Various stylistic fixes

This commit is contained in:
Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2013-03-19 15:24:36 +01:00
committed by Tobias Brunner
parent db50a35ad8
commit 7cc6fa1a98
12 changed files with 155 additions and 123 deletions
+9 -18
View File
@@ -52,23 +52,16 @@ tkm_t *tkm = NULL;
bool tkm_init()
{
private_tkm_t *this;
active_requests_type max_requests;
nc_id_type nc;
dh_id_type dh;
cc_id_type cc;
ae_id_type ae;
isa_id_type isa;
esa_id_type esa;
char *ikesock, *eessock;
tkm_limits_t limits;
/* initialize TKM client library */
tkmlib_init();
ehandler_init();
const char * const ikesock = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings,
"%s.ike_socket",
IKE_SOCKET,
charon->name);
ikesock = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings, "%s.ike_socket", IKE_SOCKET,
charon->name);
if (ike_init(ikesock) != TKM_OK)
{
tkmlib_final();
@@ -76,10 +69,8 @@ bool tkm_init()
}
DBG1(DBG_DMN, "connected to TKM via socket '%s'", ikesock);
const char * const eessock = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings,
"%s.ees_socket",
EES_SOCKET,
charon->name);
eessock = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings, "%s.ees_socket", EES_SOCKET,
charon->name);
ees_server_init(eessock);
DBG1(DBG_DMN, "serving EES requests on socket '%s'", eessock);
@@ -91,15 +82,15 @@ bool tkm_init()
}
/* get limits from tkm */
if (ike_tkm_limits(&max_requests, &nc, &dh, &cc, &ae, &isa, &esa) != TKM_OK)
if (ike_tkm_limits(&max_requests, &limits[TKM_CTX_NONCE], &limits[TKM_CTX_DH],
&limits[TKM_CTX_CC], &limits[TKM_CTX_AE],
&limits[TKM_CTX_ISA], &limits[TKM_CTX_ESA]) != TKM_OK)
{
ees_server_finalize();
tkmlib_final();
return FALSE;
}
const tkm_limits_t limits = {nc, dh, cc, isa, ae, esa};
INIT(this,
.public = {
.idmgr = tkm_id_manager_create(limits),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct tkm_chunk_map_t {
* @param id id associated with data
*/
void (*insert)(tkm_chunk_map_t * const this, const chunk_t * const data,
const uint64_t id);
const uint64_t id);
/**
* Get id for given chunk.
+4 -2
View File
@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@ struct private_tkm_cred_t {
METHOD(credential_set_t, create_private_enumerator, enumerator_t*,
private_tkm_cred_t *this, key_type_t type, identification_t *id)
{
identification_t *entry;
if (!id)
{
return this->known_keys->create_enumerator(this->known_keys);
}
identification_t *entry;
this->lock->write_lock(this->lock);
entry = this->known_keys->get(this->known_keys, id);
if (!entry)
{
identification_t *clone = id->clone(id);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "adding private key proxy for id '%Y'", clone);
tkm_private_key_t *key = tkm_private_key_init(id);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "adding private key proxy for id '%Y'", clone);
if (!key)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "unable to create private key for id '%Y'", clone);
+6 -6
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ METHOD(tkm_id_manager_t, acquire_id, int,
if (!is_valid_kind(kind))
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "tried to acquire id for invalid context kind '%d'",
kind);
kind);
return 0;
}
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ METHOD(tkm_id_manager_t, acquire_id, int,
if (!id)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "acquiring %N context id failed",
tkm_context_kind_names, kind);
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "acquiring %N context id failed", tkm_context_kind_names,
kind);
}
return id;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ METHOD(tkm_id_manager_t, release_id, bool,
if (!is_valid_kind(kind))
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "tried to release id %d for invalid context kind '%d'",
id, kind);
id, kind);
return FALSE;
}
@@ -160,8 +160,8 @@ tkm_id_manager_t *tkm_id_manager_create(const tkm_limits_t limits)
this->limits[i] = limits[i];
this->ctxids[i] = calloc(limits[i], sizeof(bool));
this->locks[i] = rwlock_create(RWLOCK_TYPE_DEFAULT);
DBG2(DBG_LIB, "%N initialized, %llu slot(s)",
tkm_context_kind_names, i, limits[i]);
DBG2(DBG_LIB, "%N initialized, %llu slot(s)", tkm_context_kind_names, i,
limits[i]);
}
return &this->public;
+22 -18
