" && change.step.fields["rp-filter"] === "strict") {
|
||||
checkRpfPolicy(change.step.serverId, evidence.snapshots, "strict")
|
||||
@@ -415,7 +429,7 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
let scopedPathExpiresAt: number | undefined
|
||||
if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" && requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval(evidence)) {
|
||||
if (plan.approved_by !== connection.owner_id) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 409)
|
||||
if (!delegated && plan.approved_by !== connection.owner_id) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 409)
|
||||
scopedPathExpiresAt = await readScopedRoutingPathAdmissionDeadline(client, evidence, connection.id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (evidence.validUntil && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(evidence.validUntil)) || Date.now() >= Date.parse(evidence.validUntil))) {
|
||||
@@ -449,18 +463,23 @@ async function admitPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempotencyKey
|
||||
const mutationCost = reservedRouting ? 2 : changeMutationCost(evidence) + (evidence.recovery ? 1 : 0)
|
||||
if (input.usage.mutationsInHour + mutationCost > connection.policy.limits.mutationsPerHour) throw new McpError("BUDGET_EXCEEDED", "Недостаточно бюджета для всех шагов плана", 429)
|
||||
if (!reservedRouting) await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_budget_buckets(connection_id,kind,bucket,used) VALUES($1,'mutations',date_trunc('hour',now()),$2) ON CONFLICT(connection_id,kind,bucket) DO UPDATE SET used=mcp_budget_buckets.used+EXCLUDED.used", [connection.id, mutationCost])
|
||||
if (delegated) {
|
||||
// Execution receipts use the delegating owner's ID. Object protections still require a human decision.
|
||||
plan.evidence.approvalSource = "connection-policy"
|
||||
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing',approved_by=$2,approved_at=now(),evidence=$3::jsonb WHERE id=$1", [planId, connection.owner_id, JSON.stringify(plan.evidence)])
|
||||
plan.approved_by = connection.owner_id
|
||||
} else await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing' WHERE id=$1", [planId])
|
||||
const inserted = await insertMcpOperationAdmission(client, operationAdmissionStart, planId, idempotencyKey, originalServiceGrant)
|
||||
const row = inserted.operation, id = row.id
|
||||
operationAdmission = inserted.admission; originalServiceGrant = inserted.originalGrant
|
||||
if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" || plan.operation_id === "operations.recover") {
|
||||
bindRoutingChargeAdmission(client, connection.id, principal.credentialId, inserted.originalGrant)
|
||||
}
|
||||
await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='executing' WHERE id=$1", [planId])
|
||||
if (reservedRouting) await reserveRouting(id)
|
||||
else if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch") await admitPersistentRoutingForwardWithinOwner(client, id)
|
||||
else if (plan.operation_id === "operations.recover") await admitManualInverseWithinOwner(client, id, plan, evidence, principal,
|
||||
(profileId, current, observedAt, deadlineAt) => readHistoricalChargesWithinOwner(client, profileId, current, observedAt, deadlineAt))
|
||||
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "operation.start", connection.id, { operationId: id, planId })
|
||||
await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "operation.start", connection.id, { operationId: id, planId, ...(delegated && { approvalSource: "connection-policy", announcedPlanDigest }) })
|
||||
return row
|
||||
}).catch(async error => { await retireMcpOperationAdmission(operationAdmission); throw error })
|
||||
const operation = admitted.value
|
||||
@@ -568,7 +587,7 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
|
||||
policy.usage.callsInMinute = 0; policy.usage.mutationsInHour = 0
|
||||
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(policy)
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied") throw new McpError(decision.reasons[0].code, decision.reasons.map(reason => reason.message).join("; "))
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "approval-required" && !plan.approved_by) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение теперь требует подтверждения", 409)
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!plan.approved_by || plan.evidence.approvalSource)) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение теперь требует подтверждения", 409)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (policyLoan) await executeRuntimePollPolicyTransaction(policyLoan, checkPolicy)
|
||||
else await transaction(checkPolicy)
|
||||
@@ -681,7 +700,7 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
|
||||
}
|
||||
stepDispatches++
|
||||
} : undefined
|
||||
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, serverWide: step.kind === "service", ...(serviceExecution?{serviceExecution}:{}), authorize: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? authorizeCatalog() : authorize()) }, authorizeWrite: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? catalogStage.fresh() : authorizeStage.fresh()) }, beforeDispatch },
|
||||
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: step.kind === "service", ...(serviceExecution?{serviceExecution}:{}), authorize: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? authorizeCatalog() : authorize()) }, authorizeWrite: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? catalogStage.fresh() : authorizeStage.fresh()) }, beforeDispatch },
|
||||
async () => {
|
||||
vrfDiagnosticFallback?.executorEntered()
|
||||
if (step.kind === "ros") {
|
||||
@@ -830,7 +849,7 @@ async function performReservedRecovery(operation: StoredOperation, plan: StoredP
|
||||
input.temporaryGrant = await temporaryScope(client, connection, principal.credentialId)
|
||||
input.usage.callsInMinute = 0; input.usage.mutationsInHour = 0
|
||||
const decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(input)
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && !plan.approved_by) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Текущая защита или допуск запрещает восстановление")
|
||||
if (decision.decision === "denied" || decision.decision === "approval-required" && (!plan.approved_by || plan.evidence.approvalSource)) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Текущая защита или допуск запрещает восстановление")
|
||||
})
|
||||
for (const channel of evidence.managementChannels ?? []) await verifyManagementChannel(channel.serverId, channel.channelId)
|
||||
if (!evidence.managementChannels?.length) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Восстановление требует независимого канала")
|
||||
@@ -847,7 +866,7 @@ async function performReservedRecovery(operation: StoredOperation, plan: StoredP
|
||||
await audit(pool, connection.owner_id, "recovery.intent", connection.id, { operationId: operation.id, authorityProfileId: recovery.authorityProfileId })
|
||||
attempted = true
|
||||
const step = recovery.step
|
||||
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, serverWide: true }, () => serviceExecute(step.service, step.input, { operationId: operation.id, phase: "recovery" }))
|
||||
const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, approvalSource: plan.evidence.approvalSource, serverWide: true }, () => serviceExecute(step.service, step.input, { operationId: operation.id, phase: "recovery" }))
|
||||
if (!await verifyStep(step, result)) throw new McpError("VERIFICATION_FAILED", "Проверка восстановления не прошла", 409)
|
||||
await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_recovery_intents SET state='verified',finished_at=now() WHERE operation_id=$1", [operation.id])
|
||||
await audit(pool, connection.owner_id, "recovery.verified", connection.id, { operationId: operation.id })
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export async function effectiveMcpConnection(principal: McpPrincipal, client: Pi
|
||||
}
|
||||
export interface StoredPlan extends QueryResultRow {
|
||||
id: string; connection_id: string; operation_id: string; operation_version: number; policy_version: number;
|
||||
generation: string; payload: { sealed: string }; evidence: { sealed: string }; state: string;
|
||||
generation: string; payload: { sealed: string }; evidence: { sealed: string; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" }; state: string;
|
||||
expires_at: Date; approved_by: string | null; created_at: Date
|
||||
}
|
||||
export interface StoredOperation extends QueryResultRow {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ function makeMcpServerWithBindings(principal: McpPrincipal, bindings: ReturnType
|
||||
for (const action of bindings) {
|
||||
const descriptor = action.operation
|
||||
server.registerTool(descriptor.toolName, {
|
||||
title: descriptor.title, description: `${descriptor.title}. ${action.prepare ? "Подготавливает неизменяемый план; применение отдельным вызовом после проверки политики." : "Возвращает данные только из разрешённой области."}`,
|
||||
title: descriptor.title, description: `${descriptor.title}. ${action.prepare
|
||||
? "Подготавливает неизменяемый план. Если возвращён announcement, опубликуйте точные изменения отдельным сообщением в чате до вызова применения."
|
||||
: descriptor.id === "changes.apply"
|
||||
? "Если план содержит announcement, сначала отправьте точные изменения пользователю в чат, затем передайте announcedPlanDigest."
|
||||
: "Возвращает данные только из разрешённой области."}`,
|
||||
inputSchema: action.schema, annotations: descriptor.annotations,
|
||||
}, async (input, sdkContext) => {
|
||||
const execute = async () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export interface VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata {
|
||||
}
|
||||
// `authorize` guards reads inside a stage and may reuse a recent proof; `authorizeWrite`, when given, is a
|
||||
// fresh check before every native or application write (each write is a stage boundary).
|
||||
interface VerifiedChange { active: boolean; actorId: string; connectionId: string; approved: boolean; serverIds: number[]; objects: McpObjectRef[]; serverWide: boolean; authorize?: () => Promise<void>; authorizeWrite?: () => Promise<void>; beforeDispatch?: () => Promise<void>; serviceExecution?:VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata }
|
||||
interface VerifiedChange { active: boolean; actorId: string; connectionId: string; approved: boolean; approvalSource?: "connection-policy" | null; serverIds: number[]; objects: McpObjectRef[]; serverWide: boolean; authorize?: () => Promise<void>; authorizeWrite?: () => Promise<void>; beforeDispatch?: () => Promise<void>; serviceExecution?:VerifiedMcpServiceMetadata }
|
||||
const verified = new AsyncLocalStorage<VerifiedChange>()
|
||||
declare const serviceExecutionBrand:unique symbol
|
||||
export type VerifiedMcpServiceExecution=Readonly<{[serviceExecutionBrand]:true}>
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export async function assertDatabaseRestoreAllowed() {
|
||||
const inherited = verified.getStore(), context = inherited?.active ? inherited : undefined
|
||||
const { rows } = await pool.query("SELECT object_ref FROM mcp_protections")
|
||||
for (const row of rows) {
|
||||
if (row.object_ref.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
|
||||
if (row.object_ref.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
|
||||
const code = row.object_ref.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED"
|
||||
await audit(pool, context?.actorId ?? actor.getStore() ?? "system", "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { domain: "database.restore", code })
|
||||
throw new McpError(code, "Полное восстановление затрагивает защищённый объект", 409)
|
||||
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export async function executeGuardedConfigurationWrite<T>(serverId: number, meth
|
||||
// typed plan instead of guessing that their writes miss a protected object.
