ikev2: Only request reauth during IKE_AUTH if active reauth is not possible
If we can initiate the reauthentication ourselves, there is no reason to explicitly request the peer to do so (at basically the same time).
This commit is contained in:
+28
-28
@@ -1937,6 +1937,23 @@ METHOD(ike_sa_t, rekey, status_t,
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return this->task_manager->initiate(this->task_manager);
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}
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/*
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* Described in header
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*/
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bool ike_sa_can_reauthenticate(ike_sa_t *public)
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{
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private_ike_sa_t *this = (private_ike_sa_t*)public;
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return array_count(this->other_vips) == 0 &&
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!has_condition(this, COND_XAUTH_AUTHENTICATED) &&
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!has_condition(this, COND_EAP_AUTHENTICATED)
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#ifdef ME
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/* as mediation server we too cannot reauth the IKE_SA */
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&& !this->is_mediation_server
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#endif /* ME */
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;
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}
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METHOD(ike_sa_t, reauth, status_t,
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private_ike_sa_t *this)
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{
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@@ -1954,37 +1971,20 @@ METHOD(ike_sa_t, reauth, status_t,
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/* we can't reauthenticate as responder when we use EAP or virtual IPs.
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* If the peer does not support RFC4478, there is no way to keep the
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* IKE_SA up. */
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if (!has_condition(this, COND_ORIGINAL_INITIATOR))
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if (!has_condition(this, COND_ORIGINAL_INITIATOR) &&
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!ike_sa_can_reauthenticate(&this->public))
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{
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "initiator did not reauthenticate as requested");
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if (array_count(this->other_vips) != 0 ||
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has_condition(this, COND_XAUTH_AUTHENTICATED) ||
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has_condition(this, COND_EAP_AUTHENTICATED)
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#ifdef ME
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/* as mediation server we too cannot reauth the IKE_SA */
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|| this->is_mediation_server
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#endif /* ME */
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)
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{
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time_t del, now;
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time_t del, now;
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del = this->stats[STAT_DELETE];
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now = time_monotonic(NULL);
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "IKE_SA %s[%d] will timeout in %V",
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get_name(this), this->unique_id, &now, &del);
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return FAILED;
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}
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else
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{
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DBG0(DBG_IKE, "reauthenticating IKE_SA %s[%d] actively",
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get_name(this), this->unique_id);
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}
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}
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else
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{
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DBG0(DBG_IKE, "reauthenticating IKE_SA %s[%d]",
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get_name(this), this->unique_id);
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del = this->stats[STAT_DELETE];
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now = time_monotonic(NULL);
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DBG1(DBG_IKE, "initiator did not reauthenticate as requested, IKE_SA "
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"%s[%d] will timeout in %V", get_name(this), this->unique_id,
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&now, &del);
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return FAILED;
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}
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DBG0(DBG_IKE, "reauthenticating IKE_SA %s[%d]",
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get_name(this), this->unique_id);
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set_condition(this, COND_REAUTHENTICATING, TRUE);
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this->task_manager->queue_ike_reauth(this->task_manager);
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return this->task_manager->initiate(this->task_manager);
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@@ -1243,4 +1243,12 @@ struct ike_sa_t {
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ike_sa_t *ike_sa_create(ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id, bool initiator,
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ike_version_t version);
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/**
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* Check if the given IKE_SA can be reauthenticated actively or if config
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* parameters or the authentication method prevent it.
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*
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* @return TRUE if active reauthentication is possible
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*/
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bool ike_sa_can_reauthenticate(ike_sa_t *this);
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#endif /** IKE_SA_H_ @}*/
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@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ METHOD(task_t, build_r, status_t,
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if (message->get_exchange_type(message) == IKE_AUTH &&
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this->ike_sa->get_state(this->ike_sa) == IKE_ESTABLISHED)
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{
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add_auth_lifetime(this, message);
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if (!ike_sa_can_reauthenticate(this->ike_sa))
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{
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add_auth_lifetime(this, message);
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}
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return SUCCESS;
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}
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return NEED_MORE;
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@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
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This scenario tests <b>repeated authentication</b> according to RFC 4478.
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The initiator <b>carol</b> sets a large <b>reauth_time=60m</b> but the responder
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<b>moon</b> defining a much shorter <b>reauth_time=30s</b> proposes this
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value via an AUTH_LIFETIME notification to the initiator. Thus the
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value via an AUTH_LIFETIME notification to the initiator as it can't initiate
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the reauthentication itself due to the EAP authentication. Thus the
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IKE reauthentication takes places after less than 30s. A ping from
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<b>carol</b> to client <b>alice</b> hiding in the subnet behind <b>moon</b>
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tests if the CHILD_SA has been recreated under the new IKE_SA.
