Adds a permanent notification while connected (or connecting), which
allows running as a foreground service, which in turn should prevent
Android from terminating the service when low on memory.
Also adds support for ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD and Curve25519 DH.
This avoids triggering additional errors via e.g. ike_updown() that
might cause the error message displayed in the GUI to change if the
status fragment is recreated.
References #2134.
Checking for `main` produces code like this in the test program:
int
main ()
{
return main ();
;
return 0;
}
This recursive call results in a warning message with some compilers (e.g.
Clang in newer Xcode versions: "all paths through this function will call
itself [-Winfinite-recursion]"), which lets the tests fail when compiling
with -Werror.
The log level was incorrectly set to the same value for all groups.
Fixes: dac15e03c8 ("bus: Fix maximum log levels when mixing log/vlog
implementing loggers")
So far every "newer" CRL (higher serial or by date) replaced an existing
"older" CRL. This meant that delta CRLs replaced an existing base CRL
and that base CRLs weren't added if a delta CRL was already stored. So
the base had to be re-fetched every time after a delta CRL was added.
With this change one delta CRL to the latest base may be stored. A newer
delta CRL will replace an existing delta CRL (but not its base, older
base CRLs are removed, though). And a newer base will replace the existing
base and optional delta CRL.
This was added a few years ago because pki --signcrl once encoded serials
incorrectly as eight byte blobs. But still ensure we have can handle
overflows in case the serial is encoded incorrectly without zero-prefix.
BoringSSL only supports a limited list of (hard-coded) algorithms via
EVP_get_cipherbyname(), which does not include AES-GCM. While BoringSSL
deprecated these functions they are also supported by OpenSSL (in BoringSSL
a completely new interface for AEADs was added, which OpenSSL currently does
not support).
Adds checks for proposals parsed from strings. For instance, the presence
of DH, PRF and encryption algorithms for IKE are now enforced and AEAD and
regular encryption algorithms are not allowed in the same proposal anymore.
Also fixed is the mapping of the aes*gmac keywords to an integrity algorithm
in AH proposals.
We parse aes*gmac as encryption algorithm, which we have to map to an
integrity algorithm. We also make sure we remove all other encryption
algorithms and ensure there is an integrity algorithm.
Adds the ability to parse KEY_ANY keys via the pkcs1 and openssl plugins.
This is then used in the pki utility, where private keys may now be
loaded via `priv` keyword instead of having to specify the type of the key
explicitly. And swanctl can load any type of key from the swanctl/private
directory.
If a responder is natted it will usually be a static NAT (unless it's a
mediated connection) in which case adding these notifies makes not much
sense (if the initiator's NAT mapping had changed the responder wouldn't
be able to reach it anyway). It's also problematic as some clients refuse
to respond to DPDs if they contain such notifies.
Fixes#2126.
Sends a DELETE when rekeyed IKE_SAs are deleted. This fixes issues with
peers (e.g. Cisco) that continue to send DPDs on the old SA and then
delete all SAs if no response is received. But since the DELETE could get
dropped this might not fix the issue in all cases.
Also, when terminating an IKE_SA DELETES for all CHILD_SAs are now sent
before sending one for the IKE_SA and destroying it.
Fixes#2090.
If we silently delete the IKE_SA the other peer might still use it even
if only to send DPDs. If we don't answer to DPDs that might result in the
deletion of the new IKE_SA too.
This is the minimum size an IPv6 implementation must support. This makes
it the default for IPv4 too, which presumably is also generally routable
(otherwise, setting this to 0 falls back to the minimum of 576 for IPv4).
The maximum would not get set correctly when a logger is removed and the
first remaining logger in the list (the one with the highest log level) does
e.g. only implement vlog() while there are other loggers that implement log().
This would result in only max_vlevel getting set correctly while max_level
would incorrectly get set to -1 so that log() would not get called for any
of the loggers anymore.
References #574.
The kernel will apply the mask to the mark on the packet and then
compare it to the configured mark. So to match only unmarked packets we
have to be able to set 0/0xffffffff.
If the number of flows over a gateway exceeds the flow cache size of the Linux
kernel, policy lookup gets very expensive. Policies covering more than a single
address don't get hash-indexed by default, which results in wasting most of
the cycles in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype() and its xfrm_policy_match() use.
Starting with several hundred policies the overhead gets inacceptable.
Starting with Linux 3.18, Linux can hash the first n-bit of a policy subnet
to perform indexed lookup. With correctly chosen netbits, this can completely
eliminate the performance impact of policy lookups, freeing the resources
for ESP crypto.
WARNING: Due to a bug in kernels 3.19 through 4.7, the kernel crashes with a
NULL pointer dereference if a socket policy is installed while hash thresholds
are changed. And because the hashtable rebuild triggered by the threshold
change that causes this is scheduled it might also happen if the socket
policies are seemingly installed after setting the thresholds.
The fix for this bug - 6916fb3b10b3 ("xfrm: Ignore socket policies when
rebuilding hash tables") - is included since 4.8 (and might get backported).
As a workaround `charon.plugins.kernel-netlink.port_bypass` may be enabled
to replace the socket policies that allow IKE traffic with port specific
bypass policies.
This makes the FWD policies in the out direction optional (disabled by
default). They may be enabled (e.g. if conflicting drop policies are
used) via the policies_fwd_out swanctl.conf option.
They are only required if drop policies would otherwise prevent
forwarding traffic. This reduces the number of policies and avoids
conflicts e.g. with SPD hash thresholds.
In case an external thread calls into our code and logs messages, a thread
object is allocated that will never be released. Even if we try to clean
up the object via thread value destructor there is no guarantee that the
thread actually terminates before we check for leaks, which seems to be the
case for the Ada Tasking threads.
Tobias Brunner