Merge branch 'ike-sig-contraints'
Signature scheme constraints against IKEv2 authentication may now be configured independently of constraints against trustchains.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ strongswan-5.4.0
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on different selectors via VICI/swanctl. Unless disabled in strongswan.conf
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the charon daemon will follow redirect requests received from servers.
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- The ike: prefix enables the explicit configuration of signature scheme
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constraints against IKEv2 authentication in rightauth, which allows the use
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of different signature schemes for trustchain verification and authentication.
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- For the vici plugin a Vici:Session Perl CPAN module has been added to allow
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Perl applications to control and/or monitor the IKE daemon using the VICI
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interface, similar to the existing Python egg or Ruby gem.
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+9
-4
@@ -587,18 +587,23 @@ or a key strength definition (for example
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or
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.BR rsa-2048-ecdsa-256-sha256-sha384-sha512 ).
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Unless disabled in
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.BR strongswan.conf (5)
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such key types and hash algorithms are also applied as constraints against IKEv2
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.BR strongswan.conf (5),
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or explicit IKEv2 signature constraints are configured (see below), such key
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types and hash algorithms are also applied as constraints against IKEv2
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signature authentication schemes used by the remote side.
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If both peers support RFC 7427 ("Signature Authentication in IKEv2") specific
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hash algorithms to be used during IKEv2 authentication may be configured.
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The syntax is the same as above. For example, with
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.B pubkey-sha384-sha256
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The syntax is the same as above, but with ike: prefix. For example, with
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.B ike:pubkey-sha384-sha256
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a public key signature scheme with either SHA-384 or SHA-256 would get used for
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authentication, in that order and depending on the hash algorithms supported by
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the peer. If no specific hash algorithms are configured, the default is to
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prefer an algorithm that matches or exceeds the strength of the signature key.
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If no constraints with ike: prefix are configured any signature scheme
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constraint (without ike: prefix) will also apply to IKEv2 authentication, unless
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this is disabled in
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.BR strongswan.conf (5).
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For
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.BR eap ,
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@@ -506,14 +506,15 @@ static auth_cfg_t *build_auth_cfg(private_stroke_config_t *this,
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}
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/* authentication metod (class, actually) */
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if (strpfx(auth, "pubkey") ||
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if (strpfx(auth, "ike:") ||
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strpfx(auth, "pubkey") ||
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strpfx(auth, "rsa") ||
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strpfx(auth, "ecdsa") ||
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strpfx(auth, "bliss"))
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{
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cfg->add(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS, AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY);
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build_crl_policy(cfg, local, msg->add_conn.crl_policy);
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, auth);
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, auth, TRUE);
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}
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else if (streq(auth, "psk") || streq(auth, "secret"))
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{
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@@ -546,7 +547,7 @@ static auth_cfg_t *build_auth_cfg(private_stroke_config_t *this,
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if (pos)
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{
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*pos = 0;
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, pos + 1);
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, pos + 1, FALSE);
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}
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type = eap_vendor_type_from_string(auth);
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if (type)
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@@ -955,13 +955,14 @@ CALLBACK(parse_auth, bool,
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{
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return FALSE;
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}
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if (strpfx(buf, "pubkey") ||
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if (strpfx(buf, "ike:") ||
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strpfx(buf, "pubkey") ||
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strpfx(buf, "rsa") ||
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strpfx(buf, "ecdsa") ||
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strpfx(buf, "bliss"))
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{
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cfg->add(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS, AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY);
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, buf);
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, buf, TRUE);
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return TRUE;
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}
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if (strcaseeq(buf, "psk"))
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@@ -981,8 +982,16 @@ CALLBACK(parse_auth, bool,
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}
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if (strcasepfx(buf, "eap"))
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{
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char *pos;
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cfg->add(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS, AUTH_CLASS_EAP);
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pos = strchr(buf, ':');
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if (pos)
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{
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*pos = 0;
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cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, pos + 1, FALSE);
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}
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type = eap_vendor_type_from_string(buf);
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if (type)
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{
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@@ -55,11 +55,6 @@ struct private_pubkey_authenticator_t {
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* Reserved bytes of ID payload
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*/
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char reserved[3];
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/**
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* Whether to store signature schemes on remote auth configs.