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, get_spi, status_t,
private_tkm_kernel_ipsec_t *this, host_t *src, host_t *dst,
u_int8_t protocol, u_int32_t reqid, u_int32_t *spi)
{
bool result;
if (!this->rng)
{
this->rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
@@ -73,8 +75,8 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, get_spi, status_t,
}
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "getting SPI for reqid {%u}", reqid);
const bool result = this->rng->get_bytes(this->rng, sizeof(u_int32_t),
(u_int8_t *)spi);
result = this->rng->get_bytes(this->rng, sizeof(u_int32_t),
(u_int8_t *)spi);
return result ? SUCCESS : FAILED;
}
@@ -93,12 +95,21 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
u_int16_t cpi, bool encap, bool esn, bool inbound,
traffic_selector_t* src_ts, traffic_selector_t* dst_ts)
{
esa_info_t esa;
bool initiator;
esp_spi_type spi_loc, spi_rem;
host_t *local, *peer;
chunk_t *nonce_loc, *nonce_rem;
nc_id_type nonce_loc_id;
esa_id_type esa_id;
nonce_type nc_rem;
if (enc_key.ptr == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "Unable to get ESA information");
return FAILED;
}
esa_info_t esa = *(esa_info_t *)(enc_key.ptr);
esa = *(esa_info_t *)(enc_key.ptr);
/* only handle the case where we have both distinct ESP spi's available */
if (esa.spi_r == spi)
@@ -109,11 +120,7 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
}
/* Initiator if encr_r is passed as enc_key to the inbound add_sa call */
const bool initiator = esa.is_encr_r && inbound;
esp_spi_type spi_loc, spi_rem;
host_t *local, *peer;
chunk_t *nonce_loc, *nonce_rem;
initiator = esa.is_encr_r && inbound;
if (initiator)
{
spi_loc = spi;
@@ -133,10 +140,7 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
nonce_rem = &esa.nonce_i;
}
const nc_id_type nonce_loc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map,
nonce_loc);
const esa_id_type esa_id = tkm->idmgr->acquire_id(tkm->idmgr, TKM_CTX_ESA);
esa_id = tkm->idmgr->acquire_id(tkm->idmgr, TKM_CTX_ESA);
if (!this->sad->insert(this->sad, esa_id, peer, local, spi_loc, protocol))
{
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "unable to add entry (%llu) to SAD", esa_id);
@@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
* creation of first CHILD SA:
* no nonce and no dh contexts because the ones from the IKE SA are re-used
*/
nonce_loc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce_loc);
if (nonce_loc_id == 0 && esa.dh_id == 0)
{
if (ike_esa_create_first(esa_id, esa.isa_id, reqid, 1, spi_loc, spi_rem)
@@ -159,7 +164,6 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
/* creation of child SA without PFS: no dh context */
else if (nonce_loc_id != 0 && esa.dh_id == 0)
{
nonce_type nc_rem;
chunk_to_sequence(nonce_rem, &nc_rem, sizeof(nonce_type));
if (ike_esa_create_no_pfs(esa_id, esa.isa_id, reqid, 1, nonce_loc_id,
nc_rem, initiator, spi_loc, spi_rem)
@@ -173,7 +177,6 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, add_sa, status_t,
/* creation of subsequent child SA with PFS: nonce and dh context are set */
else
{
nonce_type nc_rem;
chunk_to_sequence(nonce_rem, &nc_rem, sizeof(nonce_type));
if (ike_esa_create(esa_id, esa.isa_id, reqid, 1, esa.dh_id, nonce_loc_id,
nc_rem, initiator, spi_loc, spi_rem) != TKM_OK)
@@ -222,8 +225,9 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, del_sa, status_t,
private_tkm_kernel_ipsec_t *this, host_t *src, host_t *dst,
u_int32_t spi, u_int8_t protocol, u_int16_t cpi, mark_t mark)
{
const esa_id_type esa_id = this->sad->get_esa_id(this->sad, src, dst, spi,
protocol);
esa_id_type esa_id;
esa_id = this->sad->get_esa_id(this->sad, src, dst, spi, protocol);
if (esa_id)
{
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "deleting child SA (esa: %llu, spi: %x)", esa_id,
@@ -314,14 +318,14 @@ METHOD(kernel_ipsec_t, bypass_socket, bool,
if (setsockopt(fd, sol, ipsec_policy, &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
{
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "unable to set IPSEC_POLICY on socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
strerror(errno));
return FALSE;
}
policy.dir = XFRM_POLICY_IN;
if (setsockopt(fd, sol, ipsec_policy, &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
{