|
||||
const matches = !context || context.serverWide || protection.kind === "server" || context.objects.some(object => object.serverId === serverId && object.kind === protection.kind && object.id === protection.id)
|
||||
if (!matches) continue
|
||||
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
|
||||
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
|
||||
const code = protection.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED"
|
||||
await auditConfiguration(actorId, "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { serverId, method, path, code })
|
||||
throw new McpError(code, protection.protection === "deny" ? "Изменение заблокировано защитой объекта. Используйте план с проверкой зависимостей." : "Защищённый объект требует подтверждённого плана изменений.", 409)
|
||||
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ export async function executeGuardedApplicationWrite<T>(object: { kind: string;
|
||||
const { rows } = await pool.query("SELECT object_ref FROM mcp_protections WHERE object_ref->>'serverId'=ANY($1::text[]) OR (object_ref->>'kind'='server' AND object_ref->>'id'=ANY($1::text[])) OR (object_ref->>'kind'=$2 AND object_ref->>'id'=$3) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM jsonb_array_elements($4::jsonb) AS target WHERE target->>'kind'=object_ref->>'kind' AND target->>'id'=object_ref->>'id')", [serverIds.map(String), object.kind, object.id, JSON.stringify(objects)])
|
||||
for (const row of rows) {
|
||||
const protection = row.object_ref as { protection: string }
|
||||
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved) {
|
||||
if (protection.protection === "deny" || !context?.approved || context.approvalSource) {
|
||||
await auditConfiguration(actorId, "configuration.denied", context?.connectionId ?? null, { domain: "application", object, serverIds })
|
||||
throw new McpError(protection.protection === "deny" ? "PROTECTED_OBJECT" : "APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Изменение приложения затрагивает защищённый объект; нужен проверенный план", 409)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -134,15 +134,7 @@ export function isReleasableIpsecCryptoRow(row: { name?: string; comment?: strin
|
||||
return isIpsecManagedComment(row.comment) || (!row.comment?.trim() && row.name === IPSEC_COMMON_NAME)
|
||||
}
|
||||
export const IPSEC_CA_COMMON_NAME = "MikrotikManager IPsec CA"
|
||||
/** RouterOS native id: `*<hex>` for configuration rows; RouterOS 7.24 `/file` rows use case-sensitive `**<base62>` ids
|
||||
* whose length follows the file path (stand probe 2026-11-21). */
|
||||
export function isRouterOsNativeId(value: unknown): value is string {
|
||||
return typeof value === "string" && value.length <= 256 && /^\*\*?[a-z0-9]+$/i.test(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Duplicate key: hex ids compare case-insensitively without leading zeros; `**` file ids compare exactly. */
|
||||
export function routerOsIdKey(value: string): string {
|
||||
return value.startsWith("**") ? value : value.toLowerCase().replace(/^\*0+(?=[a-z0-9])/, "*")
|
||||
}
|
||||
export { isRouterOsNativeId, routerOsIdKey } from "./routeros-native-paths.js"
|
||||
/** RouterOS 7.24 omits a peer `address` equal to the any-address from REST rows (stand probe 2026-11-21). */
|
||||
export const IPSEC_ANY_PEER_ADDRESS = "0.0.0.0/0"
|
||||
/** RouterOS 7.24 `/certificate` has no `comment` (PUT refuses it), so product certificates are recognised by their
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -96,12 +96,14 @@ export function normalizeIpsecExistingExportPassphrase(raw: string | undefined,
|
||||
}
|
||||
export function projectIpsecExistingCertificateExport(state: IpsecExistingCertificateExportState, filename: string, after: IpsecExistingCertificateExportState) {
|
||||
validateIpsecExistingCertificateExportState(after)
|
||||
const old = state.catalogs["/file"], candidates = after.catalogs["/file"].filter(row => row.name === filename && !old.some(prior => idKey(prior[".id"]) === idKey(row[".id"])))
|
||||
const old = state.catalogs["/file"], files = after.catalogs["/file"]
|
||||
const candidates = files.filter(row => row.name === filename && !old.some(prior => idKey(prior[".id"]) === idKey(row[".id"])))
|
||||
if (candidates.length !== 1) throw fail("Не подтверждён единственный receipt-owned файл экспорта", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
const row = candidates[0], size = Number(row.size)
|
||||
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(size) || size <= 0 || size > MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES) throw fail("Размер приватного файла вне предела точного /file/get (61438 байт)", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
const projected = structuredClone(state)
|
||||
projected.catalogs["/file"].push(structuredClone(row))
|
||||
// The new file can appear anywhere. The proof still checks the relative order and contents of every pre-existing row.
|
||||
projected.catalogs["/file"].splice(files.indexOf(row), 0, structuredClone(row))
|
||||
return { projected, file: { id: row[".id"], name: filename, size } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
export function projectIpsecExistingCertificateCleanup(state: IpsecExistingCertificateExportState, file: { id: string; name: string; size: number }) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,12 +69,13 @@ assert.throws(() => project(withCert, cert.commands[1], { observedRow: signed })
|
||||
const signedState = project(withCert, cert.commands[1], { observedRow: signed, ownedCertificateIds: new Set(["*new"]) })
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(signedState.catalogs["/certificate"].slice(0, 2), state.catalogs["/certificate"])
|
||||
assert.throws(() => project(withCert, cert.commands[1], { observedRow: { ...signed, opaque: "changed" }, ownedCertificateIds: new Set(["*new"]) }), /исходные поля/)
|
||||
const withFile = project(signedState, cert.commands[2], { assignedId: "*export", observedRow: { ".id": "*export", name: "mm-ipsec-fixture.p12", size: "256", type: "file" } })
|
||||
const withFile = project(signedState, cert.commands[2], { assignedId: "*export", observedRow: { ".id": "*export", name: "mm-ipsec-fixture.p12", size: "256", type: "file" }, exportIndex: 0 })
|
||||
assert.equal(withFile.catalogs["/file"][0][".id"], "*export")
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(project(withFile, cert.commands[3], { assignedId: "*export" }).catalogs["/file"], state.catalogs["/file"])
|
||||
assert.throws(() => project(state, psk.commands[0], { assignedId: "*l", observedRow: { ".id": "*l", ...psk.commands[0].fields } }), /ACK/)
|
||||
assert.throws(() => project(state, psk.commands[0], { assignedId: "*new", observedRow: { ".id": "*new", ...psk.commands[0].fields, "remote-id": "key-id:mallory" } }), /Поля/)
|
||||
const staticCert = plan(state, server, { serverId: 1, name: "Alice", staticIp: "192.0.2.7" }, "mm-ipsec-fixture")
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(staticCert.commands.map(row => row.action), ["create", "create", "sign", "create", "export", "cleanup"])
|
||||
assert.equal(staticCert.commands[3].fields["remote-certificate"], cert.certName)
|
||||
assert.equal(staticCert.commands[3].fields["match-by"], "certificate")
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(staticCert.commands.map(row => row.path), ["/certificate", "/certificate/sign", "/certificate/export-certificate", "/file", "/ip/ipsec/mode-config", "/ip/ipsec/identity"])
|
||||
assert.equal(staticCert.commands[5].fields["remote-certificate"], cert.certName)
|
||||
assert.equal(staticCert.commands[5].fields["match-by"], "certificate")
|
||||
console.log("ipsec-user-create-model: full PSK/certificate/static/export plans and raw conservation passed")
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ export function planIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, server: ServerR
|
||||
if (mapClients(live).some(row => row.name === body.name.trim()) || (certName && live.certs.some(row => row.name === certName))) throw fail("Клиент уже существует")
|
||||
if (body.authMethod === "pre-shared-key" && live.identities.some(row => row.peer === peer.name && row["auth-method"] === "pre-shared-key" && row["remote-id"] === normalizeIpsecRemoteId(body.remoteId ?? body.name))) throw fail("Remote ID уже используется клиентом этого peer")
|
||||
const commands: IpsecUserCreateCommand[] = [], seeds: Array<{ path: string; row: Row }> = []
|
||||
let staticModeConfig: IpsecUserCreateCommand | undefined
|
||||
const seed = (path: string, row: unknown) => { if (row) seeds.push({ path, row: row as Row }) }
|
||||
seed("/ip/ipsec/peer", peer); seed("/ip/ipsec/mode-config", sharedMc)
|
||||
const sharedIdentity = selectSharedIke2Identity(live.identities, names)
|
||||
@@ -58,18 +59,18 @@ export function planIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, server: ServerR
|
||||
if (existing && (!isManagedIpsecModeConfig(existing) || c["/ip/ipsec/identity"].some(row => row["mode-config"] === existing.name || row["mode-config"]?.toLowerCase() === existing[".id"].toLowerCase()))) throw fail("Персональный mode-config уже используется другим клиентом; адрес чужого или общего объекта изменять нельзя")
|
||||
if (existing) for (const flag of ["dynamic", "builtin", "default"]) if (existing[flag] !== undefined && observedBoolean(existing[flag]) !== false) throw fail("Системный mode-config нельзя изменять", "PROTECTED_OBJECT")
|
||||
seed("/ip/ipsec/mode-config", existing)
|
||||
commands.push({ action: existing ? "update" : "create", path: "/ip/ipsec/mode-config", ...(existing ? { id: existing[".id"] } : {}), fields: { name: modeConfig, address: body.staticIp.trim(), responder: "yes", "address-prefix-length": "32" } })
|
||||
staticModeConfig = { action: existing ? "update" : "create", path: "/ip/ipsec/mode-config", ...(existing ? { id: existing[".id"] } : {}), fields: { name: modeConfig, address: body.staticIp.trim(), responder: "yes", "address-prefix-length": "32" } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (certName) {
|
||||
seed("/certificate", serverCert); seed("/certificate", c["/certificate"].find(row => row.name === caName))
|
||||
commands.push({ action: "create", path: "/certificate", fields: { name: certName, "common-name": body.name.trim(), "key-size": "2048", "key-usage": "digital-signature,key-encipherment,tls-client", "days-valid": String(body.daysValid ?? 1825) } })
|
||||
commands.push({ action: "sign", path: "/certificate/sign", name: certName, fields: { ca: caName! } })
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (body.authMethod !== "certificate" || body.staticIp || !sharedIdentity) commands.push({ action: "create", path: "/ip/ipsec/identity", fields: identityRosBody({ peerName: peer.name, modeConfig, comment: certName && !body.staticIp ? ipsecManagedComment("IKEv2 listener") : ipsecUserComment(body.name), authMethod: body.authMethod, certificate: certName ? serverCert!.name : undefined, remoteCertificate: body.staticIp ? certName : undefined, secret: body.psk, remoteId: body.authMethod === "pre-shared-key" ? body.remoteId ?? body.name : undefined, policyTemplateGroup: sharedIdentity?.["policy-template-group"] }) })
|
||||
if (certName) {
|
||||
if (c["/file"].some(row => row.name === `${exportPrefix}.p12`)) throw fail("Имя файла экспорта занято")
|
||||
commands.push({ action: "export", path: "/certificate/export-certificate", name: `${exportPrefix}.p12`, certificate: certName, fields: { type: "pkcs12", "file-name": exportPrefix, "export-passphrase": body.passphrase ?? "" } }, { action: "cleanup", path: "/file", name: `${exportPrefix}.p12`, fields: {} })
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Leave the client-specific IPsec settings untouched if the private export fails.
