Create and verify PSK HASH payloads in IKEv1 main mode

This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2012-03-20 17:30:47 +01:00
parent 4eee34ac49
commit 1b99befac3
+117 -9
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <encoding/payloads/ke_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/nonce_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/id_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/hash_payload.h>
typedef struct private_main_mode_t private_main_mode_t;
@@ -100,6 +101,11 @@ struct private_main_mode_t {
*/
chunk_t nonce_r;
/**
* Encoded SA initiator payload used for authentication
*/
chunk_t sa_payload;
/** states of main mode */
enum {
MM_INIT,
@@ -124,6 +130,30 @@ static auth_cfg_t *get_auth_cfg(private_main_mode_t *this, bool local)
return cfg;
}
/**
* Save the encoded SA payload of a message
*/
static bool save_sa_payload(private_main_mode_t *this, message_t *message,
sa_payload_t *sa_payload)
{
payload_t *payload;
chunk_t data;
/* TODO-IKEv1: handle other payloads in front of SA? */
payload = &sa_payload->payload_interface;
data = message->get_packet_data(message);
if (data.len >= IKE_HEADER_LENGTH + payload->get_length(payload))
{
/* Get SA payload without 4 byte fixed header */
data = chunk_skip(data, IKE_HEADER_LENGTH);
data.len = payload->get_length(payload);
data = chunk_skip(data, 4);
this->sa_payload = chunk_clone(data);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
METHOD(task_t, build_i, status_t,
private_main_mode_t *this, message_t *message)
{
@@ -133,6 +163,7 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_i, status_t,
{
sa_payload_t *sa_payload;
linked_list_t *proposals;
packet_t *packet;
this->ike_cfg = this->ike_sa->get_ike_cfg(this->ike_sa);
DBG0(DBG_IKE, "initiating IKE_SA %s[%d] to %H",
@@ -149,6 +180,20 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_i, status_t,
message->add_payload(message, &sa_payload->payload_interface);
/* pregenerate message to store SA payload */
if (this->ike_sa->generate_message(this->ike_sa, message,
&packet) != SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "pregenerating SA payload failed");
return FAILED;
}
packet->destroy(packet);
if (!save_sa_payload(this, message, sa_payload))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "SA payload invalid");
return FAILED;
}
this->state = MM_SA;
return NEED_MORE;
}
@@ -195,7 +240,9 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_i, status_t,
case MM_KE:
{
id_payload_t *id_payload;
hash_payload_t *hash_payload;
identification_t *id;
chunk_t hash, dh;
this->peer_cfg = this->ike_sa->get_peer_cfg(this->ike_sa);
this->peer_cfg->get_ref(this->peer_cfg);
@@ -219,7 +266,15 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_i, status_t,
id_payload = id_payload_create_from_identification(ID_V1, id);
message->add_payload(message, &id_payload->payload_interface);
/* TODO-IKEv1: authenticate */
this->dh->get_my_public_value(this->dh, &dh);
hash = this->keymat->get_hash(this->keymat, TRUE,
dh, this->dh_value, this->ike_sa->get_id(this->ike_sa),
this->sa_payload, id);
free(dh.ptr);
hash_payload = hash_payload_create();
hash_payload->set_hash(hash_payload, hash);
free(hash.ptr);
message->add_payload(message, &hash_payload->payload_interface);
this->state = MM_AUTH;
return NEED_MORE;
@@ -236,7 +291,6 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_r, status_t,
{
case MM_INIT:
{
linked_list_t *list;
sa_payload_t *sa_payload;
@@ -251,11 +305,12 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_r, status_t,
sa_payload = (sa_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
SECURITY_ASSOCIATION_V1);
if (!sa_payload)
if (!sa_payload || !save_sa_payload(this, message, sa_payload))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "SA payload missing");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "SA payload missing or invalid");
return FAILED;
}
list = sa_payload->get_proposals(sa_payload);
this->proposal = this->ike_cfg->select_proposal(this->ike_cfg,
list, FALSE);
@@ -298,7 +353,6 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_r, status_t,
}
this->dh->set_other_public_value(this->dh, this->dh_value);
