For some rwlock_t implementations acquiring the read lock could be quite
expensive even if there are no writers (e.g. because the implementation
requires acquiring a mutex to check for writers) particularly if the
lock is highly contended, like it is for the vlog() method.
Due to an unprotected incrementation, two load-tester initiators occasionally
use the same SPI under high load, and hence generate 2 IPsec SAs with the same
identifier. The responder IPsec stack will refuse to configure the second SA.
Use an atomic incrementation to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <[email protected]>
Due to an unprotected incrementation, two load-tester initiators occasionally
use the same identifier under high load. The responder typically drops one of
the connections.
Use an atomic incrementation to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <[email protected]>
This patch is based on one by Christoph Gouault.
Currently, to count the total number of half_open IKE_SAs,
get_half_open_count sums up the count of each segment in the SA hash
table (acquiring a lock for each segment). This procedure does not scale
well when the number of segments increases, as the method is called for
each new negotiation.
Instead, lets maintain a global atomic counter.
This optimization allows the use of big values for charon.ikesa_table_size
and charon.ikesa_table_segments.
If one peer starts reauthentication by deleting the IKE_SA, while the other
starts CHILD_SA rekeying, we run in a race condition. To avoid it, temporarily
reject the rekey attempt while we are in the IKE_SA deleting state.
RFC 4306/5996 is not exactly clear about this collision, but it should be safe
to reject CHILD_SA rekeying during this stage, as the reauth will re-trigger the
CHILD_SA. For non-rekeying CHILD_SA creations, it's up to the peer to retry
establishing the CHILD_SA on the reauthenticated IKE_SA.
The extensions and conditions apply to the rekeyed IKE_SA as well, so we should
migrate them. Especially when using algorithms from private space, we need
EXT_STRONGSWAN to properly select these algorithms during IKE rekeying.
Even in Main Mode, some Sonicwall boxes seem to send ID/HASH payloads in
unencrypted form, probably to allow PSK lookup based on the ID payloads. We
by default reject that, but accept it if the
charon.accept_unencrypted_mainmode_messages option is set in strongswan.conf.
Initial patch courtesy of Paul Stewart.
Before this change a reqid set on the create_child_t task was used as
indicator of the CHILD_SA being rekeyed. Only if that was not the case
would the local traffic selector be changed to 0.0.0.0/0|::/0 (as we
don't know which virtual IP the gateway will eventually assign).
On the other hand, in case of a rekeying the VIP is expected to remain
the same, so the local TS would simply equal the VIP.
Since c949a4d501 reauthenticated CHILD_SAs also have the reqid
set. Which meant that the local TS would contain the previously
assigned VIP, basically rendering the gateway unable to assign a
different VIP to the client as the resulting TS would not match
the client's proposal anymore.
Fixes#553.
Prevents a responder peer to trick us into established state by starting
IKE_SA rekeying before the IKE_SA has been authenticated during IKE_AUTH.
Fixes CVE-2014-2338.
The salt, or often called implicit nonce, varies between AEAD algorithms and
their use in protocols. For IKE and ESP, GCM uses 4 bytes, while CCM uses
3 bytes. With TLS, however, AEAD mode uses 4 bytes for both GCM and CCM.
Our GCM backends currently support 4 bytes and CCM 3 bytes only. This is fine
until we go for CCM mode support in TLS, which requires 4 byte nonces.
The DH transform is optional for ESP/AH proposals. The initiator can
include NONE (0) in its proposal to indicate that while it prefers to
do a DH exchange, the responder may still decide to not do so.
Fixes#532.
While it really would be desirable to allow stream destruction during on_read()
callbacks, this does not work anymore since e49b2998. Until we have a proper
solution for this issue, use asynchronous disconnects for the only user doing
so.
Fixes#518.
When doing a rekey for a CHILD_SA, the use counters get reset. An inactivity
job is queued for a time unrelated to the rekey time, so it might happen
that the inactivity job gets executed just after rekeying. If this happens,
inactivity is detected even if we had traffic on the rekeyed CHILD_SA just
before rekeying.
This change implies that inactivity checks can't handle inactivity timeouts
for rekeyed CHILD_SAs, and therefore requires that inactivity timeout is shorter
than the rekey time to have any effect.
Martin Willi