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*/
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bool store_signature_scheme;
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};
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/**
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@@ -130,7 +125,7 @@ static array_t *select_signature_schemes(keymat_v2_t *keymat,
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enumerator = auth->create_enumerator(auth);
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while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &rule, &config))
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{
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if (rule != AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
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if (rule != AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
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{
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continue;
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}
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@@ -425,10 +420,7 @@ METHOD(authenticator_t, process, status_t,
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status = SUCCESS;
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auth->merge(auth, current_auth, FALSE);
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auth->add(auth, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS, AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY);
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if (this->store_signature_scheme)
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{
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auth->add(auth, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, (uintptr_t)scheme);
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}
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auth->add(auth, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, (uintptr_t)scheme);
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break;
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}
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else
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@@ -501,8 +493,6 @@ pubkey_authenticator_t *pubkey_authenticator_create_verifier(ike_sa_t *ike_sa,
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.ike_sa = ike_sa,
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.ike_sa_init = received_init,
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.nonce = sent_nonce,
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.store_signature_scheme = lib->settings->get_bool(lib->settings,
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"%s.signature_authentication_constraints", TRUE, lib->ns),
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);
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memcpy(this->reserved, reserved, sizeof(this->reserved));
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@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void send_supported_hash_algorithms(private_ike_init_t *this,
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enumerator = auth->create_enumerator(auth);
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while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &rule, &config))
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{
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if (rule == AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
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if (rule == AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
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{
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hash = hasher_from_signature_scheme(config);
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if (hasher_algorithm_for_ikev2(hash))
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2008-2015 Tobias Brunner
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* Copyright (C) 2008-2016 Tobias Brunner
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* Copyright (C) 2007-2009 Martin Willi
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* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
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*
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@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ ENUM(auth_rule_names, AUTH_RULE_IDENTITY, AUTH_HELPER_AC_CERT,
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"RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH",
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"RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH",
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"RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME",
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"RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME",
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"RULE_CERT_POLICY",
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"HELPER_IM_CERT",
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"HELPER_SUBJECT_CERT",
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@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ static inline bool is_multi_value_rule(auth_rule_t type)
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case AUTH_RULE_IM_CERT:
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case AUTH_RULE_CERT_POLICY:
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_HELPER_IM_CERT:
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case AUTH_HELPER_IM_HASH_URL:
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case AUTH_HELPER_REVOCATION_CERT:
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@@ -211,6 +213,7 @@ static void init_entry(entry_t *this, auth_rule_t type, va_list args)
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case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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/* integer type */
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this->value = (void*)(uintptr_t)va_arg(args, u_int);
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break;
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@@ -260,6 +263,7 @@ static bool entry_equals(entry_t *e1, entry_t *e2)
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case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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{
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return e1->value == e2->value;
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}
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@@ -351,6 +355,7 @@ static void destroy_entry_value(entry_t *entry)
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case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_MAX:
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break;
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}
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@@ -383,6 +388,7 @@ static void replace(private_auth_cfg_t *this, entry_enumerator_t *enumerator,
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case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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/* integer type */
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entry->value = (void*)(uintptr_t)va_arg(args, u_int);
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break;
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@@ -459,6 +465,7 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, get, void*,
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case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
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return (void*)0;
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case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
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return (void*)HASH_UNKNOWN;
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case AUTH_RULE_CRL_VALIDATION:
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case AUTH_RULE_OCSP_VALIDATION:
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@@ -511,13 +518,16 @@ static void add(private_auth_cfg_t *this, auth_rule_t type, ...)
