fixed DoS vulnerability in the parsing of ASN.1 time strings
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@@ -326,12 +326,18 @@ time_t asn1_to_time(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type)
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}
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else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '+', utctime->len)) != NULL)
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{
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sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
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if (sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min) != 2)
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{
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return 0; /* error in positive timezone offset format */
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}
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tz_offset = 3600*tz_hour + 60*tz_min; /* positive time zone offset */
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}
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else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '-', utctime->len)) != NULL)
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{
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sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
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if (sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min) != 2)
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{
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return 0; /* error in negative timezone offset format */
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}
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tz_offset = -3600*tz_hour - 60*tz_min; /* negative time zone offset */
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}
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else
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@@ -344,13 +350,20 @@ time_t asn1_to_time(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type)
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const char* format = (type == ASN1_UTCTIME)? "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d":
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"%4d%2d%2d%2d%2d";
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sscanf(utctime->ptr, format, &tm_year, &tm_mon, &tm_day, &tm_hour, &tm_min);
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if (sscanf(utctime->ptr, format, &tm_year, &tm_mon, &tm_day,
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&tm_hour, &tm_min) != 5)
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{
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return 0; /* error in time st [yy]yymmddhhmm time format */
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}
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}
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/* is there a seconds field? */
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if ((eot - utctime->ptr) == ((type == ASN1_UTCTIME)?12:14))
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{
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sscanf(eot-2, "%2d", &tm_sec);
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if (sscanf(eot-2, "%2d", &tm_sec) != 1)
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{
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return 0; /* error in ss seconds field format */
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}
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}
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else
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{
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