|
||||
if (staticModeConfig) commands.push(staticModeConfig)
|
||||
if (body.authMethod !== "certificate" || body.staticIp || !sharedIdentity) commands.push({ action: "create", path: "/ip/ipsec/identity", fields: identityRosBody({ peerName: peer.name, modeConfig, comment: certName && !body.staticIp ? ipsecManagedComment("IKEv2 listener") : ipsecUserComment(body.name), authMethod: body.authMethod, certificate: certName ? serverCert!.name : undefined, remoteCertificate: body.staticIp ? certName : undefined, secret: body.psk, remoteId: body.authMethod === "pre-shared-key" ? body.remoteId ?? body.name : undefined, policyTemplateGroup: sharedIdentity?.["policy-template-group"] }) })
|
||||
const kinds: Record<string, string> = { "/ip/ipsec/peer": "ipsec_peer", "/ip/ipsec/identity": "ipsec_identity", "/ip/ipsec/mode-config": "ipsec_mode_config", "/ip/pool": "ip_pool", "/certificate": "certificate", "/ip/ipsec/profile": "ipsec_profile", "/ip/ipsec/proposal": "ipsec_proposal", "/ip/ipsec/policy/group": "ipsec_policy_group", "/ip/ipsec/policy": "ipsec_policy" }
|
||||
const refs: Record<string, string> = { peer: "/ip/ipsec/peer", "mode-config": "/ip/ipsec/mode-config", "address-pool": "/ip/pool", certificate: "/certificate", "remote-certificate": "/certificate", ca: "/certificate", profile: "/ip/ipsec/profile", proposal: "/ip/ipsec/proposal", "policy-template-group": "/ip/ipsec/policy/group" }
|
||||
for (const command of commands) for (const [field, refPath] of Object.entries(refs)) {
|
||||
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ export function planIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, server: ServerR
|
||||
|
||||
/** Native defaults are admitted solely for the ACK-owned newly created row.
|
||||
* Signing can change only documented generated fields of that new certificate. */
|
||||
export function projectIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, command: IpsecUserCreateCommand, options: { assignedId?: string; observedRow?: Row; ownedCertificateIds?: Set<string> } = {}) {
|
||||
export function projectIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, command: IpsecUserCreateCommand, options: { assignedId?: string; observedRow?: Row; ownedCertificateIds?: Set<string>; exportIndex?: number } = {}) {
|
||||
const next = structuredClone(state)
|
||||
const path = command.action === "sign" ? "/certificate" : command.action === "export" || command.action === "cleanup" ? "/file" : command.path
|
||||
const rows = next.catalogs[path]
|
||||
@@ -126,11 +127,17 @@ export function projectIpsecUserCreate(state: IpsecUserCreateState, command: Ips
|
||||
rows[rows.indexOf(row)] = structuredClone(observed)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const row = options.observedRow, id = options.assignedId
|
||||
if (!row || !exactId(id) || row[".id"] !== id || rows.some(item => item[".id"].toLowerCase() === id.toLowerCase()) || Object.values(row).some(value => typeof value !== "string")) throw fail("Не подтверждён ACK нового объекта", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
if (!row || !exactId(id) || row[".id"] !== id || rows.some(item => routerOsIdKey(item[".id"]) === routerOsIdKey(id)) || Object.values(row).some(value => typeof value !== "string")) throw fail("Не подтверждён ACK нового объекта", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
for (const flag of ["dynamic", "builtin", "default"]) if (row[flag] !== undefined && observedBoolean(row[flag]) !== false) throw fail("Создан системный объект", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
const fields = command.action === "export" ? { name: command.name! } : command.fields
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(fields)) if (row[key] !== value && !(["disabled", "responder"].includes(key) && observedBoolean(row[key]) !== null && observedBoolean(row[key]) === observedBoolean(value))) throw fail("Поля нового объекта не подтверждены", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
rows.push(structuredClone(row))
|
||||
if (command.action === "export") {
|
||||
const index = options.exportIndex
|
||||
if (index === undefined || !Number.isInteger(index) || index < 0 || index > rows.length) throw fail("Не подтверждена позиция нового файла экспорта", "VERIFICATION_FAILED")
|
||||
rows.splice(index, 0, structuredClone(row))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
rows.push(structuredClone(row))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return next
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
|
||||
import type { IpsecCertBundle } from "@mmapp/contracts/ipsec"
|
||||
import { getServerRowById, type ServerRow } from "../modules/servers/repository/servers-repository.js"
|
||||
import { McpError, fingerprint, privateFingerprinter } from "../modules/mcp/security.js"
|
||||
import { MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES, MikrotikClient } from "./mikrotik.js"
|
||||
import { MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES, MikrotikClient, MikrotikError } from "./mikrotik.js"
|
||||
import { readIpsecPeerDeleteState, ipsecPeerDeleteRows } from "./ipsec-peer-delete.js"
|
||||
import { ipsecUserUpdateValue } from "./ipsec-user-update.js"
|
||||
import { sameWireguardEndpoint } from "./wireguard-source.js"
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,15 @@ export async function createIpsecUserGuarded(server: ServerRow, raw: unknown, ex
|
||||
let completedCommands = 0, confirmedWrites = 0, bundle: IpsecCertBundle | undefined, artifactReceipt: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
|
||||
const stopped = (code: "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN" | "VERIFICATION_FAILED", message: string) => new IpsecUserCreateExecutionError(code, message, confirmedWrites, completedCommands, plan.commands.length)
|
||||
for (const command of plan.commands) {
|
||||
const stage = {
|
||||
create: command.path === "/certificate" ? "создание сертификата" : command.path === "/ip/ipsec/mode-config" ? "назначение персонального IP" : "создание привязки IKEv2",
|
||||
update: "обновление персонального IP",
|
||||
sign: "подпись сертификата",
|
||||
export: "экспорт .p12",
|
||||
cleanup: "удаление временного .p12",
|
||||
}[command.action]
|
||||
const stoppedAtStage = (code: "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN" | "VERIFICATION_FAILED", detail: string) =>
|
||||
stopped(code, `Создание IKEv2 остановлено на этапе «${stage}». ${detail}`)
|
||||
let dispatched = false, response: unknown, assignedId: string | undefined
|
||||
const fence = async () => { const fresh = await readIpsecUserCreateState(server, source); if (fresh.proof !== state.proof) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "IPsec изменился после durable intent; команда не отправлена", 409); await source(); dispatched = true }
|
||||
try {
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +66,8 @@ export async function createIpsecUserGuarded(server: ServerRow, raw: unknown, ex
|
||||
confirmedWrites++
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
if (!dispatched && !completedCommands && error instanceof McpError) throw error
|
||||
throw stopped(dispatched ? "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN" : "VERIFICATION_FAILED", "Создание IPsec остановлено; повтор native-команды запрещён, требуется сверка")
|
||||
const detail = !dispatched ? "Команда не отправлена." : error instanceof MikrotikError ? `RouterOS вернул HTTP ${error.statusCode}.` : "Ответ RouterOS не подтверждён."
|
||||
throw stoppedAtStage(dispatched ? "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN" : "VERIFICATION_FAILED", `${detail} Перед повтором требуется сверка.`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
let after: IpsecUserCreateState
|
||||
try {
|
||||
@@ -67,23 +77,27 @@ export async function createIpsecUserGuarded(server: ServerRow, raw: unknown, ex
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + 90000
|
||||
while (!after.catalogs["/certificate"].find(row => row.name === command.name)?.["invalid-after"] && Date.now() < deadline) { await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000)); after = await readIpsecUserCreateState(server, source) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch { throw stopped("MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN", "Команда отправлена, но read-back недоступен; повтор запрещён") }
|
||||
} catch { throw stoppedAtStage("MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN", "Команда отправлена. Не удалось перечитать состояние RouterOS.") }
|
||||
let exportIndex: number | undefined
|
||||
if (command.action === "export") {
|
||||
const files = after.catalogs["/file"]
|
||||
const candidates = files.filter(row => row.name === command.name && !state.catalogs["/file"].some(old => old[".id"] === row[".id"]))
|
||||
if (candidates.length !== 1) throw stoppedAtStage("VERIFICATION_FAILED", "В списке RouterOS не найден единственный новый файл с ожидаемым именем.")
