With Android 8.1 this isn't triggered after a reboot until the device
has been unlocked once (solving the issue with the key store) and traffic
may optionally be blocked by the user until the VPN is established.
There are still some issues (e.g. password prompts and fatal errors), and we
might need some workaround for older Android releases.
Only if there is no currently active (or previously active) profile does
this currently operate on the configured (or stored most recently used)
profile. This way it's possible to use a different connection and
quickly disable and re-enable it again. When unlocked the profile name
is shown, when locked a generic text is used (this detection doesn't seem
to work 100% reliably). To disconnect, the user is forced to unlock the
device, connecting is possible without, if the credentials are available
and no fatal error occurs (it even works with the system credential store,
at least on Android 8.1).
Note that the tile is not available right after a reboot. It seems that
the system has to be unlocked once to activate third-party tiles (will
be interesting to see how this works together with Always-on VPN).
Unfortunately, setLockscreenVisibility() doesn't seem to have any
effect. So the full notification is shown unless the user manually
configures the notification settings.
This allows us to add tiles to Quick Settings and enabling the Always-on
VPN feature in the VPN settings (both require API level 24, but 26 will
be required as targetSdkVersion later this year).
Unless there are profiles created with old versions of the app (< 1.8.0)
that were never updated since, all profiles should already have a UUID
assigned. If not, we do that now with a DB migration.
This is either because a third-party VPN app has the always-on feature
enabled, or because the user denied the permission in the system's confirmation
dialog.
If the always-on feature is enabled for a connection of the built-in VPN
client we get an IllegalStateException, for which we show an updated and
clearer error message.
The type of the value was incorrect (void**) if NULL was passed to cas_ptr()
as expected value, which caused a compiler warning with Clang because
__atomic_compare_exchange_n() expects the types of the first two arguments
to be the same.
armeabi has been superseded by armeabi-v7a and the MIPS ABIs were removed
with the latest NDK (r17), after being marked deprecated for a while.
By not specifying APP_ABI we build for all non-deprecated ABIs.
This allows switching the originally selected IKE config (based on the
IPs and IKE version) to a different one if no matching proposal is found.
This way we don't rely that much on the order of configs anymore and it's
possible to configure separate configs for clients that require weak
algorithms.
Instead of logging the search parameters for IKE configs (which were already
before starting the lookup) we log the configured settings.
The peer config lookup is also changed slightly by doing the IKE config
match first and skipping some checks if that or the local peer identity
doesn't match.
Although being already logged on level 2, these messages are usually just
confusing if they pop up randomly in the log when e.g. querying the configs
or installing traps. So after this the log messages will only be logged when
actually proposing or selecting traffic selectors during IKE.
This way we don't rely on the order of equally matching configs as
heavily anymore (which is actually tricky in vici) and this also doesn't
require repeating weak algorithms in all configs that might potentially be
selected if there are some clients that require them.
There is currently no ordering, so an explicitly configured exactly matching
proposal isn't a better match than e.g. the default proposal that also
contains the proposed algorithms.
In some scenarios we might find multiple usable peer configs with different
IKE proposals. This is a problem if we use a config with non-matching
proposals that later causes IKE rekeying to fail. It might even be a problem
already when creating the CHILD_SA if the proposals of IKE and CHILD_SA
are consistent.
This adds the ability to reference existing sections to the settings parser.
Mainly for swanctl.conf, where this could simplify complex configs a lot
as redundant information has only to be specified once and may then be
included in other sections (there is an example in the man page and
there are some in the unit tests).
Also added is a new setting in filelog sections to specify the path of
the log file (in case it contains characters that are not allowed in section
names). We should encourage people to configure their log files that way
which might allow use to prohibit dots in section names in the future.
There was a potential chance for a race condition if the ensured section
was purged for some reason before using it later.
This also changes the behavior for NULL/empty strings via load_string*
with merge == FALSE, which now purges the config/section.
Similar to the `also` keyword in ipsec.conf, the new syntax allows adding
one or more references to other sections, which means all the settings and
subsections defined there are inherited (values may be overridden, even
with an empty value to clear it).
It's important to note that all subsections are inherited, so if this is
used to reference a connection in swanctl.conf all auth rounds and
children are inherited. There is currently no syntax to limit the
inclusion level or clear inherited sections (but as mentioned, settings
in those inherited sections may be overridden).
Another property is that inherited settings or sections always follow
explicitly defined entries in the current section when they are enumerated.
This is relevant if the order is important (e.g. for auth rounds if `round`
is not specified).
References are evaluated dynamically at runtime, so referring to
sections later in the config file or included via other files is no
problem.
The colon used as separator to reference other sections may be used in
section names by writing :: (e.g. for Windows log file paths).
This is based on a patch originally written in 2016.
This way we get early log messages during plugin loading (including
integrity check results).
Instead of the fallback we could also remove the `customlog` namespace,
which was added to avoid conflicts with other settings/sections.
This was quite confusing previously: While calling insert_before()
and then remove_at() properly replaced the current item, calling them the
other way around inserted the new item before the previous item because
remove_at() changed the enumerator's position to the previous item.
The behavior in corner cases (calling the methods before or after
enumeration) is also changed slightly.
This allows switching to probing mode if the client is on a public IP
and this is the active task and connectivity gets restored. We only add
NAT-D payloads if we are currently behind a NAT (to detect changed NAT
mappings), a MOBIKE update that might follow will add them in case we
move behind a NAT.
This is quite helpful to debug why a pattern didn't match.
As it could produce quite a lot of output if something is not found in a
log file, the complete output is only printed in verbose mode, otherwise,
`head` is used to print the first 10 lines of output.
