Refactored error handling in keymat_v1_t

This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2012-07-16 14:55:07 +02:00
parent 4decfae6c2
commit a564e4ca77
+27 -25
View File
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
{
chunk_clear(&g_xy);
chunk_clear(&data);
return FALSE;
}
chunk_clear(&data);
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYID_d %B", &this->skeyid_d);
@@ -491,6 +492,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
{
chunk_clear(&g_xy);
chunk_clear(&data);
return FALSE;
}
chunk_clear(&data);
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYID_a %B", &this->skeyid_a);
@@ -501,6 +503,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
{
chunk_clear(&g_xy);
chunk_clear(&data);
return FALSE;
}
chunk_clear(&data);
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYID_e %B", &skeyid_e);
@@ -554,16 +557,15 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
/* initial IV = hash(g^xi | g^xr) */
data = chunk_cata("cc", g_xi, g_xr);
chunk_free(&dh_me);
if (!this->hasher->allocate_hash(this->hasher, data, &this->phase1_iv.iv))
{
chunk_free(&dh_me);
return FALSE;
}
if (this->phase1_iv.iv.len > this->aead->get_block_size(this->aead))
{
this->phase1_iv.iv.len = this->aead->get_block_size(this->aead);
}
chunk_free(&dh_me);
DBG4(DBG_IKE, "initial IV %B", &this->phase1_iv.iv);
return TRUE;
@@ -578,6 +580,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
u_int8_t protocol;
prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
bool success = FALSE;
if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
&enc_alg, &enc_size))
@@ -656,44 +659,30 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
}
*encr_r = *integ_r = *encr_i = *integ_i = chunk_empty;
seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
chunk_from_thing(spi_r), nonce_i, nonce_r);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "initiator SA seed %B", &seed);
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
if (!prf_plus)
{
chunk_clear(&secret);
return FALSE;
}
if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i) ||
if (!prf_plus ||
!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i) ||
!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i))
{
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
chunk_clear(&secret);
return FALSE;
goto failure;
}
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
chunk_from_thing(spi_i), nonce_i, nonce_r);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "responder SA seed %B", &seed);
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
if (!prf_plus)
{
chunk_clear(&secret);
return FALSE;
}
if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r) ||
if (!prf_plus ||
!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r) ||
!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r))
{
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
chunk_clear(&secret);
return FALSE;
goto failure;
}
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
chunk_clear(&secret);
if (enc_size)
{
@@ -705,7 +694,20 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity initiator key %B", integ_i);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity responder key %B", integ_r);
}
return TRUE;
success = TRUE;
failure:
if (!success)
{
chunk_clear(encr_i);
chunk_clear(integ_i);
chunk_clear(encr_r);
chunk_clear(integ_r);
}
DESTROY_IF(prf_plus);
chunk_clear(&secret);
return success;
}
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, create_hasher, bool,