DBG1(DBG_KNL, "unable to set IPSEC_POLICY on socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
strerror(errno));
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
+8 -5
View File
@@ -129,8 +129,9 @@ METHOD(tkm_kernel_sad_t, insert, bool,
const host_t * const src, const host_t * const dst, const u_int32_t spi,
const u_int8_t proto)
{
status_t result;
sad_entry_t *new_entry;
INIT(new_entry,
.esa_id = esa_id,
.src = (host_t *)src,
@@ -140,9 +141,9 @@ METHOD(tkm_kernel_sad_t, insert, bool,
);
this->mutex->lock(this->mutex);
const status_t result = this->data->find_first(this->data,
(linked_list_match_t)sad_entry_equal,
NULL, new_entry);
result = this->data->find_first(this->data,
(linked_list_match_t)sad_entry_equal, NULL,
new_entry);
if (result == NOT_FOUND)
{
DBG3(DBG_KNL, "inserting SAD entry (esa: %llu, src: %H, dst: %H, "
@@ -192,8 +193,10 @@ METHOD(tkm_kernel_sad_t, _remove, bool,
{
sad_entry_t *current;
bool removed = FALSE;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
this->mutex->lock(this->mutex);
enumerator_t *enumerator = this->data->create_enumerator(this->data);
enumerator = this->data->create_enumerator(this->data);
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, (void **)&current))
{
if (current->esa_id == esa_id)
+38 -32
View File
@@ -94,9 +94,11 @@ static void aead_create_from_keys(aead_t **in, aead_t **out,
const u_int16_t key_size, bool initiator)
{
*in = *out = NULL;
signer_t *signer_i, *signer_r;
crypter_t *crypter_i, *crypter_r;
signer_t * const signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
signer_t * const signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
if (signer_i == NULL || signer_r == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!",
@@ -104,10 +106,8 @@ static void aead_create_from_keys(aead_t **in, aead_t **out,
integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
return;
}
crypter_t * const crypter_i = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto,
enc_alg, key_size);
crypter_t * const crypter_r = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto,
enc_alg, key_size);
crypter_i = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, enc_alg, key_size);
crypter_r = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, enc_alg, key_size);
if (crypter_i == NULL || crypter_r == NULL)
{
signer_i->destroy(signer_i);
@@ -174,41 +174,50 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function, chunk_t rekey_skd)
{
/* Check encryption and integrity algorithms */
u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, key_size;
if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &enc_alg, &key_size))
u_int64_t nc_id, spi_loc, spi_rem;
chunk_t *nonce, c_ai, c_ar, c_ei, c_er;
tkm_diffie_hellman_t *tkm_dh;
dh_id_type dh_id;
nonce_type nonce_rem;
result_type res;
key_type sk_ai, sk_ar, sk_ei, sk_er;
/* Check encryption and integrity algorithms */
if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &enc_alg,
&key_size))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected", transform_type_names,
ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
return FALSE;
}
if (encryption_algorithm_is_aead(enc_alg))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "AEAD algorithm %N not supported",
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
return FALSE;
}
if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &int_alg, NULL))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected", transform_type_names,
INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM);
INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM);
return FALSE;
}
if (!(enc_alg == ENCR_AES_CBC && key_size == 256 &&
int_alg == AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256))
int_alg == AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "the TKM only supports aes256-sha512 at the moment, please"
" update your configuration");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "the TKM only supports aes256-sha512 at the moment, "
"please update your configuration");
return FALSE;
}
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "using %N for encryption, %N for integrity",
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg,
integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg, integrity_algorithm_names,
int_alg);