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}
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METHOD(auth_cfg_t, add_pubkey_constraints, void,
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private_auth_cfg_t *this, char* constraints)
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private_auth_cfg_t *this, char* constraints, bool ike)
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{
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enumerator_t *enumerator;
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bool rsa = FALSE, ecdsa = FALSE, bliss = FALSE,
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rsa_len = FALSE, ecdsa_len = FALSE, bliss_strength = FALSE;
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bool is_ike = FALSE, ike_added = FALSE;
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key_type_t expected_type = -1;
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auth_rule_t expected_strength = AUTH_RULE_MAX;
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int strength;
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char *token;
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auth_rule_t type;
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void *value;
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enumerator = enumerator_create_token(constraints, "-", "");
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while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &token))
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@@ -547,46 +557,47 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, add_pubkey_constraints, void,
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{ "sha512", SIGN_BLISS_WITH_SHA2_512, KEY_BLISS, },
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};
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if (rsa_len || ecdsa_len || bliss_strength)
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if (expected_strength != AUTH_RULE_MAX)
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{ /* expecting a key strength token */
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strength = atoi(token);
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if (strength)
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{
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if (rsa_len)
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{
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add(this, AUTH_RULE_RSA_STRENGTH, (uintptr_t)strength);
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}
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else if (ecdsa_len)
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{
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add(this, AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH, (uintptr_t)strength);
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}
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else if (bliss_strength)
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{
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add(this, AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH, (uintptr_t)strength);
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}
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add(this, expected_strength, (uintptr_t)strength);
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}
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rsa_len = ecdsa_len = bliss_strength = FALSE;
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expected_strength = AUTH_RULE_MAX;
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if (strength)
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{
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continue;
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}
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}
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if (streq(token, "rsa"))
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if (streq(token, "rsa") || streq(token, "ike:rsa"))
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{
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rsa = rsa_len = TRUE;
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expected_type = KEY_RSA;
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expected_strength = AUTH_RULE_RSA_STRENGTH;
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is_ike = strpfx(token, "ike:");
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continue;
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}
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if (streq(token, "ecdsa"))
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if (streq(token, "ecdsa") || streq(token, "ike:ecdsa"))
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{
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ecdsa = ecdsa_len = TRUE;
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expected_type = KEY_ECDSA;
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expected_strength = AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH;
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is_ike = strpfx(token, "ike:");
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continue;
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}
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if (streq(token, "bliss"))
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if (streq(token, "bliss") || streq(token, "ike:bliss"))
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{
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bliss = bliss_strength = TRUE;
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expected_type = KEY_BLISS;
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expected_strength = AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH;
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is_ike = strpfx(token, "ike:");
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continue;