|
||||
assignedId = candidates[0][".id"]
|
||||
exportIndex = files.indexOf(candidates[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const path = command.action === "sign" ? "/certificate" : command.action === "export" ? "/file" : command.path
|
||||
if (command.action === "create") {
|
||||
const ack = response as Record<string, unknown> | null
|
||||
if (typeof ack?.[".id"] !== "string") throw Error("missing create ACK")
|
||||
assignedId = ack[".id"]
|
||||
} else if (command.action === "export") {
|
||||
const candidates = after.catalogs["/file"].filter(row => row.name === command.name && !state.catalogs["/file"].some(old => old[".id"] === row[".id"]))
|
||||
if (candidates.length !== 1) throw Error("missing unique export file")
|
||||
assignedId = candidates[0][".id"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
const observedRow = after.catalogs[path].find(row => command.action === "sign" ? row.name === command.name : row[".id"] === assignedId)
|
||||
const projected = projectIpsecUserCreate(state, command, { assignedId, observedRow, ownedCertificateIds })
|
||||
const projected = projectIpsecUserCreate(state, command, { assignedId, observedRow, ownedCertificateIds, exportIndex })
|
||||
if (await ipsecUserCreateProof(projected) !== after.proof) throw Error("configuration mismatch")
|
||||
if (command.action === "create" && command.path === "/certificate") ownedCertificateIds.add(assignedId!)
|
||||
} catch { throw stopped("VERIFICATION_FAILED", "Не подтверждены команда и сохранность полного состояния IPsec; повтор запрещён") }
|
||||
} catch { throw stoppedAtStage("VERIFICATION_FAILED", "Проверка результата команды и состояния IPsec не пройдена.") }
|
||||
state = after; completedCommands++
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await source(); await options.checkpoint?.({ receiptId, commandCount: plan.commands.length, completedCommands, afterProof: state.proof })
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +114,7 @@ export async function createIpsecUserGuarded(server: ServerRow, raw: unknown, ex
|
||||
bundle = { user: body.name, serverEndpoint: plan.serverEndpoint, filename: file.name, contentB64: p12B64, mime: "application/x-pkcs12", passphrase, sswanFilename: `${plan.certName}.sswan`, sswanContent: buildSswanConfig({ name: `IKEv2 ${plan.serverEndpoint}`, serverEndpoint: plan.serverEndpoint, serverId: plan.serverEndpoint, p12B64 }), instructions: buildClientInstructions({ userName: body.name, serverEndpoint: plan.serverEndpoint, p12Filename: file.name, passphrase, dns: plan.dns }) }
|
||||
} finally { content.fill(0) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch { throw stopped("MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN", "Команда проверена, но checkpoint или приватный артефакт не сохранён; повтор запрещён") }
|
||||
} catch { throw stoppedAtStage("MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN", "Команда подтверждена. Не удалось прочитать приватный файл или сохранить квитанцию.") }
|
||||
}
|
||||
const reader = { get: async (path: string) => { await source(); if (!Object.hasOwn(state.catalogs, path)) throw new McpError("STATE_UNAVAILABLE", "Неизвестный каталог истории IPsec", 502); return structuredClone(state.catalogs[path]) } } as unknown as MikrotikClient
|
||||
let historyRecorded = false
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict"
|
||||
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"
|
||||
import test from "node:test"
|
||||
import ts from "typescript"
|
||||
import { isRouterOsNativeId, routerOsIdKey } from "./routeros-native-paths.js"
|
||||
|
||||
// Execute the actual method with inert I/O and retained buffer references, so
|
||||
// cleanup is observable without intercepting global Buffer methods or networking.
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ const begin = source.indexOf(" async downloadOwnedFile(")
|
||||
const end = source.indexOf(" /** Native text exports", begin)
|
||||
assert.ok(begin > 0 && end > begin)
|
||||
const script = ts.transpileModule(`
|
||||
const {rosRawRequest,extractRosContentsField,MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES,MikrotikError}=deps;
|
||||
const {rosRawRequest,extractRosContentsField,MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES,MikrotikError,isRouterOsNativeId,routerOsIdKey}=deps;
|
||||
class Reader { params={}; get=deps.get; ${source.slice(begin, end)} }
|
||||
return new Reader();
|
||||
`, { compilerOptions: { target: ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022, module: ts.ModuleKind.None } }).outputText
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ for (const mode of ["success", "raw-revoked", "decode-error", "wrong-size", "met
|
||||
const reader = new Function("deps", script)({
|
||||
MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES: 61438,
|
||||
MikrotikError: class extends Error {},
|
||||
isRouterOsNativeId,
|
||||
routerOsIdKey,
|
||||
get: async () => [{ ".id": "*owned", name: "owned.p12", size: Buffer.byteLength(secret), revision: mode === "metadata-drift" && ++metadataCalls > 1 ? "changed" : "initial" }],
|
||||
rosRawRequest: async () => { reads++; return raw },
|
||||
extractRosContentsField: (value: Buffer) => { assert.equal(value, raw); if (mode === "decode-error") throw Error(secret); return decoded },
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,11 +4,20 @@ import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises"
|
||||
import { MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES, MikrotikClient } from "./mikrotik.js"
|
||||
|
||||
const content = "synthetic-private-file-bytes", target = { id: "*owned", name: "owned.p12", size: Buffer.byteLength(content) }
|
||||
const currentTarget = { ...target, id: "**Qo24Mn6Ay8FA4" }
|
||||
let mode = "normal", allowed = true, requests: string[] = [], bodies: unknown[] = [], metadataCalls = 0, closed = false, sent = 0, controller: AbortController | undefined
|
||||
const router = createServer(async (req, res) => {
|
||||
const path = req.url ?? ""; requests.push(path); res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json")
|
||||
if (req.method === "GET") {
|
||||
metadataCalls++
|
||||
if (mode.startsWith("current-id")) {
|
||||
const id = mode === "current-id-replaced" && metadataCalls > 1 ? currentTarget.id.toLowerCase() : currentTarget.id
|
||||
res.end(JSON.stringify([
|
||||
{ ".id": id, name: target.name, size: String(target.size) },
|
||||
{ ".id": currentTarget.id.toUpperCase(), name: "other.p12", size: String(target.size) },
|
||||
]))
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
const id = mode === "replace-before" || ["replace-after", "compat-replace"].includes(mode) && metadataCalls > 1 ? "*replacement" : target.id
|
||||
res.end(JSON.stringify([{ ".id": id, name: target.name, size: String(target.size), opaque: "stable" }])); return
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +48,14 @@ try {
|
||||
assert.equal((await client.downloadOwnedFile(target, { authorize })).toString(), content)
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(requests, ["/rest/file", "/rest/file/get", "/rest/file"])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(bodies, [{ ".id": target.id, "value-name": "contents" }])
|
||||
for (const mode of ["current-id", "current-id-replaced"]) {
|
||||
reset(mode)
|
||||
const request = client.downloadOwnedFile(currentTarget, { authorize })
|
||||
if (mode === "current-id") assert.equal((await request).toString(), content)
|
||||
else await assert.rejects(request, /ID\/name\/size/)
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(requests, ["/rest/file", "/rest/file/get", "/rest/file"])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(bodies, [{ ".id": currentTarget.id, "value-name": "contents" }])
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const compatibility of ["compat-400", "compat-404"]) {
|
||||
reset(compatibility)
|
||||
assert.equal((await client.downloadOwnedFile(target, { authorize })).toString(), content)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import type { BandwidthNativeRequestBinder } from "./bandwidth-native-dispatch.j
|
||||
import { withConfigMutationLock, withApplicationMutationLock } from "./config-mutation-lock.js"
|
||||
import { executeGuardedConfigurationWrite } from "./config-mutation-policy.js"
|
||||
import { exportRouterConfiguration } from "./router-config-export.js"
|
||||
import { isRouterOsNativeId, routerOsIdKey } from "./routeros-native-paths.js"
|
||||
import type { Server } from "../db/schema.js"
|
||||
import { parseRosDataSizeBytes } from "./ros-metric-parse.js"
|
||||
import { readOspfTemplateFlags } from "./ospf-template-flags.js"
|
||||
@@ -1168,7 +1169,8 @@ export class MikrotikClient {
|
||||
* unsupported value-name parameter permits the older .proplist spelling.
