Derive IKEv1 CHILD_SA keymat twice, once for each IPsec SA
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@@ -503,32 +503,14 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
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METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
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private_keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
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chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
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chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
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u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
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chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
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{
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u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
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u_int8_t protocol;
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u_int32_t spi;
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prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
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chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
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/* KEYMAT = prf+(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b) */
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protocol = proposal->get_protocol(proposal);
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spi = proposal->get_spi(proposal);
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if (dh)
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{
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if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
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{
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return FALSE;
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}
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
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}
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seed = chunk_cata("mcccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
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chunk_from_thing(spi), nonce_i, nonce_r);
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed);
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if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
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&enc_alg, &enc_size))
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{
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@@ -591,16 +573,37 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
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int_size /= 8;
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}
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/* KEYMAT = prf+(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b) */
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this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skeyid_d);
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prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
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protocol = proposal->get_protocol(proposal);
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if (dh)
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{
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if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
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{
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return FALSE;
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}
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
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}
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seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
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chunk_from_thing(spi_r), nonce_i, nonce_r);
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "initiator SA seed %B", &seed);
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prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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seed = chunk_cata("ccccc", secret, chunk_from_thing(protocol),
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chunk_from_thing(spi_i), nonce_i, nonce_r);
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "responder SA seed %B", &seed);
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prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, FALSE, seed);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r);
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prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r);
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prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
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chunk_clear(&secret);
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if (enc_size)
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{
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DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption initiator key %B", encr_i);
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@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct keymat_v1_t {
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*
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* @param proposal selected algorithms
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* @param dh diffie hellman key, NULL if none used
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* @param spi_i SPI chosen by initiatior
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* @param spi_r SPI chosen by responder
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* @param nonce_i quick mode initiator nonce
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* @param nonce_r quick mode responder nonce
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* @param encr_i allocated initiators encryption key
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@@ -69,7 +71,8 @@ struct keymat_v1_t {
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* @param integ_r allocated responders integrity key
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*/
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bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
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diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
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diffie_hellman_t *dh, u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r,
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chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
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chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
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chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
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@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ static bool install(private_quick_mode_t *this)
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tsi->insert_last(tsi, this->tsi);
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tsr->insert_last(tsr, this->tsr);
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if (this->keymat->derive_child_keys(this->keymat, this->proposal, NULL,
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this->nonce_i, this->nonce_r, &encr_i, &integ_i, &encr_r, &integ_r))
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this->spi_i, this->spi_r, this->nonce_i, this->nonce_r,
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&encr_i, &integ_i, &encr_r, &integ_r))
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{
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if (this->initiator)
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{
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