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}
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if (streq(token, "pubkey"))
|
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if (streq(token, "pubkey") || streq(token, "ike:pubkey"))
|
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{
|
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expected_type = KEY_ANY;
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is_ike = strpfx(token, "ike:");
|
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continue;
|
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}
|
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if (is_ike && !ike)
|
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{
|
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continue;
|
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}
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@@ -595,18 +606,19 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, add_pubkey_constraints, void,
|
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{
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if (streq(schemes[i].name, token))
|
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{
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/* for each matching string, allow the scheme, if:
|
||||
* - it is an RSA scheme, and we enforced RSA
|
||||
* - it is an ECDSA scheme, and we enforced ECDSA
|
||||
* - it is not a key type specific scheme
|
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*/
|
||||
if ((rsa && schemes[i].key == KEY_RSA) ||
|
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(ecdsa && schemes[i].key == KEY_ECDSA) ||
|
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(bliss && schemes[i].key == KEY_BLISS) ||
|
||||
(!rsa && !ecdsa && !bliss))
|
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if (expected_type == KEY_ANY || expected_type == schemes[i].key)
|
||||
{
|
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add(this, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
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(uintptr_t)schemes[i].scheme);
|
||||
if (is_ike)
|
||||
{
|
||||
add(this, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
||||
(uintptr_t)schemes[i].scheme);
|
||||
ike_added = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
add(this, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
||||
(uintptr_t)schemes[i].scheme);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
found = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -617,6 +629,69 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, add_pubkey_constraints, void,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
|
||||
|
||||
/* if no explicit IKE signature contraints were added we add them for all
|
||||
* configured signature contraints */
|
||||
if (ike && !ike_added &&
|
||||
lib->settings->get_bool(lib->settings,
|
||||
"%s.signature_authentication_constraints", TRUE,
|
||||
lib->ns))
|
||||
{
|
||||
enumerator = create_enumerator(this);
|
||||
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &type, &value))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (type == AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
|
||||
{
|
||||
add(this, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
||||
(uintptr_t)value);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Check if signature schemes of a specific type are compliant
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static bool complies_scheme(private_auth_cfg_t *this, auth_cfg_t *constraints,
|
||||
auth_rule_t type, bool log_error)
|
||||
{
|
||||
enumerator_t *e1, *e2;
|
||||
auth_rule_t t1, t2;
|
||||
signature_scheme_t scheme;
|
||||
void *value;
|
||||
bool success = TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
e2 = create_enumerator(this);
|
||||
while (e2->enumerate(e2, &t2, &scheme))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (t2 == type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
success = FALSE;
|
||||
e1 = constraints->create_enumerator(constraints);
|
||||
while (e1->enumerate(e1, &t1, &value))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (t1 == type && (uintptr_t)value == scheme)
|
||||
{
|
||||
success = TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
e1->destroy(e1);
|
||||
if (!success)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (log_error)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "%s signature scheme %N not acceptable",
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME == type ? "X.509" : "IKE",
|
||||
signature_scheme_names, (int)scheme);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
e2->destroy(e2);
|
||||
return success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
METHOD(auth_cfg_t, complies, bool,
|
||||
@@ -627,7 +702,7 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, complies, bool,
|
||||
bool ca_match = FALSE, cert_match = FALSE;
|
||||
identification_t *require_group = NULL;
|
||||
certificate_t *require_ca = NULL, *require_cert = NULL;
|
||||
signature_scheme_t scheme = SIGN_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
signature_scheme_t ike_scheme = SIGN_UNKNOWN, scheme = SIGN_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
u_int strength = 0;
|
||||
auth_rule_t t1, t2;
|
||||
char *key_type;
|
||||
@@ -823,6 +898,11 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, complies, bool,
|
||||
strength = (uintptr_t)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
{
|
||||
ike_scheme = (uintptr_t)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
{
|
||||
scheme = (uintptr_t)value;
|
||||
@@ -875,35 +955,13 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, complies, bool,
|
||||
* signature schemes. */
|
||||
if (success && scheme != SIGN_UNKNOWN)
|
||||
{
|
||||
e2 = create_enumerator(this);
|
||||
while (e2->enumerate(e2, &t2, &scheme))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (t2 == AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME)