|
||||
* Metadata and grants are checked around every request; never retarget by name. */
|
||||
async downloadOwnedFile(target: { id: string; name: string; size: number }, control: { authorize: () => Promise<unknown>; signal?: AbortSignal; timeoutMs?: number }): Promise<Buffer> {
|
||||
if (!/^\*[a-z0-9]+$/i.test(target.id) || !target.name || /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(target.name) || !Number.isSafeInteger(target.size) || target.size <= 0 || target.size > MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES) throw new Error("Private export must have an exact ID/name and size between 1 and 61438 bytes")
|
||||
if (!isRouterOsNativeId(target.id) || !target.name || /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(target.name) || !Number.isSafeInteger(target.size) || target.size <= 0 || target.size > MAX_OWNED_FILE_BYTES) throw new Error("Private export must have an exact ID/name and size between 1 and 61438 bytes")
|
||||
const idKey = routerOsIdKey(target.id)
|
||||
const duration = control.timeoutMs ?? 30000
|
||||
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(duration) || duration <= 0 || duration > 45000) throw new Error("Invalid private export deadline")
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + duration, timerSignal = AbortSignal.timeout(duration)
|
||||
@@ -1186,7 +1188,7 @@ export class MikrotikClient {
|
||||
const rows = await this.get<unknown>("/file", remaining(), signal, 1048576)
|
||||
await authorize()
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(rows) || rows.length > 2000) throw new Error("Private export metadata unavailable")
|
||||
const matches = rows.filter(row => row && typeof row === "object" && (row[".id"]?.toLowerCase() === target.id.toLowerCase() || row.name === target.name))
|
||||
const matches = rows.filter(row => row && typeof row === "object" && ((isRouterOsNativeId(row[".id"]) && routerOsIdKey(row[".id"]) === idKey) || row.name === target.name))
|
||||
if (matches.length !== 1 || matches[0][".id"] !== target.id || matches[0].name !== target.name || Number(matches[0].size) !== target.size) throw new Error("Private export ID/name/size changed")
|
||||
return JSON.stringify(matches[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@ export function encodeRosId(rosId: string): string {
|
||||
return encodeURIComponent(id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** RouterOS 7.24 file IDs use case-sensitive `**<base62>` instead of the legacy single asterisk. */
|
||||
export function isRouterOsNativeId(value: unknown): value is string {
|
||||
return typeof value === "string" && value.length <= 256 && /^\*\*?[a-z0-9]+$/i.test(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function routerOsIdKey(value: string): string {
|
||||
return value.startsWith("**") ? value : value.toLowerCase().replace(/^\*0+(?=[a-z0-9])/, "*")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const greDependencyPaths = ["/interface", "/interface/bridge/port", "/interface/vlan",
|
||||
"/interface/list/member", "/ip/vrf", "/ip/route", "/ipv6/route", "/routing/filter/rule",
|
||||
"/routing/ospf/interface-template", "/routing/bfd/configuration", "/routing/bgp/connection", "/routing/rule",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ const admissionSchema = z.object({ receipt_id: uuid, identity_kind: z.literal("m
|
||||
const operationSchema = z.object({ id: uuid, plan_id: uuid, connection_id: uuid, state: z.literal("applied"), verification: z.literal("passed"),
|
||||
error_code: z.null(), result: z.unknown(), created_at: time, finished_at: time }).passthrough()
|
||||
const planSchema = z.object({ id: uuid, connection_id: uuid, operation_id: z.literal("servers.poll"), operation_version: z.literal(1),
|
||||
state: z.literal("completed"), created_at: time, approved_by: actor, approved_at: time, expires_at: time, payload: sealed, evidence: sealed }).passthrough()
|
||||
state: z.literal("completed"), created_at: time, approved_by: actor, approved_at: time, expires_at: time, payload: sealed,
|
||||
evidence: sealed.extend({ approvalSource: z.literal("connection-policy").optional() }) }).passthrough()
|
||||
const stepSchema = z.object({ operation_id: uuid, step_index: z.literal(0), server_id: z.null(), state: z.literal("verified"), intended_state: z.unknown(),
|
||||
result: z.unknown(), finished_at: time }).passthrough()
|
||||
const inputSchema = z.object({ serverId: sid, receiptId: uuid, inputDigest: hash, bindingCiphertext: z.string().min(1).max(2097152) }).strict()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ import {
|
||||
listFlowRowsForWindow,
|
||||
type PendingFlowRow,
|
||||
} from "./traffic-flow-ingest.js"
|
||||
import { flowDataEpoch, MAX_PENDING, RING_OVERLAY } from "./traffic-flow-engine.js"
|
||||
import { flowDataEpoch, MAX_PENDING } from "./traffic-flow-engine.js"
|
||||
import { resolveIfaceName } from "./traffic-flow-ifaces.js"
|
||||
import { getTrafficFlowSettingsRow } from "./traffic-flow-settings.js"
|
||||
import { applicationName, flowRowMatchesFilter } from "./traffic-flow-apps.js"
|
||||
import { dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes, flowTupleKey } from "./traffic-flow-dedup.js"
|
||||
import { collapseGreEspRows, dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes, flowTupleKey } from "./traffic-flow-dedup.js"
|
||||
import { enqueueRipeMisses } from "./traffic-flow-ripe.js"
|
||||
import { classifyFlowPlane, flowBps, shouldKeepPlane } from "./traffic-flow-planes.js"
|
||||
import { flowRateDirection, resolveInternetDest } from "./traffic-flow-dest.js"
|
||||
@@ -215,6 +215,23 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
|
||||
if (!scope) refreshFlowCatalogInBackground()
|
||||
|
||||
const matchesIngress = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRowMatchesFilter(row, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name, q, allow)
|
||||
const matchesEgress = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: row.serverId, inIface: row.outIface }, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name, q, allow)
|
||||
const serverDirection = (row: PendingFlowRow) => flowRateDirection(row.serverId, row, topo, catalog.byId.get(row.serverId)?.host)
|
||||
const interfaceDirection = (row: PendingFlowRow) => {
|
||||
const ingress = matchesIngress(row), egress = matchesEgress(row)
|
||||
return ingress === egress ? null : ingress ? "rx" : "tx"
|
||||
}
|
||||
const selected = ifaceFilter || allow ? raw.filter(row => matchesIngress(row) || matchesEgress(row)) : raw
|
||||
const { rows, espDirections } = collapseGreEspRows(selected, ifaceFilter ? interfaceDirection : serverDirection)
|
||||
const previousMinute = new Date(Math.floor(Date.now() / 60_000) * 60_000 - 60_000).toISOString()
|
||||
const ifacesForWire = new Set<string>()
|
||||
for (const row of selected) {
|
||||
ifacesForWire.add(resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name)
|
||||
const egress = resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name
|
||||
if (egress && egress !== "—") ifacesForWire.add(egress)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const applications = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
|
||||
const protocols = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
|
||||
const sources = new Map<string, { bytes: number; packets: number; label?: string }>()
|
||||
@@ -234,16 +251,12 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
const skipHeavy = Boolean(q.skipHeavy)
|
||||
let bytesPayload = 0
|
||||
let bytesOverlay = 0
|
||||
let recentOverlayBytes = 0
|
||||
let bytesMesh = 0
|
||||
const ifacesForWire = new Set<string>()
|
||||
|
||||
for (const r of raw) {
|
||||
for (const r of rows) {
|
||||
const resolved = resolveIfaceName(r.serverId, r.inIface)
|
||||
const outResolved = resolveIfaceName(r.serverId, r.outIface)
|
||||
if (!flowRowMatchesFilter(r, resolved.name, q, allow)
|
||||
&& !flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: r.serverId, inIface: r.outIface }, outResolved.name, q, allow)) continue
|
||||
ifacesForWire.add(resolved.name)
|
||||
if (outResolved.name && outResolved.name !== "—") ifacesForWire.add(outResolved.name)
|
||||
const plane = classifyFlowPlane({
|
||||
src: r.src,
|
||||
dst: r.dst,
|
||||
@@ -254,7 +267,10 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
outIface: outResolved.name,
|
||||
}, topo.plane)
|
||||
if (plane === "payload") bytesPayload += r.bytes
|
||||
else if (plane === "overlay") bytesOverlay += r.bytes
|
||||
else if (plane === "overlay") {
|
||||
bytesOverlay += r.bytes
|
||||
if (r.bucketAt === previousMinute) recentOverlayBytes += r.bytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (plane === "client_mesh") bytesMesh += r.bytes
|
||||
if (!shouldKeepPlane(plane, { excludeMesh, excludeOverlay })) continue
|
||||
matched.push(r)
|
||||
@@ -444,9 +460,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
const topCategory = topLabel(categories)
|
||||
|
||||
const ringServer = q.serverId ?? (matched[0]?.serverId ?? 0)
|
||||
const ring = ringServer
|
||||
? getRingMbps(ringServer, ifaceFilter === "" ? "__all__" : (ifacesMap.get(ifaceFilter)?.index || ifaceFilter))
|
||||
: { rx: Array(60).fill(0) as number[], tx: Array(60).fill(0) as number[], rxNow: 0, txNow: 0 }
|
||||
const ring = ringServer && !ifaceFilter && !allow && excludeOverlay ? getRingMbps(ringServer) : null
|
||||
|
||||
// The live ring covers about one minute; historical charts must use the requested window.
|
||||
// Keep the winning interface's individual minute buckets when deduplicating.
|
||||
@@ -454,13 +468,16 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
const chartRows = chosenIfaces ? matched.filter(r => chosenIfaces.get(flowTupleKey(r)) === r.inIface) : matched
|
||||
const fromBuckets = seriesFromRows(chartRows, q.minutes, row => {
|
||||
if (ifaceFilter || allow) {
|
||||
const ingress = flowRowMatchesFilter(row, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.inIface).name, q, allow)
|
||||
const egress = flowRowMatchesFilter({ serverId: row.serverId, inIface: row.outIface }, resolveIfaceName(row.serverId, row.outIface).name, q, allow)
|
||||
if (ingress && egress) return "both"
|
||||
const ingress = matchesIngress(row), egress = matchesEgress(row)
|
||||
if (ingress && egress) {
|
||||
// A repeated WAN interface in an overlay record does not prove two wire directions.
|
||||
if (ifaceFilter && (row.proto === 47 || row.proto === 50)) return espDirections.get(row) ?? serverDirection(row)
|
||||
return "both"
|
||||
}
|
||||
// At a client binding, ingress is the client's upload.
|
||||
return allow && !ifaceFilter ? (ingress ? "tx" : "rx") : (ingress ? "rx" : "tx")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return flowRateDirection(row.serverId, row, topo, catalog.byId.get(row.serverId)?.host)
|
||||
return espDirections.get(row) ?? serverDirection(row)
|
||||
})
|
||||
const rxSeries = fromBuckets.rx
|
||||
const txSeries = fromBuckets.tx
|
||||
@@ -499,9 +516,11 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
.sort((a, b) => b.bytes - a.bytes)
|
||||
.slice(0, top)
|
||||
|
||||
const overlayRing = ringServer
|
||||
? getRingMbps(ringServer, RING_OVERLAY)
|
||||
: { rxNow: 0, txNow: 0 }
|
||||
// Filtered and overlay-inclusive rates must use the same records as their totals.
