Setting the salt to NULL now fails, so we set it to hash length's zeroes,
which is the default value for HKDF-Extract if no salt is passed.
Fixesstrongswan/strongswan#2828
The `crypt` functions defined here conflict with the `crypt` function
defined in `unistd.h` and trigger compilation errors when building
against the latest version of AWS-LC, which introduced a new transitive
include of `unistd.h` via `bio.h`.
This simply renames the function to avoid the error.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2786
If this is used, the functionality to set a private key/value/seed for
key exchange methods is removed (including from the interface to avoid
accidentally forgetting to wrap implementations and uses of set_seed()).
The set_seed() method is assigned outside the INIT() macro to avoid
potentially undefined behavior (preprocessing directives in macro
arguments).
The test done by the crypto tester is a simple functionality test.
Also enables the `kdf` plugin automatically if building against an older
version of OpenSSL.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2602
Co-authored-by: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]>
This registers support for the ML_KEM_{512,768,1024} key exchange
algorithms in the `openssl` plugin when built using AWS-LC as the
libcrypto. To do this, we introduce the `openssl_kem` source files
which implement the key exchange algorithm using the Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) API. Future KEM algorithms can be implemented
generically using this interface by substituting the appropriate NIDs.
It also supports both seeded (via DRBG) and unseeded modes depending
on the user's requirements for KATs or entropy sources.
It should be noted that this does not add support for KEM algorithms
within upstream OpenSSL and is API incompatible. Future work will need
to condition out the incompatibilities as-appropriate. However, the
high-level logic should be the same for all KEMs and KEM APIs.
References strongswan/strongswan#2228Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2490
Both Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) based
key exchange methods use a common ke_test_vector format. The
set_seed() function is used to provide deterministic private key
material for the crypto tests.
OpenSSL stores the serial number for an X509 certificate as an
`ASN1_INTEGER` type. Within BoringSSL (and AWS-LC), the library
represents the value of zero as an empty array [1] which is different
from OpenSSL which represents it as the 1-byte array [0x00]. Though the
value of zero for the certificate serial number is illegal under
X.509 [2], we need to handle/encode it consistently within strongSwan.
From 18082ce2b0 ("certificates: Retrieve serial numbers in canonical
form"), we infer that the canonical representation of the zero serial
is [0x00]. To do this, we introduce `openssl_asn1_int2chunk` to
complement the existing string version that allows us to handle the
special case for zero instead of always returning a reference to the
library-dependent encodings.
References strongswan/strongswan#1907Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2138
[1] https://github.com/google/boringssl/commit/bdc35b63617f78037768f4897d8835696f02181a
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.2
AWS-LC lacks support for a number of elliptic curve algorithms so this
adds some conditional macros to avoid registering the related plugin
features. Support for curves ed448 and x448 is completely absent and are
not planned for implementation as they are no longer recommended for use.
While ed25519 is supported by the library, a single missing API for
ASN.1 DER encoding of its private keys is missing which prevents its
use in strongSwan. Future work may remove this limitation, but for now
we will disable the functionality.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2109
AWS-LC is a BoringSSL-based libcrypto implementation. SHA_CTX is declared with
the hash data specified as an array rather than as a field in upstream OpenSSL.
Since AWS-LC builds against C99, we are unable to handle this with anonymous
unions like BoringSSL. The workaround I propose is to add these conditional
macros around the accessors within openssl_sha1_prf. After this change,
everything builds successfully with AWS-LC headers.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2103
This was the order before 46a6b06282 ("openssl: Only announce ECDH
groups actually supported by OpenSSL") but that's not really the reason
for this change. It's related to the Android app, where we previously
didn't support these DH groups in BoringSSL and added the curve25519
plugin after the openssl plugin instead. This resulted in the same
order, i.e. ECDH groups before curve25519. With the switch to OpenSSL
and the mentioned commit, this changed and curve25519 was now the first
group that was proposed and used for the KE payload. Not really an
issue you'd think, however, there are apparently Zyxel Firewalls with
older firmware versions (some forum posts mentioned a fix in V5.31) that
can't handle KE payloads with DH groups > 21 (ecp521). So with
curve25519 (31) proposed in the KE payload, they silently dropped the
IKE_SA_INIT request and no connection could be established.
The x509 plugin retrieves serial numbers with two's complement
encoding whereas the openssl plugin partially returns them without
leading zeroes.
Serial numbers in X.509 certificates, X.509 CRL, X.509 attribute
certificates, OCSP Requests and OCSP responses are now returned in
canonical form without prepended zero octets.
The pattern currently is to call get_cache(), generate the encoding
if that failed and then store it with cache(). The latter adopts the
passed encoding and frees any stored encoding. However, the latter means
that if two threads concurrently fail to get a cached encoding and then
both generate and store one, one of the threads might use an encoding
that was freed by the other thread.
Since encodings are not expected to change, we can avoid this issue by
not replacing an existing cache entry and instead return that (while
freeing the passed value instead of the cached one).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1231
This avoids the use of a variable length array, which should probably
be avoided in general due to potential performance, portability and
security issues (not in this particular case, though).
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1095
More of this code was already removed with previous commits.
While versions < 1.1.1 are not officially supported anymore, 1.0.2 might
still be in use because before 3.x that was the latest version with
official FIPS support (OpenSSL apparently also provides extended commercial
support for it).
The old API has been deprecated with OpenSSL 3 and direct access to the
state isn't possible via EVP API. In the future we might just remove this
implementation but we'd probably have to implement EAP-AKA' first, which
uses HMAC-SHA-256 with IKEv2's prf+ construct to derive keys instead
of this weird construct (plus what fips-prf builds around it) that's used
by EAP-AKA.
The HKDF-Expand() function defined in RFC 5869 is basically the same as
IKEv2's prf+(), so we can use the former to implement the latter.
However, we can only support HMAC-based PRFs this way, which should be
fine as others are rarely used.
Tobias Brunner