/* Acquire nonce context id */
chunk_t * const nonce = this->initiator ? &nonce_i : &nonce_r;
const uint64_t nc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce);
nonce = this->initiator ? &nonce_i : &nonce_r;
nc_id = tkm->chunk_map->get_id(tkm->chunk_map, nonce);
if (!nc_id)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to acquire context id for nonce");
@@ -216,11 +225,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
}
/* Get DH context id */
tkm_diffie_hellman_t * const tkm_dh = (tkm_diffie_hellman_t *)dh;
const dh_id_type dh_id = tkm_dh->get_id(tkm_dh);
nonce_type nonce_rem;
u_int64_t spi_loc, spi_rem;
tkm_dh = (tkm_diffie_hellman_t *)dh;
dh_id = tkm_dh->get_id(tkm_dh);
if (this->initiator)
{
@@ -235,8 +241,6 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
spi_rem = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
}
result_type res;
key_type sk_ai, sk_ar, sk_ei, sk_er;
if (rekey_function == PRF_UNDEFINED)
{
this->ae_ctx_id = tkm->idmgr->acquire_id(tkm->idmgr, TKM_CTX_AE);
@@ -253,12 +257,14 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
}
else
{
isa_info_t isa_info;
if (rekey_skd.ptr == NULL || rekey_skd.len != sizeof(isa_info_t))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to retrieve parent isa info");
return FALSE;
}
const isa_info_t isa_info = *((isa_info_t *)(rekey_skd.ptr));
isa_info = *((isa_info_t *)(rekey_skd.ptr));
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "deriving IKE keys (parent_isa: %llu, ae: %llu, nc: %llu,"
"dh: %llu, spi_loc: %llx, spi_rem: %llx)", isa_info.parent_isa_id,
isa_info.ae_id, nc_id, dh_id, spi_loc, spi_rem);
@@ -276,15 +282,14 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
return FALSE;
}
chunk_t c_ai, c_ar, c_ei, c_er;
sequence_to_chunk(sk_ai.data, sk_ai.size, &c_ai);
sequence_to_chunk(sk_ar.data, sk_ar.size, &c_ar);
sequence_to_chunk(sk_ei.data, sk_ei.size, &c_ei);
sequence_to_chunk(sk_er.data, sk_er.size, &c_er);
aead_create_from_keys(&this->aead_in, &this->aead_out,
&c_ai, &c_ar, &c_ei, &c_er,
enc_alg, int_alg, key_size / 8, this->initiator);
aead_create_from_keys(&this->aead_in, &this->aead_out, &c_ai, &c_ar, &c_ei,
&c_er, enc_alg, int_alg, key_size / 8,
this->initiator);
chunk_clear(&c_ai);
chunk_clear(&c_ar);
@@ -315,8 +320,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
{
esa_info_t *esa_info_i, *esa_info_r;
dh_id_type dh_id = 0;
if (dh)
{
dh_id = ((tkm_diffie_hellman_t *)dh)->get_id((tkm_diffie_hellman_t *)dh);
@@ -362,6 +367,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, get_auth_octets, bool,
private_tkm_keymat_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id, char reserved[3], chunk_t *octets)
{
sign_info_t *sign;
if (verify)
{
/* store peer init message for authentication step */
@@ -370,7 +377,6 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, get_auth_octets, bool,
return TRUE;
}
sign_info_t *sign;
INIT(sign,
.isa_id = this->isa_ctx_id,
.init_message = chunk_clone(ike_sa_init),
+53 -32
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ static ri_id_type get_remote_identity_id(peer_cfg_t *peer)
{
ri_id_type remote_id = 0;
child_cfg_t *child;
enumerator_t* children = peer->create_child_cfg_enumerator(peer);
enumerator_t* children;
children = peer->create_child_cfg_enumerator(peer);
/* pick the reqid of the first child, no need to enumerate all children. */
children->enumerate(children, &child);
@@ -76,20 +78,26 @@ static ri_id_type get_remote_identity_id(peer_cfg_t *peer)
*/
static bool build_cert_chain(const ike_sa_t * const ike_sa, cc_id_type cc_id)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "building certificate chain context %llu for IKE SA %s",
cc_id, ike_sa->get_name((ike_sa_t *)ike_sa));
auth_cfg_t *auth;
certificate_t *cert;
enumerator_t *rounds;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "building certificate chain context %llu for IKE SA %s",
cc_id, ike_sa->get_name((ike_sa_t *)ike_sa));
rounds = ike_sa->create_auth_cfg_enumerator((ike_sa_t *)ike_sa, FALSE);
while (rounds->enumerate(rounds, &auth))
{
cert = auth->get(auth, AUTH_RULE_SUBJECT_CERT);
if (cert)
{
/* set user certificate */
chunk_t enc_user_cert;
ri_id_type ri_id;
certificate_type user_cert;
auth_rule_t rule;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