|
||||
const recentBytes = ring ? 0 : chartRows.reduce((sum, row) => sum + (row.bucketAt === previousMinute ? row.bytes : 0), 0)
|
||||
const bpsNow = ring
|
||||
? (!fromBuckets.undirectedBytes && (ring.rxNow + ring.txNow) * 1_000_000) || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec
|
||||
: (recentBytes * 8) / 60 || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec
|
||||
const greNames = ringServer ? enGreIfaceNames(topo, ringServer, [...ifacesForWire]) : []
|
||||
await authorize()
|
||||
const wire = ringServer ? await latestWireBps(ringServer, greNames, Boolean(scope)) : { bps: 0, bytes: 0 }
|
||||
@@ -511,7 +530,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
if (scope && (!isDeepStrictEqual(topo, await loadFlowTopology(scope.serverIds, authorize)) || (await readFlowSourceLimits()).topN !== settings.topN)) throw new Error("Топология или предел источника NetFlow изменились во время чтения")
|
||||
await authorize()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
bpsNow: (!fromBuckets.undirectedBytes && (ring.rxNow + ring.txNow) * 1_000_000) || (totalBytes * 8) / windowSec,
|
||||
bpsNow,
|
||||
bytes: totalBytes,
|
||||
packets: totalPackets,
|
||||
conversations: conv.size,
|
||||
@@ -549,7 +568,7 @@ async function buildFlowAnalyticsUncached(q: FlowAnalyticsQuery, scope?: ScopedF
|
||||
bytesOverlay,
|
||||
bytesMesh,
|
||||
bytesWire: wire.bytes,
|
||||
bpsOverlay: (overlayRing.rxNow + overlayRing.txNow) * 1_000_000 || (bytesOverlay * 8) / windowSec,
|
||||
bpsOverlay: (recentOverlayBytes * 8) / 60 || (bytesOverlay * 8) / windowSec,
|
||||
bpsWire: wire.bps,
|
||||
excludeMeshApplied: excludeMesh,
|
||||
excludeOverlayApplied: excludeOverlay,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict"
|
||||
import {
|
||||
collapseGreEspRows,
|
||||
dedupFlowRowsAcrossExporters,
|
||||
dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes,
|
||||
flowConversationKey,
|
||||
@@ -36,4 +37,28 @@ assert.equal(across.length, 1)
|
||||
assert.equal(across[0]?.serverId, 7)
|
||||
assert.equal(across[0]?.bytes, 9_000)
|
||||
|
||||
const minute = "2026-11-22T06:26:00.000Z"
|
||||
const nextMinute = "2026-11-22T06:27:00.000Z"
|
||||
const gre = { ...a, bucketAt: minute, proto: 47, srcPort: 0, dstPort: 0 }
|
||||
const esp = { ...gre, proto: 50, bytes: gre.bytes + gre.packets * 40, inIface: "10" }
|
||||
const plain = { ...gre, dst: "198.51.100.3" }
|
||||
const reverse = { ...esp, src: esp.dst, dst: esp.src }
|
||||
const foreign = { ...esp, serverId: 9 }
|
||||
const collapse = (rows: typeof gre[]) => collapseGreEspRows(rows, row => row.inIface === "2" ? "tx" : null)
|
||||
const layerPair = collapse([gre, esp, plain, reverse, foreign])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(layerPair.rows, [esp, plain, reverse, foreign])
|
||||
assert.equal(layerPair.espDirections.get(esp), "tx")
|
||||
|
||||
const splitGre = [{ ...gre, bytes: 8_400, packets: 7 }, { ...gre, bucketAt: nextMinute, bytes: 3_600, packets: 3 }]
|
||||
const laterEsp = { ...esp, bucketAt: nextMinute }
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(collapse([...splitGre, laterEsp]).rows, [laterEsp])
|
||||
for (const unrelated of [
|
||||
{ ...esp, packets: esp.packets - 1 },
|
||||
{ ...esp, bytes: gre.bytes },
|
||||
{ ...esp, bytes: gre.bytes + gre.packets * 500 },
|
||||
{ ...esp, bucketAt: "2026-11-22T06:29:00.000Z" },
|
||||
{ ...esp, srcPort: 123 },
|
||||
]) assert.deepEqual(collapse([gre, unrelated]).rows, [gre, unrelated])
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(collapseGreEspRows([gre, esp], row => row.proto === 47 ? "rx" : "tx").rows, [gre, esp])
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("traffic-flow-dedup.test.ts: ok")
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
|
||||
import { isUnspecifiedIp } from "./traffic-flow-ip.js"
|
||||
|
||||
export interface FlowTupleRow {
|
||||
serverId: number
|
||||
src: string
|
||||
@@ -68,3 +70,66 @@ export function dedupFlowRowsMaxBytes<T extends FlowTupleRow>(rows: T[]): T[] {
|
||||
}
|
||||
return [...byTuple.values()]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type TimedFlowRow = FlowTupleRow & { bucketAt: string }
|
||||
type FlowDirection = "rx" | "tx"
|
||||
type OverlayRows<T> = { gre: T[]; esp: T[] }
|
||||
|
||||
function account(rows: readonly FlowTupleRow[]) {
|
||||
return rows.reduce((total, row) => ({ bytes: total.bytes + row.bytes, packets: total.packets + row.packets }), { bytes: 0, packets: 0 })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** GRE and its IPsec envelope can both be exported for the same packet sequence. */
|
||||
export function collapseGreEspRows<T extends TimedFlowRow>(rows: readonly T[], direction: (row: T) => FlowDirection | null) {
|
||||
const groups = new Map<string, OverlayRows<T>>()
|
||||
for (const row of rows) {
|
||||
if ((row.proto !== 47 && row.proto !== 50) || row.srcPort !== 0 || row.dstPort !== 0 ||
|
||||
row.packets <= 0 || isUnspecifiedIp(row.src) || isUnspecifiedIp(row.dst) || row.src === row.dst) continue
|
||||
const key = JSON.stringify([row.serverId, row.src, row.dst])
|
||||
const group = groups.get(key) ?? { gre: [], esp: [] }
|
||||
if (row.proto === 47) group.gre.push(row)
|
||||
else group.esp.push(row)
|
||||
groups.set(key, group)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const copies = new Set<T>()
|
||||
const espDirections = new Map<T, FlowDirection>()
|
||||
const match = (gre: T[], esp: T[]) => {
|
||||
if (!gre.length || !esp.length) return
|
||||
const inner = account(gre), outer = account(esp)
|
||||
if (inner.packets !== outer.packets) return
|
||||
const overhead = (outer.bytes - inner.bytes) / inner.packets
|
||||
// Keep ambiguous records. An ESP envelope adds its headers, trailer and padding.
|
||||
if (overhead < 8 || overhead > 128) return
|
||||
const directions = new Set([...gre, ...esp].map(direction).filter(side => side !== null))
|
||||
if (directions.size > 1) return
|
||||
const [side] = directions
|
||||
if (side) for (const row of esp) espDirections.set(row, side)
|
||||
for (const row of gre) copies.add(row)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const group of groups.values()) {
|
||||
if (!group.gre.length || !group.esp.length) continue
|
||||
const byMinute = new Map<string, OverlayRows<T>>()
|
||||
for (const plane of ["gre", "esp"] as const) for (const row of group[plane]) {
|
||||
const bucket = byMinute.get(row.bucketAt) ?? { gre: [], esp: [] }
|
||||
bucket[plane].push(row)
|
||||
byMinute.set(row.bucketAt, bucket)
|
||||
}
|
||||
const unmatched: OverlayRows<T> = { gre: [], esp: [] }
|
||||
for (const [, bucket] of [...byMinute].sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b))) {
|
||||
match(bucket.gre, bucket.esp)
|
||||
if (!bucket.gre.length || !copies.has(bucket.gre[0])) {
|
||||
unmatched.gre.push(...bucket.gre)
|
||||
unmatched.esp.push(...bucket.esp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The exporter can flush the two layers in different minute buckets.