|
||||
{
|
||||
success = FALSE;
|
||||
e1 = constraints->create_enumerator(constraints);
|
||||
while (e1->enumerate(e1, &t1, &value))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (t1 == AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME &&
|
||||
(uintptr_t)value == scheme)
|
||||
{
|
||||
success = TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
e1->destroy(e1);
|
||||
if (!success)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (log_error)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "signature scheme %N not acceptable",
|
||||
signature_scheme_names, (int)scheme);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
e2->destroy(e2);
|
||||
success = complies_scheme(this, constraints,
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, log_error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (success && ike_scheme != SIGN_UNKNOWN)
|
||||
{
|
||||
success = complies_scheme(this, constraints,
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, log_error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if we have a matching constraint (or none at all) for used
|
||||
@@ -1027,6 +1085,7 @@ static void merge(private_auth_cfg_t *this, private_auth_cfg_t *other, bool copy
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
{
|
||||
add(this, type, (uintptr_t)value);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -1197,6 +1256,7 @@ METHOD(auth_cfg_t, clone_, auth_cfg_t*,
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_ECDSA_STRENGTH:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME:
|
||||
clone->add(clone, type, (uintptr_t)value);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUTH_RULE_MAX:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ enum auth_rule_t {
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_BLISS_STRENGTH,
|
||||
/** required signature scheme, signature_scheme_t */
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
||||
/** required signature scheme for IKE authentication, signature_scheme_t */
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME,
|
||||
/** certificatePolicy constraint, numerical OID as char* */
|
||||
AUTH_RULE_CERT_POLICY,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -185,8 +187,10 @@ struct auth_cfg_t {
|
||||
* Add public key and signature scheme constraints to the set.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param constraints constraints string (e.g. "rsa-sha384")
|
||||
* @param ike whether to add/parse constraints for IKE signatures
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void (*add_pubkey_constraints)(auth_cfg_t *this, char *constraints);
|
||||
void (*add_pubkey_constraints)(auth_cfg_t *this, char *constraints,
|
||||
bool ike);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Get a rule value.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ tests_SOURCES = tests.h tests.c \
|
||||
suites/test_certpolicy.c \
|
||||
suites/test_certnames.c \
|
||||
suites/test_host.c \
|
||||
suites/test_auth_cfg.c \
|
||||
suites/test_hasher.c \
|
||||
suites/test_crypter.c \
|
||||
suites/test_crypto_factory.c \
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2016 Tobias Brunner
|
||||
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
|
||||
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
|
||||
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
|
||||
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
|
||||
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
|
||||
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
|
||||
* for more details.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include "test_suite.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <credentials/auth_cfg.h>
|
||||
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
char *constraints;
|
||||
signature_scheme_t sig[5];
|
||||
signature_scheme_t ike[5];
|
||||
} sig_constraints_tests[] = {
|
||||
{ "rsa-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa-sha256-sha512", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA512, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "ecdsa-sha256", { SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa-sha256-ecdsa-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "pubkey-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, SIGN_BLISS_WITH_SHA2_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "ike:rsa-sha256", {0}, { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }},
|
||||
{ "ike:rsa-sha256-rsa-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }, { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }},
|
||||
{ "rsa-sha256-ike:rsa-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }, { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }},
|
||||
{ "ike:pubkey-sha256", {0}, { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, SIGN_BLISS_WITH_SHA2_256, 0 }},
|
||||
{ "rsa-ecdsa-sha256", { SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa-4096-ecdsa-sha256", { SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa-4096-ecdsa-256-sha256", { SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER, SIGN_ECDSA_256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa-ecdsa256-sha256", { SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 0 }, {0}},
|
||||
{ "rsa4096-sha256", {0}, {0}},
|
||||
{ "sha256", {0}, {0}},
|
||||
{ "ike:sha256", {0}, {0}},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static void check_sig_constraints(auth_cfg_t *cfg, auth_rule_t type,
|
||||
signature_scheme_t expected[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
enumerator_t *enumerator;
|
||||
auth_rule_t t;
|
||||
void *value;
|
||||
int i = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
enumerator = cfg->create_enumerator(cfg);
|
||||
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &t, &value))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (t == type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ck_assert(expected[i]);