/* set user certificate */
if (!cert->get_encoding(cert, CERT_ASN1_DER, &enc_user_cert))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to extract encoded user certificate");
@@ -97,10 +105,8 @@ static bool build_cert_chain(const ike_sa_t * const ike_sa, cc_id_type cc_id)
return FALSE;
}
ri_id_type ri_id = get_remote_identity_id(ike_sa->get_peer_cfg((ike_sa_t *)ike_sa));
certificate_type user_cert;
chunk_to_sequence(&enc_user_cert, &user_cert,
sizeof(certificate_type));
ri_id = get_remote_identity_id(ike_sa->get_peer_cfg((ike_sa_t *)ike_sa));
chunk_to_sequence(&enc_user_cert, &user_cert, sizeof(certificate_type));
chunk_free(&enc_user_cert);
if (ike_cc_set_user_certificate(cc_id, ri_id, 1, user_cert) != TKM_OK)
{
@@ -111,23 +117,23 @@ static bool build_cert_chain(const ike_sa_t * const ike_sa, cc_id_type cc_id)
}
/* process intermediate CA certificates */
auth_rule_t rule;
enumerator_t *enumerator = auth->create_enumerator(auth);
enumerator = auth->create_enumerator(auth);
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &rule, &cert))
{
if (rule == AUTH_RULE_IM_CERT)
{
chunk_t enc_im_cert;
certificate_type im_cert;
if (!cert->get_encoding(cert, CERT_ASN1_DER, &enc_im_cert))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to extract encoded intermediate CA"
" certificate");
" certificate");
rounds->destroy(rounds);
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
return FALSE;
}
certificate_type im_cert;
chunk_to_sequence(&enc_im_cert, &im_cert,
sizeof(certificate_type));
chunk_free(&enc_im_cert);
@@ -147,7 +153,10 @@ static bool build_cert_chain(const ike_sa_t * const ike_sa, cc_id_type cc_id)
cert = auth->get(auth, AUTH_RULE_CA_CERT);
if (cert)
{
const ca_id_type ca_id = 1;
certificate_type ca_cert;
chunk_t enc_ca_cert;
if (!cert->get_encoding(cert, CERT_ASN1_DER, &enc_ca_cert))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to extract encoded CA certificate");
@@ -155,8 +164,6 @@ static bool build_cert_chain(const ike_sa_t * const ike_sa, cc_id_type cc_id)
return FALSE;
}
const ca_id_type ca_id = 1;
certificate_type ca_cert;
chunk_to_sequence(&enc_ca_cert, &ca_cert,
sizeof(certificate_type));
chunk_free(&enc_ca_cert);
@@ -200,8 +207,12 @@ METHOD(listener_t, alert, bool,
{
if (alert == ALERT_KEEP_ON_CHILD_SA_FAILURE)
{
tkm_keymat_t * const keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
const isa_id_type isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
tkm_keymat_t *keymat;
isa_id_type isa_id;
keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "TKM alert listener called for ISA context %llu", isa_id);
if (ike_isa_skip_create_first(isa_id) != TKM_OK)
{
@@ -217,47 +228,51 @@ METHOD(listener_t, authorize, bool,
private_tkm_listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa,
bool final, bool *success)
{
tkm_keymat_t *keymat;
isa_id_type isa_id;
cc_id_type cc_id;
chunk_t *auth, *other_init_msg;
signature_type signature;
init_message_type init_msg;
if (!final)
{
return TRUE;
}
tkm_keymat_t * const keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
const isa_id_type isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "TKM authorize listener called for ISA context %llu", isa_id);
const cc_id_type cc_id = tkm->idmgr->acquire_id(tkm->idmgr, TKM_CTX_CC);
cc_id = tkm->idmgr->acquire_id(tkm->idmgr, TKM_CTX_CC);
if (!cc_id)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to acquire CC context id");
*success = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
const bool cc_success = build_cert_chain(ike_sa, cc_id);
if (!cc_success)
if (!build_cert_chain(ike_sa, cc_id))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "unable to build certificate chain");
*success = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
const chunk_t * const auth = keymat->get_auth_payload(keymat);
auth = keymat->get_auth_payload(keymat);
if (!auth->ptr)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no AUTHENTICATION data available");
*success = FALSE;
}
const chunk_t * const other_init_msg = keymat->get_peer_init_msg(keymat);
other_init_msg = keymat->get_peer_init_msg(keymat);
if (!other_init_msg->ptr)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no peer init message available");
*success = FALSE;
}
signature_type signature;
