Let's try this again :) Since cache entries with the same key are not
updated/replaced and there is no option to do so, we manually delete the
previous entry for the current branch.
This reduces the cache storage for active branches, which can cause
caches of the master branch to get evicted, which in turn will slow down
builds of not only master but also new branches as they can't fall back
on those caches.
Permission has to be explicitly granted in order to delete the cache
entries when not using the legacy all-write tokens that are the default
for old repositories.
The continue-on-error option is set for the step that deletes the old
cache entry as it's expected that cache-hit will be true for a new feature
branch when restoring the cache from the master branch. However, because
there won't be anything to delete for this branch yet, the command will
fail. The --succeed-on-no-caches option of the command unfortunately
only works with --all.
For the Linux tests, several jobs use the same cache key. So there is
a chance that two jobs try to store a new entry concurrently, which will
fail (it works if there was a cache hit and they are slightly off as
previous entries are first deleted). To avoid that, we store the cache
only for one particular config.
Also made sure that the "openssl" test does not remove "openssl-3/4"
caches by adding a suffix to the former.
For alpine, the repository had to be set explicitly as gh wasn't able to
determine it (didn't detect the Git working dir).
While continue-on-error can be configured more specifically (e.g. also
would allow to handle "default" and "printf-builtin" tests that rely
on debug symbols), it also lets the workflow succeed if any of these
jobs fail. That's not ideal if there is an actual error and not
just an intermittent package sync problem.
The leak detective doesn't wrap this function and calling the original
causes unknown memory frees and even segmentation faults. This is now
triggered with OpenSSL 4 as the implementation of ECP256 uses
OPENSSL_aligned_alloc_array().
Setting a custom memory functions forces OpenSSL to implement aligned
allocations internally, using the registered allocation function.
Using the return value of i2d_* directly as input of chunk_alloc imposes
the risk of creating an invalid chunk when the return value of the i2d_*
function is -1. The openssl_i2chunk macro is meant to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <[email protected]>
This fixes a potential crash due to a null-pointer dereference if rsadp()
returns NULL (e.g. with an all-zero ciphertext).
And it also implements the PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption padding check in
constant time.
The timing leak caused by the previous implementation was measured at
~17.5 μs at 3 GHz, which could allow a Bleichenbacher-like attack in
LAN environments. However, because of how RSA encryption is used in
strongSwan, this is not that much of an issue in practice. The mechanism
is only used for two use cases. One is SCEP/EST via PKCS#7 enveloped
data. Fortunately, this can not be triggered in significant numbers by
an attacker. The other use case is TLS as used by EAP methods (EAP-TLS,
EAP-PEAP/TTLS) during the authentication. While the cipher suites that
use RSA encryption are still enabled by default, the TLS messages are
wrapped in EAP and encrypted by IKE, making any kind of attack difficult.
Note that the gmp plugin isn't enabled anymore by default. And even
before that, most setups had the openssl plugin enabled, which has
priority over the gmp plugin. So it's unlikely the plugin was used in
practice.
Fixes: d615ffdcf3 ("implement gmp_rsa_private_key.decrypt()")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35334
As the previous issue, this can be triggered via IKEv1 CERT payloads.
Fixes: d7aa09104f ("Implement PKCS#7 enveloped-data parsing and decryption")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35329
Can be triggered via empty PKCS#7 encrypted content in IKEv1 CERT payload.
Fixes: 4076e3ee91 ("Extract PKCS#5 handling from pkcs8 plugin to separate helper class")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35329
If the extension doesn't contain a multiple of two bytes, the previous
code would get stuck in an infinite loop as `remaining()` continued to
return TRUE while `read_uint16()` failed to parse a value. Initiating
several connections with such an extension allows a DoS attack as no
threads would eventually be available to handle packets/events.
Fixes: 7fbe2e27ec ("tls-server: TLS 1.3 support for TLS server implementation")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35328
There is an issue similar to the one fixed with the previous commit when
using directoryName (DN) name constraints. Some RDNs have to be matched
in a case-insensitive manner, which we e.g. do in
`identification.c::rdn_equals`. By not doing it for name constraints,
a malicious intermediate CA could evade an excluded name constraint
just by modifying the case in such an RDN.
While we could use the mentioned function in `dn_matches`, this doesn't
properly fix the problem because the function is basically too strict.
