added additional sanity checks to asn1_length() parsing

This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2009-07-03 09:26:48 +02:00
parent 00fcc0f8f3
commit 90855e965a
+16 -9
View File
@@ -260,25 +260,32 @@ size_t asn1_length(chunk_t *blob)
u_char n;
size_t len;
/* advance from tag field on to length field */
blob->ptr++;
blob->len--;
if (blob->len < 2)
{
DBG2("insufficient number of octets to parse ASN.1 length");
return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
}
/* read first octet of length field */
n = *blob->ptr++;
blob->len--;
/* read length field, skip tag and length */
n = blob->ptr[1];
*blob = chunk_skip(*blob, 2);
if ((n & 0x80) == 0)
{/* single length octet */
{ /* single length octet */
if (n > blob->len)
{
DBG2("length is larger than remaining blob size");
return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
}
return n;
}
/* composite length, determine number of length octets */
n &= 0x7f;
if (n > blob->len)
if (n == 0 || n > blob->len)
{
DBG2("number of length octets is larger than ASN.1 object");
DBG2("number of length octets invalid");
return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
}