chunk_to_sequence(auth, &signature, sizeof(signature_type));
init_message_type init_msg;
chunk_to_sequence(other_init_msg, &init_msg, sizeof(init_message_type));
if (ike_isa_auth(isa_id, cc_id, init_msg, signature) != TKM_OK)
@@ -280,21 +295,27 @@ METHOD(listener_t, message, bool,
private_tkm_listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa,
message_t *message, bool incoming, bool plain)
{
tkm_keymat_t *keymat;
isa_id_type isa_id;
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
if (!incoming || !plain || message->get_exchange_type(message) != IKE_AUTH)
{
return TRUE;
}
tkm_keymat_t * const keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
const isa_id_type isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
keymat = (tkm_keymat_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
isa_id = keymat->get_isa_id(keymat);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "saving AUTHENTICATION payload for authorize hook"
" (ISA context %llu)", isa_id);
" (ISA context %llu)", isa_id);
auth_payload_t * const auth_payload =
(auth_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message, AUTHENTICATION);
auth_payload = (auth_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
AUTHENTICATION);
if (auth_payload)
{
const chunk_t auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
chunk_t auth_data;
auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
keymat->set_auth_payload(keymat, &auth_data);
}
else
+1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ METHOD(nonce_gen_t, get_nonce, bool,
private_tkm_nonceg_t *this, size_t size, u_int8_t *buffer)
{
nonce_type nonce;
if (ike_nc_create(this->context_id, size, &nonce) != TKM_OK)
{
return FALSE;
+7 -4
View File
@@ -63,16 +63,18 @@ METHOD(private_key_t, sign, bool,
{
signature_type sig;
init_message_type msg;
sign_info_t sign;
isa_id_type isa_id;
if (data.ptr == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "unable to get signature information");
return FALSE;
}
sign_info_t sign = *(sign_info_t *)(data.ptr);
sign = *(sign_info_t *)(data.ptr);
chunk_to_sequence(&sign.init_message, &msg, sizeof(init_message_type));
const isa_id_type isa_id = sign.isa_id;
isa_id = sign.isa_id;
chunk_free(&sign.init_message);
if (ike_isa_sign(isa_id, 1, msg, &sig) != TKM_OK)
@@ -141,6 +143,8 @@ METHOD(private_key_t, destroy, void,
tkm_private_key_t *tkm_private_key_init(identification_t * const id)
{
private_tkm_private_key_t *this;
certificate_t *cert;
public_key_t *pubkey;
INIT(this,
.public = {
@@ -164,7 +168,6 @@ tkm_private_key_t *tkm_private_key_init(identification_t * const id)
);
/* get key type from associated public key */
certificate_t *cert;
cert = lib->credmgr->get_cert(lib->credmgr, CERT_ANY, KEY_ANY, id, FALSE);
if (!cert)
{
@@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ tkm_private_key_t *tkm_private_key_init(identification_t * const id)
return NULL;
}
public_key_t *pubkey = cert->get_public_key(cert);
pubkey = cert->get_public_key(cert);
if (!pubkey)
{
cert->destroy(cert);
+4 -3
View File
@@ -26,18 +26,19 @@ struct sequence_type {
typedef struct sequence_type sequence_type;
void sequence_to_chunk(const byte_t * const first, const uint32_t len,
chunk_t * const chunk)
chunk_t * const chunk)
{
*chunk = chunk_alloc(len);
memcpy(chunk->ptr, first, len);
}
void chunk_to_sequence(const chunk_t * const chunk, void *sequence,
const uint32_t typelen)
const uint32_t typelen)
{
const uint32_t seqlenmax = typelen - sizeof(uint32_t);
memset(sequence, 0, typelen);
sequence_type *seq = sequence;
memset(sequence, 0, typelen);
if (chunk->len > seqlenmax)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "chunk too large to fit into sequence %d > %d, limiting"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
* @param chunk pointer to chunk struct
*/
void sequence_to_chunk(const byte_t * const first, const uint32_t len,
chunk_t * const chunk);
chunk_t * const chunk);
/**
* Convert chunk to variable-length byte sequence.
@@ -43,6 +43,6 @@ void sequence_to_chunk(const byte_t * const first, const uint32_t len,
* @param typelen length of sequence type
*/
void chunk_to_sequence(const chunk_t * const chunk, void *sequence,
const uint32_t typelen);
const uint32_t typelen);
#endif /** TKM_UTILS_H_ @}*/