This reverts commit 3293d14628.
The position of tasks in the queue does not actually determine the order
in which they are activated. Instead this is determined by the
statements in task_manager_v2_t.initiate().
We don't expect a response with the same MID, but apparently some
devices (e.g. FRITZ!Box) do that for DPDs, while still treating the
response as a new exchange. By storing the last message block as IV
we can't decrypt the first block of such a response.
Fixes#661.
While the examples in RFC 2408 show proposal numbers starting at 1 and
increasing by one for each subsequent proposal this is not mandatory.
Actually, IKEv1 proposals may start at any number, the only requirement
is that the proposal numbers increase monotonically they don't have to
do so consecutively.
Most implementations follow the examples and start numbering at 1 (charon,
racoon, Shrew, Cisco, Windows XP, FRITZ!Box) but pluto was one of the
implementations that started with 0 and there might be others out there.
The previous assumption that implementations always start numbering proposals
at 0 caused problems with clients that start numbering with 1 and whose first
proposal consists of multiple protocols (e.g. ESP+IPComp).
Fixes#661.
This might not be the case if e.g. an address appeared but the old one
is still available but not actually usable. Without this the MOBIKE
task would eventually time out even though we might be able to switch
to a working address.
Because we only queue one MOBIKE task at a time, but destroy superfluous
ones only after we already increased the counter for pending MOBIKE updates,
we have to reduce the counter when such tasks are destroyed. Otherwise, the
queued task would assume another task is queued when it is running and
ignore any successful response.
Due to how reauthentication works for IKEv1 we could get a second
IKE_SA, which might cause problems, when connectivity problems arise
when the connection is initially established.
Fixes#670.
The adopt_children_job_create() function is not available when IKEv1 support
is disabled. Fixes uncommon builds using --enable-ha --disable-ikev1.
Fixes#690.
When having the unity plugin enabled and both peers send the Unity Vendor ID,
we proposed 0.0.0.0/0 as traffic selector, even if no Split-Include has been
received on the SA. This can break compatibility with some responders, as
they don't narrow the TS themselves, but expect the configured TS.
When an initiator starts reauthentication on a connection that uses push
mode to assign a virtual IP, we can't execute the Mode Config before releasing
the virtual IP. Otherwise we would request a new and different lease, which
the client probably can't handle. Defer Mode Config execution, so the same IP
gets first released then reassigned during reauthentication.
If a peer immediately sends DELETE messages when completing Quick Mode rekeying,
the third Quick Mode message and the DELETE are sent simultaneously. This
implies that DELETE messages may arrive before the completing third Quick Mode
message.
Handle this case by ignoring the DELETE INFORMATIONAL in Quick Mode and let
the delete task handle it.
To check if a received IKE_SA_INIT request is a new request or a
retransmit, charon maintains hashes of the pending IKE_SA_INIT
exchanges.
However, the hash calculation is not reentrant because a single hasher
is used for the whole IKE SA manager. It leads to bogus calculations
under high load and hence dropped messages on responder
(IkeInInvalidSpi incremented).
Don't share a single hasher in the IKE SA manager, create a transient
one whenever a message must be hashed.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <[email protected]>
We sent both a notify using IKEv1 and IKEv2. This is a little more aggressive
than required, RFC 5996 says we "SHOULD send an unauthenticated Notify
message of type INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION containing the highest (closest) version
number it supports".
Fixes#657.
Shea Levy