Derive IKEv1 CHILD_SA keymat twice, once for each IPsec SA

This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2012-03-20 17:30:50 +01:00
parent 85f5c478bf
commit a7910b1c6e
3 changed files with 31 additions and 24 deletions
+25 -22
View File
@@ -503,32 +503,14 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
private_keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
{
u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
u_int8_t protocol;
u_int32_t spi;
prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
/* KEYMAT = prf+(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b) */
protocol = proposal->get_protocol(proposal);
spi = proposal->get_spi(proposal);
if (dh)
{
if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
{
return FALSE;
}
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
}
seed = chunk_cata("mcccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
chunk_from_thing(spi), nonce_i, nonce_r);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed);
if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
&enc_alg, &enc_size))
{
@@ -591,16 +573,37 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
int_size /= 8;
}
/* KEYMAT = prf+(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b) */
this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skeyid_d);
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
protocol = proposal->get_protocol(proposal);
if (dh)
{
if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
{
return FALSE;
}
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
}
seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
chunk_from_thing(spi_r), nonce_i, nonce_r);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "initiator SA seed %B", &seed);
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i);
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i);
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
chunk_from_thing(spi_i), nonce_i, nonce_r);
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "responder SA seed %B", &seed);
prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r);
prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r);
prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
chunk_clear(&secret);
if (enc_size)
{
DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption initiator key %B", encr_i);
+4 -1
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct keymat_v1_t {
*
* @param proposal selected algorithms
* @param dh diffie hellman key, NULL if none used
* @param spi_i SPI chosen by initiatior
* @param spi_r SPI chosen by responder
* @param nonce_i quick mode initiator nonce
* @param nonce_r quick mode responder nonce
* @param encr_i allocated initiators encryption key
@@ -69,7 +71,8 @@ struct keymat_v1_t {
* @param integ_r allocated responders integrity key
*/
bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
diffie_hellman_t *dh, u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
+2 -1
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ static bool install(private_quick_mode_t *this)
tsi->insert_last(tsi, this->tsi);
tsr->insert_last(tsr, this->tsr);
if (this->keymat->derive_child_keys(this->keymat, this->proposal, NULL,
this->nonce_i, this->nonce_r, &encr_i, &integ_i, &encr_r, &integ_r))
this->spi_i, this->spi_r, this->nonce_i, this->nonce_r,
&encr_i, &integ_i, &encr_r, &integ_r))
{
if (this->initiator)
{