nonce_payload = (nonce_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
NONCE_V1);
if (!nonce_payload)
@@ -315,7 +369,9 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_r, status_t,
{
enumerator_t *enumerator;
id_payload_t *id_payload;
hash_payload_t *hash_payload;
identification_t *id, *any;
chunk_t hash, dh;
id_payload = (id_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message, ID_V1);
if (!id_payload)
@@ -351,11 +407,30 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_r, status_t,
this->other_auth = get_auth_cfg(this, FALSE);
if (!this->my_auth || !this->other_auth)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "auth config missing");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "auth config missing");
return FAILED;
}
/* TODO-IKEv1: authenticate peer */
hash_payload = (hash_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
HASH_V1);
if (!hash_payload)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "hash payload missing");
return FAILED;
}
hash = hash_payload->get_hash(hash_payload);
this->dh->get_my_public_value(this->dh, &dh);
hash = this->keymat->get_hash(this->keymat, TRUE,
this->dh_value, dh, this->ike_sa->get_id(this->ike_sa),
this->sa_payload, id);
free(dh.ptr);
if (!chunk_equals(hash, hash_payload->get_hash(hash_payload)))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "calculated hash does not match to hash payload");
free(hash.ptr);
return FAILED;
}
free(hash.ptr);
this->state = MM_AUTH;
return NEED_MORE;
@@ -439,6 +514,7 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_r, status_t,
sa_payload = sa_payload_create_from_proposal(SECURITY_ASSOCIATION_V1,
this->proposal);
message->add_payload(message, &sa_payload->payload_interface);
return NEED_MORE;
}
case MM_KE:
@@ -474,7 +550,9 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_r, status_t,
case MM_AUTH:
{
id_payload_t *id_payload;
hash_payload_t *hash_payload;
identification_t *id;
chunk_t hash, dh;
id = this->my_auth->get(this->my_auth, AUTH_RULE_IDENTITY);
if (!id)
@@ -488,7 +566,15 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_r, status_t,
id_payload = id_payload_create_from_identification(ID_V1, id);
message->add_payload(message, &id_payload->payload_interface);
/* TODO-IKEv1: authenticate us */
this->dh->get_my_public_value(this->dh, &dh);
hash = this->keymat->get_hash(this->keymat, FALSE,
dh, this->dh_value, this->ike_sa->get_id(this->ike_sa),
this->sa_payload, id);
free(dh.ptr);
hash_payload = hash_payload_create();
hash_payload->set_hash(hash_payload, hash);
free(hash.ptr);
message->add_payload(message, &hash_payload->payload_interface);
/* TODO-IKEv1: check for XAUTH rounds, queue them */
DBG0(DBG_IKE, "IKE_SA %s[%d] established between %H[%Y]...%H[%Y]",
@@ -571,7 +657,9 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t,
case MM_AUTH:
{
id_payload_t *id_payload;
hash_payload_t *hash_payload;
identification_t *id;
chunk_t hash, dh;
id_payload = (id_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message, ID_V1);
if (!id_payload)
@@ -589,7 +677,26 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t,
}
this->ike_sa->set_other_id(this->ike_sa, id);
/* TODO-IKEv1: verify auth */
hash_payload = (hash_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
HASH_V1);
if (!hash_payload)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "hash payload missing");
return FAILED;
}
hash = hash_payload->get_hash(hash_payload);
this->dh->get_my_public_value(this->dh, &dh);
hash = this->keymat->get_hash(this->keymat, FALSE,
this->dh_value, dh, this->ike_sa->get_id(this->ike_sa),
this->sa_payload, id);
free(dh.ptr);
if (!chunk_equals(hash, hash_payload->get_hash(hash_payload)))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "calculated hash does not match to hash payload");
free(hash.ptr);
return FAILED;
}
free(hash.ptr);
/* TODO-IKEv1: check for XAUTH rounds, queue them */
DBG0(DBG_IKE, "IKE_SA %s[%d] established between %H[%Y]...%H[%Y]",
@@ -629,6 +736,7 @@ METHOD(task_t, destroy, void,
free(this->dh_value.ptr);
free(this->nonce_i.ptr);
free(this->nonce_r.ptr);
free(this->sa_payload.ptr);
free(this);
}