|
||||
if (unmatched.gre.length && unmatched.esp.length &&
|
||||
Math.abs(Date.parse(unmatched.gre[0].bucketAt) - Date.parse(unmatched.esp[0].bucketAt)) <= 60_000 &&
|
||||
Math.abs(Date.parse(unmatched.gre.at(-1)!.bucketAt) - Date.parse(unmatched.esp.at(-1)!.bucketAt)) <= 60_000) {
|
||||
match(unmatched.gre, unmatched.esp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { rows: rows.filter(row => !copies.has(row)), espDirections }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { applySqlMigrations } from '../db/migrate.js'
|
||||
import { ensurePartitionFor } from '../db/partitions.js'
|
||||
import { createMcpConnection,updateMcpSettings,setConnectionStatus } from '../modules/mcp/store.js'
|
||||
import { mcpConnectionCreateSchema } from '@mmapp/contracts/mcp'
|
||||
import type { FlowAnalyticsDto } from '@mmapp/contracts/traffic-flow'
|
||||
import mcpTransport from '../routes/mcp-transport.js'
|
||||
import trafficFlowRoutes from '../routes/traffic-flow.js'
|
||||
import logsRoutes from '../routes/logs.js'
|
||||
@@ -167,6 +168,38 @@ try{
|
||||
invalidateFlowAnalyticsCache()
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log('PASS five-minute REST analysis uses one latest counter per interface despite 50,010 historical samples')
|
||||
const overlayBucket = new Date(Math.floor(Date.now()/60000)*60000-120000)
|
||||
await ensurePartitionFor(pool,'flow_buckets','day',overlayBucket)
|
||||
await pool.query(`INSERT INTO flow_buckets(server_id,bucket_at,src,dst,proto,src_port,dst_port,bytes,packets,in_iface,out_iface) VALUES
|
||||
(1,$1,'192.0.2.1','203.0.113.9',47,0,0,12000,10,'gre-test','ether1'),
|
||||
(1,$1,'192.0.2.1','203.0.113.9',50,0,0,12400,10,'ether1','ether1'),
|
||||
(1,$1,'203.0.113.9','192.0.2.1',47,0,0,24000,20,'ether1','gre-test'),
|
||||
(1,$1,'203.0.113.9','192.0.2.1',50,0,0,24800,20,'ether1','ether1'),
|
||||
(1,$1,'203.0.113.10','192.0.2.1',47,0,0,1000,1,'ether1','gre-other'),
|
||||
(1,$1,'203.0.113.11','203.0.113.12',50,0,0,2000,2,'ether1','ether1')`,[overlayBucket])
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const args={serverId:1,interface:'ether1',dedup:false,excludeOverlay:false}
|
||||
const rest=await fetch(endpoint+'/api/traffic/flow/analytics?range=5m&serverId=1&iface=ether1&dedup=false&excludeOverlay=false')
|
||||
assert.equal(rest.status,200,await rest.clone().text())
|
||||
const filtered=await client.callTool({name:'mm_netflow_analytics_report_get',arguments:{...args,minutes:5}})
|
||||
const live=await client.callTool({name:'mm_netflow_live_observe',arguments:args})
|
||||
assert.ok(!filtered.isError,JSON.stringify(filtered))
|
||||
assert.ok(!live.isError,JSON.stringify(live))
|
||||
const mcp=(filtered.structuredContent as {result:{analytics:FlowAnalyticsDto}}).result.analytics
|
||||
const sample=(live.structuredContent as {result:{events:{data:FlowAnalyticsDto}[]}}).result.events[0].data
|
||||
const fromSeries=(series:number[])=>Math.round(series.reduce((sum,value)=>sum+value,0)*60*1e6/8)
|
||||
for(const analytics of [await rest.json() as FlowAnalyticsDto,mcp,sample]){
|
||||
assert.equal(analytics.bytes,40300,'Each overlay packet sequence contributes only the ESP bytes')
|
||||
assert.equal(analytics.bytesOverlay,40200,'Plain GRE and undirected ESP remain part of the volume')
|
||||
assert.equal(fromSeries(analytics.rxSeries),25900)
|
||||
assert.equal(fromSeries(analytics.txSeries),12400)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.equal(sample.bpsOverlay,40200*8/300)
|
||||
}finally{
|
||||
await pool.query("DELETE FROM flow_buckets WHERE server_id=1 AND bucket_at=$1 AND proto IN (47,50)",[overlayBucket])
|
||||
invalidateFlowAnalyticsCache()
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log('PASS REST and MCP history and live analytics collapse GRE/ESP and place each confirmed ESP direction once')
|
||||
const globalAccess=await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({name:'owned global telemetry',mode:'observer',permissions:['mm:traffic:read'],expiresAt:new Date(Date.now()+600000).toISOString(),scope:{serverIds:[1],operationIds:['traffic.flow.talkers.read','netflow.settings.read'],allowGlobal:true},limits:{callsPerMinute:240}}),actor)
|
||||
const globalClient=new Client({name:'owned-global-quality',version:'1'})
|
||||
try{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ for(const mode of ['runtime-policy-entry','policy-authorize','executor-entry','e
|
||||
const error=Object.assign(Error('PRIVATE_RUNTIME_POLICY_FAILURE'),{code:'ECONNRESET'}),events=[]
|
||||
const env={failure:error,failAfterWrapper:mode==='after-wrapper',productionVrf:mode!=='non-production',
|
||||
operationId:id,connection:{owner_id:'owner',id:'connection'},serverIds:[1],evidence:{objects:[],snapshots:[{resource:'vrf',serverId:1,sourceProof:'a'.repeat(64)}]},serviceExecution:undefined,reservedStep:{},
|
||||
plan:{id:'plan',operation_id:'ros.vrf.create',operation_version:1,approved_by:'owner'},step:{kind:'ros',step:{serverId:1,resource:'vrf',action:'create',fields:{name:'customers',interfaces:'none'}}},
|
||||
plan:{id:'plan',operation_id:'ros.vrf.create',operation_version:1,approved_by:'owner',evidence:{sealed:'fixture-ciphertext'}},step:{kind:'ros',step:{serverId:1,resource:'vrf',action:'create',fields:{name:'customers',interfaces:'none'}}},
|
||||
prefix:{async check(){}},async authorize(){},async authorizeCatalog(){if(mode==='policy-authorize')throw error},McpError,createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary:diagnostic.createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary,
|
||||
console:{error(raw){events.push(JSON.parse(raw));if(loggerThrows)throw Error('PRIVATE_LOGGER_FAILURE')}},
|
||||
async executeRosStep(){throw error},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
|
||||
const [step, setStep] = useState(1), [busy, setBusy] = useState(false), [error, setError] = useState("")
|
||||
const [name, setName] = useState(editing?.name ?? ""), [mode, setMode] = useState<McpConnection["policy"]["mode"]>(editing?.policy.mode ?? "observer")
|
||||
const [service, setService] = useState(editing?.policy.authority === "service")
|
||||
const [unattended, setUnattended] = useState(editing?.policy.allowUnattendedPlans === true)
|
||||
const [selectAllServers, setSelectAllServers] = useState(false)
|
||||
const [serverIds, setServerIds] = useState(editing?.policy.scope.serverIds ?? []), [selected, setSelected] = useState<string[]>(editing?.policy.scope.operationIds ?? [])
|
||||
const serverCatalog = useQuery(useCallback(signal => api.serverChoices(undefined, signal), [api]))
|
||||
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
|
||||
const save = async () => {
|
||||
setBusy(true); setError("")
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const input = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name, ...(service ? { authority: "service", mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null } : { mode, expiresAt: new Date(expires + "Z").toISOString() }), permissions: [...new Set(eligible.filter(operation => selected.includes(operation.id)).flatMap(operation => operation.requiredPermissions))], ...(selectAllServers && { selectAllServers: true }), scope: { serverIds: selectAllServers ? [] : serverIds, operationIds: selected, allowGlobal: global }, dangerousPolicy: service ? "approval" : danger, autonomousDangerousOperationIds: service || danger !== "explicit-allow" ? [] : autonomousDangerIds, limits })
|
||||
const input = mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name, ...(service ? { authority: "service", mode: "autonomous", expiresAt: null, ...(unattended && { allowUnattendedPlans: true }) } : { mode, expiresAt: new Date(expires + "Z").toISOString() }), permissions: [...new Set(eligible.filter(operation => selected.includes(operation.id)).flatMap(operation => operation.requiredPermissions))], ...(selectAllServers && { selectAllServers: true }), scope: { serverIds: selectAllServers ? [] : serverIds, operationIds: selected, allowGlobal: global }, dangerousPolicy: service ? "approval" : danger, autonomousDangerousOperationIds: service || danger !== "explicit-allow" ? [] : autonomousDangerIds, limits })
|
||||
if (editing) { await api.update(editing.id, input); created() }
|
||||
else { const result = await api.create(input); created(result.token) }
|
||||
} catch (failure) { setError(errorText(failure)) } finally { setBusy(false) }
|
||||
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
|
||||
return <Dialog open onOpenChange={open => { if (!open && !busy) close() }}><DialogContent className="max-h-[90dvh] overflow-y-auto sm:max-w-3xl"><DialogHeader><DialogTitle>{editing ? "Изменить разрешения" : "Новое подключение"}</DialogTitle><DialogDescription>Шаг {step} из 4 · доступ ограничивается правами текущего владельца.</DialogDescription></DialogHeader><ErrorMessage message={error} />
|
||||
{step === 1 && <><Field label="Название"><Input value={name} onChange={event => setName(event.target.value)} placeholder="Агент диагностики" /></Field>{!editing && <NativeSelect label="Тип подключения" value={service ? "service" : "personal"} onChange={value => setService(value === "service")}><option value="personal">Личное</option><option value="service">Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ</option></NativeSelect>}
|
||||
{service
|
||||
? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Подключение действует до отзыва. Агент выполняет разрешённые обычные операции автономно, а опасные действия требуют подтверждения.</p>
|
||||
? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Подключение действует до отзыва. Способ подтверждения планов можно выбрать на шаге 3.</p>
|
||||
: <><Field label="Срок действия (UTC)"><Input type="datetime-local" value={expires} onChange={event => setExpires(event.target.value)} /></Field><NativeSelect label="Режим управления" value={mode} onChange={value => setMode(value as typeof mode)}>{Object.entries(modeLabels).map(([value, title]) => <option key={value} value={value}>{title}</option>)}</NativeSelect></>}</>}
|
||||
{step === 2 && <>
|
||||
<ServerChoices catalog={serverCatalog} selected={serverIds} onChange={setServerIds} all={selectAllServers} onAllChange={setSelectAllServers} />
|
||||
@@ -269,11 +270,14 @@ function ConnectionForm({ api, operations, editing, close, created }: { api: Mcp
|
||||
<OperationChoices operations={eligible} selected={selected} onChange={setSelected} />
|
||||
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">Выбор операций учитывает права владельца. Режим, список серверов и глобальный доступ задаются отдельно. Новые инструменты нужно добавлять вручную. Для применения планов выберите также инструменты просмотра и применения.</p>
|
||||
</>}
|
||||