Especially in regards to RDNs of type UTF8String, which are only compared
binary. To match these properly, we'd have to implement the string
preparation described in RFC 5280, section 7.1 and the referenced RFCs.
Until that's the case, we reject excluded name constraints of type
directoryName as we are unable to enforce them.
Fixes: a2b340764f ("Implemented NameConstraint matching in constraints plugin")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35331
The case is generally ignored when matching such identities. So this is
an issue with excluded name constraints where a malicious intermediate
CA could evade the constraints by issuing certificates with names that
just modify the case (e.g. strongSwan.org instead strongswan.org).
Note that it's likely that permitted name constraints are preferred over
excluded name constraints as it might be difficult to come up with a
conclusive list of names to exclude.
Fixes: a2b340764f ("Implemented NameConstraint matching in constraints plugin")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35331
This prevents a crash due to a null-pointer dereference when processing
an empty ECDH public key.
The previous length check only applied in the `!ec` case, so in the `ec`
case, the access to `pub.ptr[0]` was unguarded. If a crafted TLS
record ends with an empty ClientKeyExchange, then `read_data8` sets
`pub` to `chunk_empty`, causing a null-pointer dereference.
Note that if some data follows the empty ClientKeyExchange, this just
causes a 1-byte out-of-bounds read that has no further effect as the
TLS session is aborted immediately. Either because the read value
doesn't equal TLS_ANSI_UNCOMPRESSED or because the empty public key
is rejected by `set_public_key()`.
The referenced commit that introduced the pointer access, added the
check for `pub.len` specifically to the `!ec` case, while the pointer
access was initially unconditional (probably because the code was just
copied from `tls_peer.c` which processes ECDH public keys in a separate
function, so there was no `ec` flag). The latter was fixed a couple of
days later with 7b3c01845f ("Read the compression type byte for EC
groups, only"). However, that commit didn't change the length check.
Anyway, it's possible that the original intention was to add the check
to the `ec` case on the previous line, or that there was some confusion
with the parenthesis and something like the current code was intended to
begin with.
Fixes: e6cce7ff0d ("Prepend point format to ECDH public key")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35332
attribute_enumerate() accepts RADIUS attributes whose length byte is
smaller than sizeof(rattr_t) (2). For length == 0, the iterator never
advances and traps callers — including verify() — in a non-advancing
loop. For length == 1, misaligned packed-struct reads occur.
Add a separate check for this->next->length < sizeof(rattr_t) after
the existing truncation guard. This mirrors radius_message_parse(),
which already distinguishes invalid length from truncation.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>
Fixes: 4a6b84a934 ("reintegrated eap-radius branch into trunk")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35333
parse_attributes() accepts hdr->length == 0 in the AT_ENCR_DATA,
AT_RAND, AT_PADDING, default branches. The code then subtracts the
fixed attribute header size from the encoded length, which underflows
and exposes a wrapped payload length to later code. In particular,
for the cases where add_attribute() is called, this causes a heap-based
buffer overflow (a buffer of 12 bytes is allocated to which the wrapped
length is written). For AT_PADDING, the underflow is irrelevant as
add_attribute() is not called. Instead, this results in an infinite loop.
Reject zero-length attributes before subtracting the attribute header.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>
Fixes: f8330d0395 ("Added a libsimaka library with shared message handling code for EAP-SIM/AKA")
Fixes: CVE-2026-35330
These are quite a bit faster than on AppVeyor (with ccache about a fifth,
without less than half - and they run concurrently).
We only keep the AppVeyor builds for now to test against those old
OpenSSL versions (1.1.1 and 1.0.2) for which there is still extended
support available. Even simplified like that they still take longer
than the builds on GA.
This reduces the cache storage for active branches and since caches for
different branches are separate and we abort previous builds of the same
branch, this is not necessary to ensure caches can successfully be stored.
We are still too close to the limit of 1 hour (at least with the 2019
image and the 2022 image is about the same), so reduce the build time by
not building libimcv natively, which saves about 10 minutes.
Also, only build against OpenSSL 1.0.2 (on the 2017 image) and 1.1.1 (on
the 2019 image) as these are the only versions for which OpenSSL provides
extended support.
wolfSSL 5.9.1 starts to enforce a minimum (and maximum) length for the
hash when signing. Since we'll always require SHA-1, use 20 bytes as
input in the tests to succeed with SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_NULL.
Tobias Brunner