If it was necessary to pass the local certificates we could probably
clone the config (but we don't do that either when later looking for the
key to actually authenticate).
Passing auth adds the same subject cert to the config over and over
again (I guess we could also try to prevent that by searching for
duplicates).
The structs that make up a message sent to the kernel have all to be
aligned with XT_ALIGN. That was not necessarily the case when
initializing the complete message as struct.
Fixes#1212.
If there is no path to the other peer there is no point in trying to
send a NAT keepalive.
If the condition changes back and forth within the keepalive interval there
is a chance that multiple jobs get queued.
/usr/local/sbin is not included in PATH set by the charon init script and
since the ipsec script is obsolete when using swanctl it makes sense to
change this anyway.
This could be helpful when debugging deadlocks that manifest around
wait_for_entry(), as it helps identifying other involved threads (the
thread object is seen in the thread_main() call in each thread's backtrace).
An example are the fallback drop policies installed when updating SAs.
We ignore such policies in add_policy() so there is no point in attempting
to remove them. Since they use different priorities than regular policies
this did not result in policies getting deleted unintentionally but there
was an irritating log message on level 2 that indicated otherwise.
If DPD timeout is set but to a value smaller than the DPD delay the code
in task_manager_v1.c:queue_liveliness_check will run into an integer
underrun.
With IKEv1 we have to reuse IKE_SAs as otherwise the responder might
detect the new SA as reauthentication and will "adopt" the CHILD_SAs of
the original IKE_SA, while the initiator will not do so. This could
cause CHILD_SA rekeying to fail later.
Fixes#1236.
Otherwise, libcharon's dependency on kernel-ipsec can't be satisfied.
This changed with db61c37690 ("kernel-interface: Return bool for
kernel interface registration") as the registration of further
kernel-ipsec implementations now fails and therefore even if other
plugins are loaded the dependency will not be satisfied anymore.
References #953.
When handling a rekey collision we might have to delete an already
installed redundant CHILD_SA (or expect the other peer to do so).
We don't want to trigger updown events for these as neither do we do
so for successfully rekeyed CHILD_SAs.
Fixes#853.
To handle Phase 2 exchanges on the other HA host we need to sync the last
block of the last Phase 1 message (or the last expected IV). If the
gateway is the initiator of a Main Mode SA the last message is an
inbound message. When handling such messages the expected IV is not
updated until it is successfully decrypted so we can't sync the IV
when processing the still encrypted (!plain) message. However, as responder,
i.e. if the last message is an outbound message, the reverse applies, that
is, we get the next IV after successfully encrypting the message, not
while handling the plain message.
Fixes#1267.
It is required for IKEv1 to determine the DH group of the CHILD SAs
during rekeying. It also fixes the status output for HA SAs, which so
far haven't shown the DH group on the passive side.
Fixes#1267.
If the retransmit of an initial message is processed concurrently with the
original message it might not have been handled as intended as the
thread processing the retransmit might not have seen the correct value
of entry->processing set by the thread handling the original request.
For IKEv1, i.e. without proper message IDs, there might still be races e.g.
when receiving a retransmit of the initial IKE message while processing the
initiator's second request.
Fixes#1269.
Make sure commands registered in pki and swanctl don't exceed the
maximum number of lines available for their usage summary.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#22.
Since the move to Google Compute Engine (GCE) IPv6 has been disabled
on the build hosts, causing several tests to fail. Lets try to get at
least local IPv6 connectivity up again.
If we mistakenly detect a new IKE_SA as a reauthentication the client
won't request the previous virtual IP, but since we already migrated
it we already triggered the assign_vips() hook, so we should reassign
the migrated virtual IP.
Fixes#1152.
Since the textual representation for a CRL is now standardized
in RFC 7468 one could argue that we should accept that too, even
though RFC 5280 explicitly demands CRLs fetched via HTTP/FTP to
be in DER format. But in particular for file URIs enforcing that
seems inconvenient.
Fixes#1203.
This replaces the EAP-Identity with the EAP-MSCHAPv2 username, which
ensures the client is known with an authenticated identity. Previously
a client with a valid username could use a different identity (e.g. the
name of a different user) in the EAP-Identity exchange. Since we use
the EAP-Identity for uniqueness checks etc. this could be problematic.
The EAP-MSCHAPv2 username is now explicitly logged if it is different
from the EAP-Identity (or IKE identity).
Fixes#1182.
This is particularly important for single valued rules (e.g.
identities). When copying values this is already handled correctly
by the enumerator and add().
In Java all integer types are signed, when a negative integer is casted
to a larger type (e.g. int to long) then due to sign extension the upper
bytes are not 0. So writing that value to a byte array does not produce
the expected result. By overloading the putX() methods we make sure to
upcast the values correctly.
Since we don't use the kernel-netlink plugin anymore and the headers
in the NDK are reasonably recent, we don't need this anymore (at least
when building the app).
Fixes#1172.
We already did so during Phase 1 but because all three Quick Mode
message have the same message ID we occasionally dropped the third
message as retransmit, so we do it there too. For INFORMATIONAL
and TRANSACTION exchanges we don't expect more than one inbound message
with the same message ID so we still use them there.
Fixes#1198.
This ensures we don't pass data (via msg_control) defined in a different
scope to sendmsg(). Actually, some compilers (e.g. GCC 5.2.1) might
optimize the memcpy() call away causing the packets not to get sent from
the intended source address.
It also makes the code clearer than with all these ifdefs.
Fixes#1171.
In some scenarios an IKE_SA might get restarted multiple times (e.g.
due to retransmits and delayed INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies) so that
two IKE_SA_INIT messages might be sent that only differ in the
previously randomly generated NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload.
This could cause an authentication failure on the responder if the two
peers don't use the same IKE_SA_INIT message in their InitiatorSignedOctets.
While the payload is generated in a reproducible way it will still change
when the daemon is restarted, which should make detecting the payloads
as fake a bit harder (compared to e.g. just using 0.0.0.0:0 as address).
Fixes#1131.
Tobias Brunner