|
||||
ck_assert_int_eq(expected[i], (signature_scheme_t)value);
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
|
||||
ck_assert(!expected[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
START_TEST(test_sig_contraints)
|
||||
{
|
||||
auth_cfg_t *cfg;
|
||||
signature_scheme_t none[] = {0};
|
||||
|
||||
cfg = auth_cfg_create();
|
||||
cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, sig_constraints_tests[_i].constraints, FALSE);
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].sig);
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, none);
|
||||
cfg->destroy(cfg);
|
||||
|
||||
lib->settings->set_bool(lib->settings, "%s.signature_authentication_constraints",
|
||||
FALSE, lib->ns);
|
||||
|
||||
cfg = auth_cfg_create();
|
||||
cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, sig_constraints_tests[_i].constraints, TRUE);
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].sig);
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].ike);
|
||||
cfg->destroy(cfg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
END_TEST
|
||||
|
||||
START_TEST(test_ike_contraints_fallback)
|
||||
{
|
||||
auth_cfg_t *cfg;
|
||||
|
||||
lib->settings->set_bool(lib->settings, "%s.signature_authentication_constraints",
|
||||
TRUE, lib->ns);
|
||||
|
||||
cfg = auth_cfg_create();
|
||||
cfg->add_pubkey_constraints(cfg, sig_constraints_tests[_i].constraints, TRUE);
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].sig);
|
||||
if (sig_constraints_tests[_i].ike[0])
|
||||
{
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].ike);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
check_sig_constraints(cfg, AUTH_RULE_IKE_SIGNATURE_SCHEME, sig_constraints_tests[_i].sig);
|
||||
}
|
||||
cfg->destroy(cfg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
END_TEST
|
||||
|
||||
Suite *auth_cfg_suite_create()
|
||||
{
|
||||
Suite *s;
|
||||
TCase *tc;
|
||||
|
||||
s = suite_create("auth_cfg");
|
||||
|
||||
tc = tcase_create("add_pubkey_constraints");
|
||||
tcase_add_loop_test(tc, test_sig_contraints, 0, countof(sig_constraints_tests));
|
||||
tcase_add_loop_test(tc, test_ike_contraints_fallback, 0, countof(sig_constraints_tests));
|
||||
suite_add_tcase(s, tc);
|
||||
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ TEST_SUITE_DEPEND(certpolicy_suite_create, CERT_ENCODE, CERT_X509)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE_DEPEND(certnames_suite_create, CERT_ENCODE, CERT_X509)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(host_suite_create)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(printf_suite_create)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(auth_cfg_suite_create)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(hasher_suite_create)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(crypter_suite_create)
|
||||
TEST_SUITE(crypto_factory_suite_create)
|
||||
|
||||
+30
-1
@@ -309,6 +309,19 @@ connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.auth = pubkey
|
||||
An EAP module implementing the appropriate method is selected to perform
|
||||
the EAP conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
If both peers support RFC 7427 ("Signature Authentication in IKEv2")
|
||||
specific hash algorithms to be used during IKEv2 authentication may be
|
||||
configured. To do so use _ike:_ followed by a trust chain signature scheme
|
||||
constraint (see description of the **remote** section's **auth** keyword).
|
||||
For example, with _ike:pubkey-sha384-sha256_ a public key signature scheme
|
||||
with either SHA-384 or SHA-256 would get used for authentication, in that
|
||||
order and depending on the hash algorithms supported by the peer. If no
|
||||
specific hash algorithms are configured, the default is to prefer an
|
||||
algorithm that matches or exceeds the strength of the signature key.
|
||||
If no constraints with _ike:_ prefix are configured any signature scheme
|
||||
constraint (without _ike:_ prefix) will also apply to IKEv2 authentication,
|
||||
unless this is disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5).
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.id =
|
||||
IKE identity to use for authentication round.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -415,9 +428,25 @@ connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.auth = pubkey
|
||||
Authentication to expect from remote (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
|
||||
_eap[-method]_).
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** sections **auth**
|
||||
Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** section's **auth**
|
||||
keyword description about the details of supported mechanisms.
|
||||
|
||||
To require a trustchain public key strength for the remote side, specify the
|
||||
key type followed by the minimum strength in bits (for example _ecdsa-384_
|
||||
or _rsa-2048-ecdsa-256_). To limit the acceptable set of hashing algorithms
|
||||
for trustchain validation, append hash algorithms to _pubkey_ or a key
|
||||
strength definition (for example _pubkey-sha1-sha256_ or
|
||||
_rsa-2048-ecdsa-256-sha256-sha384-sha512_).
|
||||
Unless disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5), or explicit IKEv2 signature
|
||||
constraints are configured (refer to the description of the **local**
|
||||
section's **auth** keyword for details), such key types and hash algorithms
|
||||
are also applied as constraints against IKEv2 signature authentication
|
||||
schemes used by the remote side.
|
||||
|
||||
To specify trust chain constraints for EAP-(T)TLS, append a colon to the
|
||||
EAP method, followed by the key type/size and hash algorithm as discussed
|
||||
above (e.g. _eap-tls:ecdsa-384-sha384_).
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child> {}
|
||||
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user