We only get stdout from SSH, so the stderr redirection is only really
for errors ssh itself produces.
In case the PRF's set_key() or allocate_bytes() method failed, skeyseed
was not initialized and the chunk_clear() call later caused a crash.
This could have happened with OpenSSL in FIPS mode when MD5 was
negotiated (and test vectors were not checked, in which case the PRF
couldn't be instantiated as the test vectors would have failed).
MD5 is not included in the default proposal anymore since 5.6.1, so
with recent versions this could only happen with configs that are not
valid in FIPS mode anyway.
Fixes: CVE-2018-10811
We continue to parse them but remove the documentation because mixing the two
sets of keywords in the same config might result in unexpected behavior.
References #2663.
Adds new options to force the local destruction of an IKE_SA (after
trying to send a DELETE first). This might be useful in situations where
it's known the other end is not reachable or already deleted the IKE_SA so
there is no point in retransmitting the DELETE and waiting for a response.
We now check if there are other routes tracked for the same destination
and replace the installed route instead of just removing it. Same during
installation, where we previously didn't replace existing routes due to
NLM_F_EXCL. Routes with virtual IPs as source address are preferred over
routes without.
This should allow using trap policies with virtual IPs on Linux.
Fixes#85, #2162.
This fixes several issues that came up via BSI's Certification Path
Validation Test Tool (CPT):
1) In compliance with RFC 4945, section 5.1.3.2, we now enforce that a
certificate used for IKE authentication either does not contain a keyUsage
extension (like the ones produced by pki --issue) or that they include
digitalSignature or nonRepudiation.
2) CRLs that are not yet valid are now rejected as that could be a
problem in scenarios where expired certificates are removed from CRLs and
the clock on the host doing the revocation check is trailing behind that
of the host issuing CRLs.
3) Results other than revocation (e.g. a skipped check because the CRL
couldn't be fetched) are now stored also for intermediate CA certificates
and not only for end-entity certificates, so a strict CRL policy can be
enforced in such cases.
If the certificate is revoked, we immediately returned and the chain was
invalid, however, if we couldn't fetch the CRL that result was not stored
for intermediate CAs and we weren't able to enforce a strict CRL policy
later.
Using such CRLs can be a problem if the clock on the host doing the
revocation check is trailing behind that of the host issuing CRLs in
scenarios where expired certificates are removed from CRLs. As revoked
certificates that expired will then not be part of new CRLs a host with
trailing clock might still accept such a certificate if it is still
valid according to its system clock but is not contained anymore in the
not yet valid CRL.
According to RFC 4945, section 5.1.3.2, a certificate for IKE must
either not contain the keyUsage extension, or, if it does, have at least
one of the digitalSignature or nonReputiation bits set.
Fixes some issues in the dhcp plugin like avoiding ICMP port unreachables
when setting a specific server address, or increasing the maximum size for
options e.g. for DNs in the client identifier option. The latter is also
only sent now if identity_lease is enabled (for most DHCP servers it
serves the same function as a unique MAC address does).
The client identifier serves as unique identifier just like a unique MAC
address would, so even with identity_leases disabled some DHCP servers
might assign unique leases per identity.
This increases the chances that subject DNs that might have been cut
off with the arbitrary previous limit of 64 bytes might now be sent
successfully.
The REQUEST message has the most static overhead in terms of other
options (17 bytes) as compared to DISCOVER (5) and RELEASE (7).
Added to that are 3 bytes for the DHCP message type, which means we have
288 bytes left for the two options based on the client identity (host
name and client identification). Since both contain the same value, a
FQDN identity, which causes a host name option to get added, may be
142 bytes long, other identities like subject DNs may be 255 bytes
long (the maximum for a DHCP option).
According to RFC 2131, the minimum size of the 'options' field is 312
bytes, including the 4 byte magic cookie. There also does not seem to
be any restriction regarding the message length, previously the length
was rounded to a multiple of 64 bytes. The latter might have been
because in BOOTP the options field (or rather vendor-specific area as it
was called back then) had a fixed length of 64 bytes (so max(optlen+4, 64)
might actually have been what was intended), but for DHCP the field is
explicitly variable length, so I don't think it's necessary to pad it.
Since we won't read from the socket reducing the receive buffer saves
some memory and it should also minimize the impact on other processes that
bind the same port (Linux distributes packets to the sockets round-robin).
DHCP servers will respond to port 67 if giaddr is non-zero, which we set
if we are not broadcasting. While such messages are received fine via
RAW socket the kernel will respond with an ICMP port unreachable if no
socket is bound to that port. Instead of opening a dummy socket on port
67 just to avoid the ICMPs we can also just operate with a single
socket, bind it to port 67 and send our requests from that port.
Since SO_REUSEADDR behaves on Linux like SO_REUSEPORT does on other
systems we can bind that port even if a DHCP server is running on the
same host as the daemon (this might have to be adapted to make this work
on other systems, but due to the raw socket the plugin is not that portable
anyway).
The previous code compared the port in the packet to the client port and, if
successful, checked it also against the server port, which, therefore, never
matched, but due to incorrect offsets did skip the BPF_JA. If the client port
didn't match the code also skipped to the instruction after the BPF_JA.
However, the latter was incorrect also and processing would have continued at
the next instruction anyway. Basically, DHCP packets to any port were accepted.
What's not fixed with this is that the kernel returns an ICMP Port
unreachable for packets sent to the server port (67) because we don't
have a socket bound to it.
Fixes: f0212e8837 ("Accept DHCP replies on bootps port, as we act as a relay agent if server address configured")
Tobias Brunner