ikev1: Don't cache last block of INFORMATIONAL messages as IV
We don't expect a response with the same MID, but apparently some devices (e.g. FRITZ!Box) do that for DPDs, while still treating the response as a new exchange. By storing the last message block as IV we can't decrypt the first block of such a response. Fixes #661.
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@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ METHOD(message_t, generate, status_t,
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chunk = generator->get_chunk(generator, &lenpos);
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htoun32(lenpos, chunk.len);
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this->packet->set_data(this->packet, chunk_clone(chunk));
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if (this->is_encrypted)
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if (this->is_encrypted && this->exchange_type != INFORMATIONAL_V1)
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{
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/* update the IV for the next IKEv1 message */
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chunk_t last_block;
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@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ METHOD(message_t, parse_body, status_t,
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}
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chunk_free(&hash);
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}
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if (this->is_encrypted)
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if (this->is_encrypted && this->exchange_type != INFORMATIONAL_V1)
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{ /* message verified, confirm IV */
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if (!keymat_v1->confirm_iv(keymat_v1, this->message_id))
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{
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