{step === 3 && <><div className="grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2">{Object.entries(limits).map(([key, value]) => <Field key={key} label={({ callsPerMinute: "Вызовов в минуту", concurrentReads: "Одновременных чтений", mutationsPerHour: "Изменений в час", serversPerPlan: "Серверов на план", objectsPerPlan: "Объектов на план" } as Record<string, string>)[key]}><Input type="number" min={1} value={value} onChange={event => setLimits(current => ({ ...current, [key]: Number(event.target.value) }))} /></Field>)}</div>{service ? <p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Опасные действия всегда требуют подтверждения.</p> : <><NativeSelect label="Опасные действия" value={danger} onChange={value => setDanger(value as typeof danger)}><option value="approval">Всегда подтверждать</option><option value="explicit-allow">Автономно для явно выбранных действий</option></NativeSelect>{danger === "explicit-allow" && <>
|
||||
{step === 3 && <><div className="grid gap-3 sm:grid-cols-2">{Object.entries(limits).map(([key, value]) => <Field key={key} label={({ callsPerMinute: "Вызовов в минуту", concurrentReads: "Одновременных чтений", mutationsPerHour: "Изменений в час", serversPerPlan: "Серверов на план", objectsPerPlan: "Объектов на план" } as Record<string, string>)[key]}><Input type="number" min={1} value={value} onChange={event => setLimits(current => ({ ...current, [key]: Number(event.target.value) }))} /></Field>)}</div>{service ? <>
|
||||
<Choice label="Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения" checked={unattended} onChange={setUnattended} />
|
||||
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">Действует для всех операций, выданных ключу. Клиент должен сначала показать точный план в чате. Сервер проверяет контрольную сумму плана, а публикацию сообщения обеспечивает клиент. Защита объектов сохраняется.</p>
|
||||
</> : <><NativeSelect label="Опасные действия" value={danger} onChange={value => setDanger(value as typeof danger)}><option value="approval">Всегда подтверждать</option><option value="explicit-allow">Автономно для явно выбранных действий</option></NativeSelect>{danger === "explicit-allow" && <>
|
||||
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">В автономном режиме выбранные здесь опасные операции смогут выполняться без подтверждения, если этого не требует защита объекта или сама операция.</p>
|
||||
<OperationChoices operations={dangerous} selected={autonomousDangerIds} onChange={setDangerIds} selectAllLabel="Выбрать все опасные операции" />
|
||||
</>}</>}</>}
|
||||
{step === 4 && <div className="space-y-3 text-sm"><p><strong>{name || "Без названия"}</strong> · {service ? "Сервисное, бессрочное" : modeLabels[mode]}</p><p>Серверы: {selectAllServers ? "все на момент сохранения" : serverIds.join(", ") || "не выбраны"}. Операций: {selected.length}. Глобальный доступ: {global ? "да" : "нет"}.</p>{!service && mode === "autonomous" && danger === "explicit-allow" && <p>Опасных операций выбрано для автономного выполнения: {autonomousDangerIds.length}.</p>}<p>Защита объектов продолжает действовать независимо от автономных разрешений.</p><p>После сохранения проверьте конкретное действие в симуляторе на вкладке «Разрешения».</p></div>}
|
||||
{step === 4 && <div className="space-y-3 text-sm"><p><strong>{name || "Без названия"}</strong> · {service ? "Сервисное, бессрочное" : modeLabels[mode]}</p><p>Серверы: {selectAllServers ? "все на момент сохранения" : serverIds.join(", ") || "не выбраны"}. Операций: {selected.length}. Глобальный доступ: {global ? "да" : "нет"}.</p>{service && unattended && <p>Ручное подтверждение планов отключено. Клиент публикует план в чате перед применением.</p>}{!service && mode === "autonomous" && danger === "explicit-allow" && <p>Опасных операций выбрано для автономного выполнения: {autonomousDangerIds.length}.</p>}<p>Защита объектов продолжает действовать независимо от автономных разрешений.</p><p>После сохранения проверьте конкретное действие в симуляторе на вкладке «Разрешения».</p></div>}
|
||||
<div className="flex flex-wrap justify-between gap-2"><Button variant="outline" disabled={busy} onClick={() => step > 1 ? setStep(step - 1) : close()}>{step > 1 ? "Назад" : "Отмена"}</Button>{step < 4 ? <Button onClick={() => setStep(step + 1)}>Далее</Button> : <Button disabled={busy} onClick={() => { void save() }}>{busy ? "Сохранение…" : "Сохранить доступ"}</Button>}</div>
|
||||
</DialogContent></Dialog>
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +121,11 @@
|
||||
|
||||
### Сервисное подключение
|
||||
|
||||
В «Подключения» → «Выдать доступ» администратор MCP может выбрать «Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ». Выберите нужные серверы и операции. Доступ действует до отзыва и переживает истечение обычной сессии портала. Опасные операции всегда требуют подтверждения человеком, а лимиты и защита объектов действуют как обычно.
|
||||
В «Подключения» → «Выдать доступ» администратор MCP может выбрать «Сервисное — бессрочный автономный доступ». Выберите нужные серверы и операции. Доступ действует до отзыва и переживает истечение обычной сессии портала. По умолчанию опасные действия требуют ручного подтверждения.
|
||||
|
||||
На шаге 3 можно включить «Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения». Режим действует на все выданные ключу операции. Списки серверов, права, лимиты и правила защиты объектов продолжают действовать.
|
||||
|
||||
Если план содержит `announcement`, клиент сначала публикует отдельное сообщение в чате с ID плана, целями, изменениями и предупреждениями из `changes`. Затем вызывает `mm_change_apply` с `planId`, `idempotencyKey` и `announcedPlanDigest`, равным `announcement.digest`. Manager проверяет контрольную сумму сохранённого плана. Публикацию сообщения обеспечивает клиент. В аудите такой запуск отмечается как допуск по политике подключения.
|
||||
|
||||
Сервисный токен можно заменить, приостановить вместе с подключением или отозвать. Явный отзыв прав выдавшего доступ администратора в портале также отзывает его сервисные подключения. Чтобы сменить тип подключения, выдайте новый токен через новое подключение.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ export const mcpConnectionPolicySchema = z.object({
|
||||
version: z.number().int().positive(),
|
||||
status: z.enum(["active", "paused", "revoked"]),
|
||||
authority: z.literal("service").optional(),
|
||||
allowUnattendedPlans: z.literal(true).optional(),
|
||||
expiresAt: instant,
|
||||
mode: mcpModeSchema,
|
||||
permissions: uniqueStrings,
|
||||
@@ -42,8 +43,9 @@ export const mcpConnectionPolicySchema = z.object({
|
||||
dangerousPolicy: z.enum(["approval", "explicit-allow"]).default("approval"),
|
||||
autonomousDangerousOperationIds: uniqueStrings.default([]),
|
||||
limits: mcpLimitsSchema.default(() => mcpLimitsSchema.parse({})),
|
||||
}).strict().refine(policy => policy.authority !== "service" ||
|
||||
policy.expiresAt === MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length,
|
||||
}).strict().refine(policy => policy.authority === "service"
|
||||
? policy.expiresAt === MCP_SERVICE_EXPIRATION && policy.mode === "autonomous" && policy.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !policy.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length
|
||||
: !policy.allowUnattendedPlans,
|
||||
"Некорректная политика сервисного подключения")
|
||||
|
||||
export const mcpTargetSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("scope", [
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +135,7 @@ export type McpPolicyReasonCode = z.infer<typeof mcpPolicyReasonCodeSchema>
|
||||
export const mcpConnectionCreateSchema = z.object({
|
||||
name: z.string().trim().min(1).max(100),
|
||||
authority: z.literal("service").optional(),
|
||||
allowUnattendedPlans: z.literal(true).optional(),
|
||||
expiresAt: instant.nullable(),
|
||||
mode: mcpModeSchema.default("observer"),
|
||||
permissions: uniqueStrings,
|
||||
@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ export const mcpConnectionCreateSchema = z.object({
|
||||
limits: mcpLimitsSchema.default(() => mcpLimitsSchema.parse({})),
|
||||
}).strict().refine(input => input.authority === "service"
|
||||
? input.expiresAt === null && input.mode === "autonomous" && input.dangerousPolicy === "approval" && !input.autonomousDangerousOperationIds.length
|
||||
: input.expiresAt !== null, "Для сервисного подключения выберите автономный режим с подтверждением опасных действий. Для личного подключения укажите срок действия.")
|
||||
: input.expiresAt !== null && !input.allowUnattendedPlans, "Опция доступна только бессрочному сервисному подключению. Для личного подключения укажите срок действия.")
|
||||
.refine(input => !input.selectAllServers || !input.scope.serverIds.length, "Выберите все серверы или укажите конкретные ID")
|
||||
export const mcpConnectionSchema = z.object({
|
||||
id: z.string().uuid(), name: z.string(), ownerId: z.string(),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ test('synthetic: edit autonomous dangerous operations by group or all at once',
|
||||
}) })])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of dangerous actions', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
for (const unattended of [false, true]) test(`synthetic: issue service access with unattended plans ${unattended ? 'enabled' : 'disabled'}`, async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
const state = await setup(page, ['mm:mcp:admin', 'mm:servers:read'])
|
||||
await page.goto('/mcp?tab=connections')
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Выдать доступ', exact: true }).click()
|
||||
@@ -402,7 +402,9 @@ test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of d
|
||||
await dialog.getByRole('button', { name: 'CHR WAN', exact: true }).click()
|
||||
await dialog.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'Все операции группы «Журналы»' }).check()
|
||||
await next.click()
|
||||
await expect(dialog.getByText('Опасные действия всегда требуют подтверждения.')).toBeVisible()
|
||||
const unattendedChoice = dialog.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'Выполнять планы без ручного подтверждения', exact: true })
|
||||
await expect(unattendedChoice).not.toBeChecked()
|
||||
if (unattended) await unattendedChoice.check()
|
||||
await next.click()
|
||||
await expect(dialog.getByText('Сервисное, бессрочное', { exact: false })).toBeVisible()
|
||||
await dialog.getByRole('button', { name: 'Сохранить доступ', exact: true }).click()
|
||||
@@ -411,6 +413,7 @@ test('synthetic: issue service access with no expiry and mandatory approval of d
|
||||
authority: 'service', expiresAt: null, mode: 'autonomous', dangerousPolicy: 'approval', autonomousDangerousOperationIds: [],
|
||||
scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ['logs.query'], allowGlobal: false },
|
||||
}) })])
|
||||
expect(state.mutations[0].body.allowUnattendedPlans).toBe(unattended ? true : undefined)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test('synthetic: pause, resume, cancelled revoke, revoke, monitor denied outcome, stop automation', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user