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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# /etc/strongswan.conf - strongSwan configuration file
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charon {
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load = random nonce aes sha1 sha2 pem pkcs1 curve25519 gmp x509 curl revocation hmac vici kernel-netlink socket-default updown
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load = random nonce aes sha1 sha2 pem pkcs1 curve25519 gmp x509 curl revocation hmac vici kernel-netlink socket-default updown md5 eap-tls
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}
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@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ connections {
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over_time = 10s
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local {
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auth = pubkey
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auth = eap-tls
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certs = carolCert.pem
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id = [email protected]
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}
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remote {
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auth = pubkey
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auth = eap-tls
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id = moon.strongswan.org
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}
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children {
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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# /etc/strongswan.conf - strongSwan configuration file
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charon {
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load = random nonce aes sha1 sha2 pem pkcs1 curve25519 gmp x509 curl revocation hmac vici kernel-netlink socket-default updown
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load = random nonce aes sha1 sha2 pem pkcs1 curve25519 gmp x509 curl revocation hmac vici kernel-netlink socket-default updown md5 eap-tls
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}
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@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ connections {
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rand_time = 0
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local {
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auth = pubkey
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auth = eap-tls
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certs = moonCert.pem
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id = moon.strongswan.org
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}
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remote {
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auth = pubkey
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auth = eap-tls
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}
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children {
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net {
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@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
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This scenario tests <b>repeated authentication</b> according to RFC 4478.
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The initiator <b>carol</b> sets a short <b>reauth_time=20s</b> but the responder
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<b>moon</b> defining a much larger <b>reauth_time=60m</b> proposes this
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value via an AUTH_LIFETIME notification to the initiator. The initiator
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value via an AUTH_LIFETIME notification to the initiator as it can't initiate
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the reauthentication itself due to the virtual IP address. The initiator
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ignores this notification and schedules the IKE reauthentication at its
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configured time. A ping from <b>carol</b> to client <b>alice</b>
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hiding in the subnet behind <b>moon</b> tests if the CHILD_SA has been
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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moon:: swanctl --list-sas --ike-id 2 --raw 2> /dev/null::rw.*version=2 state=ESTABLISHED local-host=PH_IP_MOON local-port=4500 local-id=moon.strongswan.org remote-host=PH_IP_CAROL remote-port=4500 [email protected].*encr-alg=AES_CBC encr-keysize=128 integ-alg=HMAC_SHA2_256_128 prf-alg=PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 dh-group=CURVE_25519.*child-sas.*net.*reqid=1 state=INSTALLED mode=TUNNEL.*ESP.*encr-alg=AES_GCM_16 encr-keysize=128.*local-ts=\[10.1.0.0/16] remote-ts=\[192.168.0.100/32]::YES
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carol::swanctl --list-sas --ike-id 2 --raw 2> /dev/null::home.*version=2 state=ESTABLISHED local-host=PH_IP_CAROL local-port=4500 [email protected] remote-host=PH_IP_MOON remote-port=4500 remote-id=moon.strongswan.org initiator=yes.*encr-alg=AES_CBC encr-keysize=128 integ-alg=HMAC_SHA2_256_128 prf-alg=PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 dh-group=CURVE_25519.*child-sas.*home.*state=INSTALLED mode=TUNNEL.*ESP.*encr-alg=AES_GCM_16 encr-keysize=128.*local-ts=\[192.168.0.100/32] remote-ts=\[10.1.0.0/16]::YES
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moon:: swanctl --list-sas --ike-id 2 --raw 2> /dev/null::rw.*version=2 state=ESTABLISHED local-host=PH_IP_MOON local-port=4500 local-id=moon.strongswan.org remote-host=PH_IP_CAROL remote-port=4500 [email protected].*encr-alg=AES_CBC encr-keysize=128 integ-alg=HMAC_SHA2_256_128 prf-alg=PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 dh-group=CURVE_25519.*child-sas.*net.*reqid=1 state=INSTALLED mode=TUNNEL.*ESP.*encr-alg=AES_GCM_16 encr-keysize=128.*local-ts=\[10.1.0.0/16] remote-ts=\[10.3.0.1/32]::YES
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carol::swanctl --list-sas --ike-id 2 --raw 2> /dev/null::home.*version=2 state=ESTABLISHED local-host=PH_IP_CAROL local-port=4500 [email protected] remote-host=PH_IP_MOON remote-port=4500 remote-id=moon.strongswan.org initiator=yes.*encr-alg=AES_CBC encr-keysize=128 integ-alg=HMAC_SHA2_256_128 prf-alg=PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 dh-group=CURVE_25519.*child-sas.*home.*state=INSTALLED mode=TUNNEL.*ESP.*encr-alg=AES_GCM_16 encr-keysize=128.*local-ts=\[10.3.0.1/32] remote-ts=\[10.1.0.0/16]::YES
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carol::cat /var/log/daemon.log::scheduling reauthentication in 20s::YES
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carol::cat /var/log/daemon.log::received AUTH_LIFETIME of 3600s, reauthentication already scheduled in 20s::YES
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carol::ping -c 1 PH_IP_ALICE::64 bytes from PH_IP_ALICE: icmp_.eq=1::YES
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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ connections {
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local_addrs = PH_IP_CAROL
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remote_addrs = PH_IP_MOON
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vips = 0.0.0.0
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# short lifetimes for testing purposes
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reauth_time = 20s
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over_time = 10s
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@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ connections {
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rw {
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local_addrs = PH_IP_MOON
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pools = rw
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# short lifetimes for testing purposes
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reauth_time = 60m
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over_time = 10s
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@@ -28,3 +30,9 @@ connections {
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proposals = aes128-sha256-x25519
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}
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}
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pools {
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rw {
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addrs = 10.3.0.0/24
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}
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}
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