ikev2: Reject CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange on unestablished IKE_SAs
Prevents a responder peer to trick us into established state by starting IKE_SA rekeying before the IKE_SA has been authenticated during IKE_AUTH. Fixes CVE-2014-2338.
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Tobias Brunner
parent
abd7d3be9c
commit
8503077175
@@ -778,6 +778,15 @@ static status_t process_request(private_task_manager_t *this,
|
||||
case CREATE_CHILD_SA:
|
||||
{ /* FIXME: we should prevent this on mediation connections */
|
||||
bool notify_found = FALSE, ts_found = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
if (this->ike_sa->get_state(this->ike_sa) == IKE_CREATED ||
|
||||
this->ike_sa->get_state(this->ike_sa) == IKE_CONNECTING)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received CREATE_CHILD_SA request for "
|
||||
"unestablished IKE_SA, rejected");
|
||||
return FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
enumerator = message->create_payload_enumerator(message);
|
||||
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &payload))
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user